A study of the evolution of the phenomenological nature of cultural consciousness : Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger by Mascali, Barbara Froeschle & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order. 
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600 

Order Number 9502684 
A study of the evolution of the phenomenological nature of 
cultural consciousness: Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger 
Mascali, Barbara Froeschle, Ph.D. 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1994 
Copyright ©1994 by Mascali, Barbara Eroeschle. All rights reserved. 
U M I  
300 N. ZeebRd. 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 

A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
NATURE OF CULTURAL CONSCIOUSNESS: 
KANT, HEGEL, AND HEIDEGGER 
by 
Barbara F. Mascali 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
The Faculty of the Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Greensboro 
1994 
Approved by 
MASCALI, BARBARA FROESCHLE, Ph.D. A Study of the Evolution 
of the Phenomenological Nature of Cultural Consciousness: 
Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. (1994) Directed by R. Fritz 
Mengert. 247 pp. 
This study is an examination of the evolution of 
individual consciousness from German Idealism to 
Heideggerian Existentialism. It traces the individual ego 
back to Kant and Fichte, demonstrates how with Hegel it 
underwent a gathering process, and suggests that with 
Heidegger it returned to the realm of pre-Socratic unity. 
The investigation begins with an analysis of the 
groundwork laid by Kant and Fichte, whose conception of the 
powers of the Transcendental Ego paved the way to 
phenomenal thought. The system of consciousness established 
by German Idealism is thus characterized by the 
presupposition of an unmediated "I". With Hegel, the 
conception of consciousness underwent a radical change, 
demonstrated in his attempt to bring together the multitude 
of individual minds in his concept of the Absolute Spirit. 
This Hegelian concept, which culminated in Marx's 
notion of collective consciousness, drew strong criticisms 
from Kierkegaard and Heidegger, who rejected Hegelian 
objectivism and Cartesian dualism. While Kierkegaard 
attempted to unify the individual "I" via the power of 
faith, Heidegger tried to demonstrate that Being was 
grounded in a primordial unity of subject and object. 
However, the development of the individual "I" was 
thwarted by the phenomenology of Husserl, who, in Neo-
Hegelian fashion, insisted on the mind's objective stance. 
Again, it was brought back on course through Heidegger's 
proclamation that the mind does not exist apart from the 
body. He took the stance that epistemology needed to be 
examined from a phenomenological standpoint, a view which 
led him to the conclusion that epistemology actually 
constitutes ontology. 
The study concludes with an examination of the later 
Heidegger and his insistence on the authority of language. 
It suggests that the Heideggerian conception of the 
subjective individual mind is continued by Hannah Arendt, 
whose work on metaphor and embodiment provide important 
insights into contemporary thought. Although Arendt's 
conception of the mind demonstrates an obvious allegiance 
to Hegel, she follows in the footsteps of the early 
Heidegger in her insistence on the phenomenological method. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study arose from a need to understand 
consciousness in a manner different from the positivist 
stance. The so-called cognitive sciences seem to have come 
to a tacit agreement that consciousness is to be equated 
with awareness of perception. However, this assumption does 
not take into consideration the diverse activities of the 
mind that make this state possible, nor does it give credit 
to the realm in which the individual knows that it knows, 
in which it is not only aware of the object perceived, but 
of its awareness. 
This paper will suggest that in Western philosophy the 
evolution of the individuality of consciousness begins with 
a separation of the "New Mind" from German Idealism. This 
individual mind may be traced back to Heraclitus, as 
numerous philosophers have attempted to demonstrate, but it 
was without a doubt Immanuel Kant who initiated the idea 
that Cartesian dualism was not sufficient to account for 
the diversity of individual minds. 
In the course of this study it will come to light that 
in the evolution of the individual consciousness a variety 
of issues play vital roles, issues about the Self, about 
meaning, context, and relationship, as well as imagination 
and thinking. In discussing these issues, two directions 
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present themselves. It would have been possible and 
plausible to take the route of psychology, on which we 
encounter such thinkers as Freud and Jung. I have chosen 
the stream of philosophy, trying to show the process of 
evolution from Kant over Hegel to Heidegger. 
Especially in the work of Martin Heidegger, the 
notions of context and culture are given a central 
position. His claim that culture arises from 
contextualization provides the basis for his conception of 
consciousness. Similarly, his insistence that we examine 
the history of consciousness in order to find clues that 
help us understand our present-day beliefs, as well as the 
reasons for them, points to the importance of context. 
Therefore, contrary to popular belief, it seems that an 
examination of the so-called Canon is necessary if we wish 
to see ourselves in context. Only by re-tracing the process 
of evolution can we come to an understanding of the 
present. The attempt of this study, to put the Heideggerian 
conception of consciousness into context, should therefore 
be seen as a process paralleling his own search for 
relation and perspective. 
Hannah Arendt once commented on the necessity of the 
thinker taking a position outside of the "world of human 
affairs" in order to be able to examine it. (Arendt, 1978, 
p. 302). Similarly, in the course of my work, I have come 
to the conclusion that, while I cannot take a stance 
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outside of language to talk about language, it has been 
extremely beneficial for me to be able to talk in English 
about the language of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger (which 
happens to be my native language as well). It seems that in 
using a second language to describe the first, the 
necessary distance is gained to achieve a "spectator's" 
view of language. This, of course, would explain, why in 
the age of Kant and Hegel students of philosophy were 
encouraged to learn foreign languages. A point in case is 
Heidegger. While he was able to use German for the 
deconstruction of Greek, he did not have the fluency in a 
second language available to him when it came to the 
analysis of his native language. Therefrom stems his lament 
that we are locked into language, unable to take a step 
back in order to deconstruct it. 
Since this study deals with two languages 
simultaneously, an attempt has been made to facilitate the 
reading by attaching a glossary of common terms in both 
English and German. At times, especially in the discussion 
of Heidegger, it seemed impossible to find English 
equivalents which would convey precisely the same meaning. 
In those cases the German term is kept, accompanied by an 
explanation in English. 
As regards quotations, they are rendered in the 
language in which they were originally written. I have 
chosen to do my own translations, which, at times, may vary 
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from the English translations that have appeared in print. 
The reason for this decision stems from a belief in the 
decidedly subjective involvement of the reader. 
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CHAPTER I 
UPROOTING GERMAN IDEALISM 
Part 1: Kant - Transition and Foundation 
One notion looming large in Heideggerian methodology 
is the concept of deconstruction (Destruktion). Only 
through the deconstruction, the analysis and the 
interpretation of our philosophical inheritance which has 
shaped our commonly accepted world-view, can we come in any 
way close to having an understanding of this Weltanschauung 
which we have accepted unquestioningly. Deconstruction will 
lead us to a comprehension of our consciousness, to an 
acknowledgment of the unaware aspect of our being 
conscious. 
Heidegger is indebted to a number of philosophers as 
concerns this particular methodology. It was Immanuel Kant 
who first expressed dissatisfaction with existing 
philosophical systems. He realized that any intent to 
construct a newly conceived philosophical system must be 
invalidated as long as it was not preceded by a 
deconstruction of the existing one. Like Heidegger after 
him, Kant challenges our inclination to consider our 
conceptions of the world "natural" and "god-given", and 
insists that Vernunft (reason) is contingent upon an 
analysis of exactly these preconceived, inherited notions. 
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Nun scheint es zwar naturlich, dass, sobald man den 
Boden der Erfahrung verlassen hat, man doch nicht mit 
Erkenntnis, die man besitzt, ohne zu wissen woher, und 
auf den Kredit, der Grundsatze, deren Ursprung man 
nicht kennt, sofort ein Gebaude errichten werde, ohne 
der seiner Grundlegung durch sorgfaltige Untersuchung 
vorher versichert zu sein, dass man also die Frage 
vorlangst werde aufgeworfen haben, wie denn der 
Verstand zu alien diesen Erkenntnissen a priori kommen 
konne und welchen Umfang, Gultigkeit und Wert sie 
haben mogen. (Kant, 1988, p. 10, author's emphasis) 
Now it may seem natural that, once we have left the 
ground of experience, we should not at once begin to 
construct an edifice with knowledge which we possess 
but of whose origin we have no clue. Nor should we 
trust those principles the origins of which are 
unknown, without having assured ourselves of the 
safety of the foundation through careful examination. 
We should first of all have asked the question how it 
is possible that the mere intellect could arrive at 
all these insights a priori, and what extend, what 
truth, and what value they may possess. 
Kant's Critical Philosophy 
He continues by insisting that the method by which we must 
proceed is that of deconstruction: 
Ein grosser Teil, und vielleicht der grosste, von dem 
Geschaft unserer Vernunft besteht in Zergliederung der 
Begriffe, die wir schon von Gegenstaenden haben. 
(Kant, 1988, p. 11, author's emphasis) 
A large, perhaps the largest portion of our reason's 
activity consists in the analysis of the concepts 
which we already have of objects. 
Kant's attempt to destroy dogmatism is obvious. We 
must bear in mind that he did not see much more validity in 
the Cartesian method of doubt. Contrarily, he considered 
the idea of skepticism merely a cynical reaction against 
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dogmatism, which in itself did not achieve the 
understanding needed for an explanation of how we come to 
know what we do. 
Was nun die Beobachter einer szientifischen Methode 
betrifft, so haben sie hier die Wahl, entweder 
dogmatisch oder skeptisch, in alien Fallen aber doch 
die Verbindlichkeit, systematisch zu verfahren. 
Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen. (Kant, 1988, 
p. 485) 
As far as the observers of a scientific method are 
concerned, they have the choice of proceeding either 
dogmatically or skeptically - in any case they should 
proceed systematically. ... Alone the critical way is 
still open. 
The Active Self 
Since his goal is the discovery of those abilities 
which make possible our comprehension of things, 
deconstruction, or Critical Philosophy, as Kant calls it, 
must be the sole methodology by which we come to define not 
only the limitations within which we operate, but also an 
understanding of why we have accepted them in the first 
place. Hegel stipulated that these limitations have been 
imposed upon us by previous philosophical thought, and we 
have been expected to accept them uncritically. According 
to Kant, and to Heidegger after him, a deconstruction of 
traditional philosophy is called for. We must probe into 
the origins of the existing systems in order to discover 
that which has been unthought by philosophy: we must 
uncover and examine the human powers at work in the 
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production of great philosophical systems. Simultaneously, 
we must take a historical perspective and acknowledge the 
reasons that have created a need for such constructions. 
With this move, Kant asserts himself as the first 
philosopher to redefine what it means to be a rational 
human being. Rather than seeing the Self as passive, he 
acknowledges the Self's active mode with his suggestion 
that it is the mind that imposes its order on nature, and 
not vice versa, as has traditionally been assumed (Funke, 
1974, p. 55). Metaphysics since Plato has grounded itself 
in the unquestioned assumption of a reality independent of 
us. Kant, in what he terms his "Copernican Revolution", 
states that the world does not exist independently of our 
experience of it. A century later Martin Heidegger, in what 
he called his fundamental ontology, addressed the same 
issue when he insisted that Dasein exists solely in 
relation to entities in its environment, and that these 
entities take on meaning precisely because of Dasein's 
involvement with them. Copernicus made a distinction 
between our perception of things (the fact that our 
position on earth makes heavenly bodies seem to move) and 
our understanding (our realization to the contrary). Kant 
also distinguish between our common view of the world, 
which posits that we exist as an independent entity, and 
our concepts of understanding, which are formed by means of 
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the activity of our thought, concepts which cannot result 
solely from our experience. 
So iibertrieben, so widersinning es also auch lautet, 
zu sagen, der Verstand ist selbst der Quell der 
Gesetze der Natur und mithin der formalen Einheit der 
Natur, so richtig und dem Gegenstand, namlich der 
Erfahrung, angemessen ist gleichwohl eine solche 
Behauptung. ... alle empirischen Gesetze sind nur 
besondere Bestimmungen der reinen Gesetze des 
Verstandes, unter welchen und nach deren Norm jene 
allererst moglich sind und die Erscheinungen eine 
gesetzliche Form annehmen ... (Kant, 1988, p. 78) 
As exaggerated, as contradictory as it may sound to 
say that the intellect is itself the source of the 
laws of nature and of its formal unity, such a 
statement is nevertheless correct and in accordance 
with the object, i.e. with experience. ... all 
empirical laws are only particular determinations of 
the pure laws of the intellect, under which, and 
according to which the former become possible, and 
phenomena assume a regular form ... 
With this realization, Kant has completed the move that 
Descartes initiated. Not only does he agree with Descartes 
as to the importance of the first person in the attempt to 
analyze knowledge, but he acknowledges the all-encompassing 
nature of the individual. This acknowledgment leads Kant to 
the conclusion that the world is the world of our 
experience, and that we act upon the world to give it its 
basic form. 
The System 
In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant stipulates 
that knowledge of the world is possible because the self 
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determines the structure of every experience and thus makes 
knowledge of it possible. He distinguishes between two 
entities which influence our acknowledgment of knowledge, 
our consciousness. On the one hand there is a constant and 
stable entity given by the individual's mind itself which 
he calls the Forms (Formen) of the faculty of knowledge. 
... wird eine Erkenntnis schlechthin rein genannt, in 
die sich uberhaupt keine Erfahrung oder Empfindung 
einmischt, welche mithin vollig a priori mSglich ist. 
Nun ist Vernunft das Vermogen, welches die Prinzipien 
der Erkenntnis a priori an die Hand gibt. Daher ist 
reine Vernunft diejenige, welche die Prinzipien, etwas 
schlechthin a priori zu erkennen, enthalt. (Kant, 
1988, p. 14) 
... any kind of knowledge is called pure, if it is not 
invaded by any experience or sensation, if, in other 
words, it is possible entirely a priori. Reason is the 
faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge a 
priori. Therefore, pure reason is that faculty which 
contains the principles of knowing anything entirely a 
priori. 
On the other hand there is Matter (Materiel, which is 
produced by external influences. Since Kant's preoccupation 
is with the faculties of the mind, he naturally focuses our 
attention on his system of Forms which he divides into 
three groups. These groups he arranges in ascending order, 
culminating in "transcendental knowledge". 
Ich nenne alle Erkennntnis transzendental, die sich 
nicht sowohl mit Gegenstanden, sondern mit unseren 
Begriffen a priori von Gegenstanden uberhaupt 
beschaftigt. (Kant, 1988, p. 14) 
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I call all knowledge transcendental which occupies 
itself not so much with objects, as with our a priori 
concepts of objects in general. 
Transcendental knowledge, the highest knowledge possible, 
is hereby placed firmly in that realm of consciousness 
where concepts have already been developed and play a major 
role. This thought is reminiscent of Fichte's Reflexion 
where abstract thought reigns, and where the mind is free 
from external apperceptions. For Fichte as for Kant, the 
abstract concepts developed in intellectual intuition or in 
transcendental knowledge causes objects to exist as 
objects. 
Heidegger appropriated Kant's three stages in his 
search for the primordial grounding of consciousness, but 
he arranged them in reverse order since his goal is not the 
quest for pure reason, but rather the return to everyday 
coping which must underlie reason and awareness. In this 
sense, Heidegger applied a mode of Kant's own methodology, 
that of deconstruction, in order to deconstruct Kant's 
system. 
Since Kant has made his move away from the priority of 
experience, he clearly stresses the method of deduction. He 
now explains how we can come to have any concepts at all 
without relying on experience and on the faulty meaning we 
often attribute to experience. Deduction, for him, is the 
explanation of how concepts can a priori refer to objects, 
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and with this attempt alone he removes himself distinctly 
from the empiricist tradition. 
Level one - Sense perception 
Pure reason, as Kant defines it, is based upon a 
three-fold division of the faculties of the mind. The most 
basic forms of our faculties are those of apprehension, or 
of sense (Sinnlichkeifl, characterized by our ability to be 
affected by sensations. Sense perceptions as such are, for 
all intents and purposes, unknown. Therefore, apprehension 
constitutes the bottommost level of consciousness, 
presupposed by all the other levels, and simultaneously the 
germ of the process through which a thinking, experiencing, 
and reasoning mind can develop. 
All perceptual experiences include intuitional data. 
Intuitional data do not classify themselves into concepts, 
but they provide some basis for the development of concepts 
through a process of reflection upon them. Intuitional data 
are received and are experienced as received. Of certain 
interest to Heidegger was the fact that Kant considers 
space and time as forms of our perception, forms because 
every single experience pre-supposes them (Waxman, 1991, 
p. 20). Time and space are products of intuition and in no 
manner givens of the senses (Green, 1992, p. 36). Thus, the 
realm to which Kant assigns temporality and spatiality 
foreshadows Heidegger's concept of being-in-the world, a 
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mode of consciousness which is in part determined by time 
and space. Space, according to Kant, 
... ist eine notwendige Vorstellung a priori, die 
alien ausseren Anschauungen zugrunde liegt. Man kann 
sich niemals eine Vorstellung davon machen, dass kein 
Raum sei, obwohl man sich ganz wohl denken kann, dass 
keine Gegenstande darin angetroffen werden. Er wird 
also als die Bedingung der Moglichkeit der 
Erscheinungen und nicht als eine von ihnen abhangende 
Bestimmung angesehen, und ist eine Vorstellung a 
priori, die notwendigerweise ausseren Erscheinungen 
zugrunde liegt. (Kant, 1988, pp. 19/20) 
... is a necessary representation a priori, forming 
the foundation of all external intuition. One cannot 
imagine that there should be no space, although one 
might very well imagine that there should be space 
without objects to fill it. Space is therefore 
regarded as a condition of the possibility of 
phenomena, not as a determination dependent on them. 
Time is defined in analogous terms. It seems that 
Heidegger must have found Kant's retort to his empiricist 
critics especially interesting, because he will eventually 
pick up on the notion that in our common assumptions (which 
are reflected in and caused by our language) we tend to 
consider time as an object to be had, saved, or squandered. 
When faced with the challenge that the passage of time is 
empirically observable, Kant responds that 
Die Zeit ist allerdings etwas Wirkliches, namlich die 
wirkliche Form der inneren Anschauung. Sie hat also 
subjektive Realitat in Ansehung der inneren Erfahrung, 
d.i. ich habe wirklich die Vorstellung von der Zeit 
und meiner Bestimmungen in ihr. Sie ist also wirklich 
nicht als Objekt, sondern als die Vorstellung meiner 
selbst als Objekt anzusehen. (Kant, 1988, p. 27, 
author's emphasis) 
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Time certainly is something real, namely the real form 
of internal intuition. Time therefore has subjective 
reality regard to internal experience: that is, I 
really have the representation of time and my 
determinations in it. Time is to be considered real, 
not as an object, but as the representation of myself 
as an object. 
Time and space together with the manifold they contain are 
for Kant entirely products of intuition, not sense-data. 
They are intuitions founded on sensibility, not concepts 
derived from understanding. 
Heidegger agreed with Kant in that he did not conceive 
of time and space as entities which are present-at-hand and 
therefore to be conceived of as objects. Rather, he made 
the distinction between what he called "derivative time", 
our conventional conception which implies that time passes 
outside of us, and "primordial time" which is produced by 
our intuitions (Ornstein, 1991, p. 164). For Kant, only one 
of the twelve categories was responsible for the 
"construction" of the concept of time and space, but 
Heidegger sees primordial time as being grounded in a tri-
fold structure of understanding (to be seen in the Kantian 
sense as a pre-conceptual and every-day coping), facticity 
(our moods and states of mind), and falling (the 
preoccupation with entities alongside us). These three 
ecstasies constituted for Heidegger the three dimensions of 
temporality. By adding a fourth temporal dimension, 
Heidegger was able to think Kant's thought to its end and 
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succeeded in connecting time and space by providing a way 
to determine the "where" of time. It is the "giving" of 
time, the bringing-about of the conception of time that is 
to be seen as a pre-spatial region which brings about the 
presencing of the three dimensions of time. 
The Process of Ordering 
For Kant, the first step on the way to knowledge is 
characterized by the manifold that is necessarily contained 
in "pure intuition." At this level we cannot yet speak of 
an attempt to organize the manifold in any way, since we 
are not conscious of the intuitional data in which the 
manifold is contained. Therefore, a gathering and ordering 
of the manifold is required, which is accomplished in the 
Synthese (synthesis). This act of connecting the 
intuitional data does indeed happen on this first level of 
Kant's framework of knowledge. It is what he calls the 
synthesis of apprehension in intuition (Synthesis der 
Apprehension in der Anschauung). This act collects the 
manifold available in intuition and unites it. 
Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der 
Anschauung werde (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des 
Raumes), so ist erstens das Durchlaufen der 
Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung 
desselben notwendig, welche Handlung ich die Synthesis 
der Apprehension nenne, weil sie geradezu auf die 
Anschauung gerichtet ist, die zwar ein Mannigfaltiges 
darbietet, dieses aber als ein solches, und zwar in 
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einer Vorstellung enthalten, niemals ohne eine dabei 
vorkommende Synthesis bewirken kann. (Kant, 1988, 
p. 63) 
In order for this manifold to become unity of 
intuition (as for example in the representation of 
space), it is necessary that the manifold is first 
perused and then collected. I call this act the 
synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed 
toward apprehension which displays a manifold, but 
which can never effect a manifold as such, contained 
in a representation, without the accompanying 
synthesis. 
Only after this act has occurred can we speak of having 
representations, because a representation, by necessity, 
must be characterized by unity. If the act of synthesis 
would not take place, then the variety of apprehensions 
would be too diffuse. In the case of space this would mean 
that we would be able to represent to ourselves one spatial 
dimension at a time, but without the act of gathering the 
different dimensions, there could be no mention of the 
concept of space as we hold it. Since intuition offers 
something manifold, this manifold must be collected in 
order to form one representation. 
Level two - The Intellect 
One step up on his hierarchical ladder of forms brings 
Kant to those of the intellect. While perception fashions 
the chaos of sensations into spatial and temporal 
sense-images, the intellect arranges these images: 
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... dass es zwei Stamme der menschlichen Erkenntnis 
gebe, die vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaftlichen, 
aber uns unbekannten Wurzel entspringen, namlich 
Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, durch deren ersteren uns 
Gegenstande gegeben, durch den zweiten aber gedacht 
werden. (Kant, 1988, p. 17) 
... that there are two branches of human knowledge 
which spring from a common root, unknown to us, namely 
sensibility and intellect. Through the former objects 
are given to us. Through the latter these objects are 
being thought. 
It is in the realm of the intellect that Kant anchors 
his twelve categories which are themselves forms of the 
intellect. Categories, such as those of continuity and of 
causality, are necessary for the development of concepts 
that are not dependent on experiences, but are a priori 
(Gotshalk, 1969, p. 8). Kant asserts that we can only 
experience by means of the application of our forms of 
perception and of the categories. Simultaneously, this 
assertion makes manifest certain limitations within which 
we operate, because our mode of knowledge (in time and 
space and according to the categories of the intellect) is 
the only possible mode. 
On the level of the intellect, another synthesis takes 
place, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination 
(Synthesis der Reproduktion in der Ejjibildung). Since 
phenomena are not things in themselves, but have been 
created by our representations in the sense that they are 
the manner in which we are affected by external objects or 
incidents (Powell, 1990, p. 53), we could never imagine 
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that which is not present without having a way by which to 
organize these representations. We have to bring them 
together in a meaningful way. We must endow them with 
meaning and comprehend that which, so far, has been a part 
of our pre-conceptual mode of knowing. On the intuitional 
level we cannot be aware of our apperceptions (Pothast, 
1971, p. 14), but once we have reached the level of the 
intellect, we have moved a step closer to knowledge. 
Dieses Gesetz der Reproduktion setzt aber voraus, dass 
die Erscheinungen selbst wirklich einer solchen Regel 
unterworfen seien und dass in dem Mannigfaltigen ihrer 
Vorstellungen eine gewissen Regeln gemasse Begleitung 
oder Folge stattfinde; denn ohne das wurde unsere 
empirische Einbildungskraft niemals etwas ihrem 
Vermogen Gemasses zu tun bekommen, also wie ein totes 
und uns selbst unbekanntes Vermogen im Inneren des 
Gemiits verborgen bleiben. (Kant, 1988, p. 63) 
This law of reproduction, however, presupposes that 
the phenomena themselves are really subject to such a 
rule, and that there is in the variety of these 
representations a sequence and concomitancy subject to 
certain rules; for without this the faculty of 
empirical imagination would never find anything to do 
that it is able to do, and remain therefore buried 
within our mind as a dead faculty, unknown to 
ourselves. 
Through a second act of synthesis, the elements of 
intuition to which we were receptive before, are now 
collected and united. This second synthesis makes for 
awareness of the a priori intuition of time and space. 
Time and space must already be given as the rule by which 
the synthesis can take place. They are now brought to 
light, because during the act of organizing events or 
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objects we necessarily achieve a basic awareness of time 
and space. This naturally implies that time and space, 
although first given as intuitions, are in fact products of 
a synthesis and make up a unity of their own for which 
preconceptual knowledge is responsible. Although we may be 
tempted to understand time and space as preceding 
imagination, the fact that Kant does not exclusively rule 
out all manner of understanding from an account of time and 
space, places their genesis temporally after imagination. 
What he does rule out, at the level of the intellect, is 
conceptual understanding. When Kant asserts that time and 
space are first given as intuitions through or because of a 
synthesis not belonging to sense, we can assume that no 
intuitions of time and space precede such a synthesis. 
Therefore, imagination must be the force which makes any 
consciousness of time and space possible. 
It seems that for Kant there is a sensing of 
sensations, which is analogous to the acknowledgment of 
phenomena. We encounter precisely the same notion in 
Fichte's stage of Reflexion (reflexation). Whereas 
reflection refers to the perceiver, reflexation refers to 
that which is perceived. By locating this sensing of 
sensations on the level of the intellect, Kant paves the 
way for phenomenological thought. 
A third synthesis must take place on the level of 
the intellect, one which Kant calls the synthesis of 
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recognition in concepts (Synthesis der Recognition im 
Begriff). It is here where the notion of consciousness 
enters into the discussion. Without consciousness we could 
not recognize the representations of our imagination. 
Consciousness is what unites the manifold of that which has 
been perceived and reproduced into a representation by 
imagination. 
Dieses Bewusstsein kann oft nur schwach sein, so dass 
wir es nur in der Wirkung, nicht aber in dem Actus 
selbst, d.i. unmittelbar mit der Erzeugung der 
Vorstellung verknupfen: aber unerachtet dieser 
Unterschiede muss doch immer ein Bewusstsein 
angetroffen werden, wenn ihm gleich die hervorstehende 
Klarheit mangelt, und ohne dasselbe sind Begriffe und 
mit ihnen Erkenntnis von Gegenstanden ganz unmoglich. 
(Kant, 1988, p. 65) 
This consciousness may often be only faint, so that we 
may connect it with the effect only, and not with the 
act itself, immediately with the production of a 
representation. Regardless of these differences, this 
consciousness must be there, even if it is lacking in 
pointed clarity. Without this consciousness, concepts, 
and with them, knowledge of objects are impossible. 
Kant insists that phenomena are not objects outside of 
us, but sensuous representations. If we examine the 
relationship between the object and our representation of 
it, we must come to realize that the different 
representations we may entertain must all somehow agree 
with each other. This agreement, this unity which 
constitutes the concept, has been guaranteed by the third 
synthesis. 
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Alle Erkenntnis erfordert einen Begriff, dieser mag 
nun so unvollkommen Oder so dunkel sein, wie er wolle; 
dieser aber ist seiner Form nach jederzeit etwas 
Allgemeines und was zur Regel dient. (Kant, 1988, 
p. 66) 
All knowledge presupposes a concept, however imperfect 
or obscure it may be. This concept is always, with 
regard to its form, something general, something that 
serves as a rule. 
If the external object is indeed nothing more than 
something created by the concept by means of synthesis, 
then there has to be an "ultimate ground" which would 
explain the unity of our collective consciousness. Kant 
finds this ground in what he calls transcendental 
apperception, which is nothing else than the original 
consciousness at the basis of all knowledge. It is a 
consciousness that precedes even intuitional data. It is a 
unified yet preconceptual and unmediated "I". 
This has serious consequences concerning the identity 
of the "I" for Kant. Consciousness of oneself, just as 
consciousness of objects or phenomena, must itself first be 
synthesized. Otherwise "[kann es] kein stehendes oder 
bleibendes Selbst in diesem Fluss innerer Erscheinungen 
geben ..." (Kant, 1988, p. 67) ("There can be no fixed or 
permanent self in that stream of internal phenomena ..."). 
The self, for Kant, is necessary for consciousness as 
a singular "I". What differentiates consciousness of the 
self from consciousness of phenomena is the fact that the 
"I" can only be the subject of experience, never the 
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object. As a result, the categories of the intellect cannot 
be applied to the self because they presuppose this "I". It 
follows that the self cannot be known, an idea with which 
Fichte would disagree, since he posits that in the act of 
Reflexion subject and object become identical. This implies 
that the "I" as a subject is able to contemplate the "I" as 
an object and therefore know it. Husserl, as well, rejected 
the Kantian distinction between phenomena as given in 
intuition and noumena as things in themselves. For Husserl, 
the phenomenon constituted the "thing in itself", and 
simultaneously he saw no distinction between the Kantian 
forms of sensibility and of the intellect. 
The paradox which grows out of this train of thought 
is the fact that the "I", for Kant, is that which is 
presupposed by the categories. It is a self that is in 
time and space, since time and space constitute the 
original intuitions. At the same time - and Hegel will 
eventually point this out - due to its pure and original 
state, the self imposes the forms of time and space in any 
possible experience. 
Level three - Reason 
Once we consider the third group of forms, those of 
reason (Vernunft), another paradox unfolds. While the 
categories in the realm of the intellect are responsible 
for the appearance of objects as independent of us, as 
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existing by and for themselves in the world, it is through 
the forms of reason that we come to appreciate this 
independence as an illusion. Indeed, we come to realize 
that this appearance of independence is dependent upon us 
and upon the forms of the intellect which in turn are 
dependent on the a priori categories that inform our 
thinking. Thus, understanding on an intellectual level is 
the application of concepts to make sense of our 
experience, to give us knowledge. Reason is the application 
of concepts to themselves. 
Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft can be said to be an 
investigation into those structures which determine our 
experience, the structures of sense and of the intellect. 
A new vision of human knowledge is introduced into the 
discipline of philosophy which has so far dwelled on the 
passive reception and interpretation of sensations. Martin 
Heidegger, while appropriating the Kantian concept of the 
mind as the determining factor of experience, introduced a 
new aspect into this conception of the mind. For Heidegger 
the mind, while actively involved in the formation of its 
reality, must nevertheless go one step further (Heidegger 
considers it a "turning back"), and acknowledge the manner 
in which consciousness is limited in that endeavor. 
Heidegger's thought can be considered an extension to the 
Kantian philosophy in that he insists on Dasein's 
obligation to be receptive and open to that which phenomena 
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will show us. With Kant, human knowledge becomes a mode of 
knowledge that is basic to and yet independent of 
experience. It is due to this a priori knowledge that the 
world must have the structure we impose on it. We know -
and we know that we know the world - not because our 
experience corresponds to reality, but because reality must 
conform to the structure of the mind. Kant's conception of 
the self and of self-knowledge is one source of our 
experience. It is the condition for the existence of the 
world, and it supplies the forms of our experience which 
are given a priori. 
Being versus Knowing 
In the "Transzendentale Aesthetik" Kant introduces two 
modes of Self, modes which Heidegger will acknowledge in 
his philosophy of being-in-the-world. The empirical self 
(Dasein) is characterized as the personal self with a 
history, immersed in everyday life. It is an "ordinary 
knowing consciousness." The transcendental self or 
transcendental ego is a formal source of a priori 
conditions. It is timeless and universal. In short, it is 
consciousness in general (Heidegger's Seiendes). If we 
acknowledge the difference between these two selfs and the 
two modes of consciousness associated with them, we will 
come to an understanding of the two modes of temporality 
connected to and produced by them. 
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Since the empirical self operates in the realm of 
perception and of the intellect, it is necessarily limited 
to a view of time as existing "out there" as a reality, as 
independent of the observer. Therefore it is a precursor of 
Heidegger's Dasein which is necessarily cursed (or blessed) 
with the ecstasy of fallenness, propelled to follow das 
Man. In this manner, the empirical self makes claims about 
the pastness, presentness, and futurity of objects and of 
time itself. 
Contrarily, the transcendental ego is concerned with 
the essential features of time that are known a priori. 
Although Kant analyzes primarily what we knowers must be 
like in order that we can know a posteriori about specific 
temporal facts, he lists certain things that we must know a 
priori about time itself. 
(Die Zeit) hat nur eine Dimension: verschiedene Zeiten 
sind nicht zugleich, sondern nacheinander. ... 
Verschiedene Zeiten sind nur Teile ebenderselben Zeit. 
... Die Unendlichkeit der Zeit bedeuted nichts weiter, 
als dass alle bestimmte Grosse der Zeit nur durch 
Einschrainkungen einer einzigen zugrunde liegenden Zeit 
moglich sei. (Kant, 1988, p. 24) 
(Time) has one dimension only: different times are not 
simultaneous, but successive. ... Different times are 
only parts of one and the same time. ... To say that 
time is infinite means no mote than every definite 
quantity of time is possible only through limitations 
of one time which forms the foundation of all times. 
Based on these propositions, Kant concludes that time is 
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not something which can exist in itself and can be 
experienced as an "external object" or event or as 
something which can be appended to objects like a predicate 
and thus define and characterize them. Time can only be the 
form of our mental activity, of our contemplation of 
ourselves and of our inner states. Time defines the 
relationship of our concepts, such as simultaneity or 
sequence, and it can therefore not have a physical shape 
(Gestalt). It is precisely the lack of physical shape which 
will be taken up by philosophers after Kant, especially 
those concerned with language, because, as Kant himself 
acknowledges, 
... eben weil diese innere Anschauung keine Gestalt 
gibt, suchen wir auch diesen Mangel durch Analogien zu 
ersetzen und stellen die Zeitfolge durch eine ins 
Unendliche fortgehende Linie vor ... (Kant, 1988, 
p. 25) 
... and precisely because this internal intuition 
supplies no shape, we try to remedy this deficiency by 
means of analogies and represent the succession of 
time by a line progressing to infinity ... 
On this imaginary time line, which our language has brought 
about, time is sequential and one-dimensional. What is 
more, we attribute the characteristics of this line (which 
we have constructed merely as an analogy, in order to 
represent time in a physical manner) to time itself. The 
same thing happens in our modern-day analogy of the brain 
and the computer. In our haste to find an adequate analogy 
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for the brain, we turn the tables and assign the qualities 
and characteristics of the computer (which we intended to 
use as the analogy in order to explain the workings of the 
brain) to the brain. 
Kant's Conception of Time 
Kant never denied the existence of things-in-
themselves - a failure which casts a paradoxical shadow on 
his Critical Philosophy considering his idealist stance as 
concerns the power of the mind - he did deny the reality of 
time. Time is a framework for experience, not a feature of 
independently real things. His argument, in support of this 
thesis, is that this would be the only way in which we can 
know a priori the essential features of time. If we were to 
know an independently real time and space we would have to 
have some type of access to it. However, the only kind of 
access, that of empirical observation, would not provide 
for the universal validity of time and space. 
Another argument for the non-reality of time occurs in 
the first antinomy. It states that time is essentially 
contradictory because time is such that the world must be 
thought both to have and not have a beginning in time. 
Since what is contradictory cannot exist on its own, time 
cannot be real. In view of this antinomy we must 
acknowledge the illusory nature of reason and we must come 
to the conclusion that the capacity for self-contradiction 
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is built into reason itself. If space and time are not 
products of the senses and of the intellect, if they are 
indeed a priori as are the categories, then how do human 
beings acquire them? Since we apprehend time and space on 
the level of pre-reflective immediacy, they cannot be 
concepts or concept-derived intuitions. 
No special act, no directing of attention is required 
to apprehend them. One is in time and space simply by 
having them- merely by the virtue of their presence. 
Therefore, the mere subjective intuition of sensations 
revealing simultaneity and succession already entails that 
one is "in" formal intuition: we are aware of them 
immediately in the act of synthesizing the apprehended 
manifold. This synthesis cannot take place unless there is 
a manifold of sense impressions actually present in the 
mind. Since time and space are forms of this act, and can 
arise only with its occurrence, they presuppose the 
presence of sensations. Time and space are thus sensible 
intuitions. 
Intuited time and space precede all concepts. Indeed, 
the 11 Transzendentale Aesthetik" hinges on the claim that 
the intuition of space and time is essentially prior and 
independent of the acquisition of any concept whatsoever. 
Die Zeit ist die formale Bedingung a priori aller 
Erscheinungen iiberhaupt. Der Raum als die reine Form 
aller ausseren Anschauung ist als Bedingung a priori 
bloss auf aussere Erscheinungen eingeschrankt. ... so 
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ist die Zeit eine Bedingung a priori von aller 
Erscheinung uberhaupt, und zwar die unmittelbare 
Bedingung der inneren (unserer Seele) und eben dadurch 
mittelbar auch der ausseren Erscheinungen. (Kant, 
1988, p. 25) 
Time is the formal condition, a priori, of any 
phenomena at all. Space, as the pure form of all 
external intuition, is an a priori condition, limited 
to external phenomena. ... thus time is an a priori 
condition of any phenomena at all. It is the immediate 
condition of inner phenomena (of our soul), and 
thereby indirectly of external phenomena as well. 
Time and space are not concepts of outer relations. 
Rather, they constitute that which underlies the 
possibility of an individual having outer relations. Being 
"in" formal intuition enables us to acknowledge the range 
of synthetic action open to us: Only because time and space 
are forms of intuition, are we able to gather and order 
external entities (the manifold offered to us in 
apprehension) and to put them in relation to each other. 
Only because time and space are intuited, and not acquired 
through experience, are we able to fixate and pinpoint 
perceptions near or far, after, before or concurrent, 
outside or alongside. "Pure intuition" is the purely formal 
awareness of the framework within which and according to 
which the composition of perception can occur. Without it 
no empirical temporal or spatial intuition, even the most 
subjective and non-reflective, would be possible. 
Through the act of bringing sensations into 
consciousness (apprehension) and synthesizing them, they 
30 
are endowed with form: 
Ich verstehe aber unter Synthese in der allgemeinsten 
Bedeutung die Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen 
zueinander hinzuzutun und ihre Mannigfaltigkeit in 
einer Erkenntnis zu begreifen. (Kant, 1988, p. 50) 
In the most general sense, I understand by synthesis 
the act of arranging different representations 
together, and of comprehending what is manifold in 
them under one form of knowledge. 
On the level of intuition no form exists. On the level 
of the intellect, representations come into existence when 
the "raw material" of apprehended sensation is present and 
form-giving acts of synthesis are performed. The manifold 
of intuition is combined, and through the ordering process 
of the intellect, representation is possible: 
Die Synthese eines Mannigfaltigen aber (es sei 
empirisch oder a priori gegeben) bringt zuerst eine 
Erkenntnis hervor, die zwar anfanglich noch roh und 
verworren sein kann und also der Analyse bedarf; 
allein die Synthesis ist doch dasjenige, was 
eigentlich die Elemente zu Erkenntnissen sammelt und 
zu einem gewissen Inhalt vereinigt. (Kant, 1988, 
p. 50) 
Synthesis of that which is manifold (whether given 
empirically or a priori) produces at first a knowledge 
which may initially be crude and confused and in need 
of analysis. Synthesis alone collects the elements 
necessary for knowledge and unites them to have a 
certain content. 
The importance of the act of synthesis for 
understanding becomes again evident in this passage. Only 
after the many different impressions of intuition have been 
gathered, combined and endowed with form, can awareness 
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become possible. During this process, what has so far been 
mere intuition, becomes intellectual understanding. With 
the awareness of the existence of external objects comes 
the ability to also represent these objects even when they 
are not present. 
According to Kant, time and space represent the form 
of our experiences rather than their content. Our concepts 
of time and space are not gathered from experience, and 
therefore must be purely formal. As Kant admitted, neither 
of the concepts can be formed in complete absence of 
experience: experience is a necessary occasion or correlate 
upon which we form such concepts, but they are not 
empirical. Time and space are not acquired from experience, 
but activated on the occasion of experience. Therefore, 
there is no relation between any particular experiences and 
these concepts. Time and space are how things appear to us, 
in fact, how things must necessarily appear to us. They are 
not things themselves that appear to us. 
Whereas Kant relied solely on the powers of the ego to 
form the world, with his contemporary Fichte we are 
transcending German Idealism and are moving toward a 
"science" of thought and understanding. The Kantian 
conviction that the "I" can never be known as an object is 
overcome by Fichte's Science of Knowledge in which he 
considers Dasein to be an object among others. The new 
"science" of philosophy includes thus the "I am" in the 
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manipulation of the object world which in turn produces a 
subject world as well. For Fichte the unmediated "I" and 
the knowledge that I know is combined, and the old Kantian 
opposites are erased. 
Part 2: Fichte - A Way to Phenomenal Thought 
Fichte wrote his Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre 
almost a decade before Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. 
However, it appears that the latter would serve well as an 
introduction into the development of the mind from its 
"primitive" stages of intuition to the higher realm of 
consciousness or intellectual intuition which are the focus 
of his works. The Wissenschaftslehre serves as an 
examination of what constitutes knowledge. It is left to 
the later work to trace the path, so to speak, of human 
development. Both works are attempts to probe into those 
realms that constitute consciousness for Fichte: the 
unawareness in everyday life of the possibility of 
philosophical reflection or abstraction to return to and 
merge with pure intuition, resulting in the Act or in the 
Thatiakeit (the activity) of thinking. 
The Primordial Unity 
His method, unlike that of Kant who proceeded from the 
manifold given in the content of consciousness to the all 
embracing unity, is to start at the original activity of 
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the ego and to deduce from it the special forms of the 
manifold - "ein Zusammenfassen eines Mannigfaltigen" 
(Fichte, 1845, p. 7). With this move, Fichte distances 
himself from Cartesian dualism. He posits that in our 
mind's pre-conceptual realm there exists a primordial unity 
which can be separated into its different components only 
by force. The force which we need to apply in order to 
understand the composition of this Verschmelzuna is 
philosophical reflection. Whereas Kant had considered this 
unity to be a product of synthesis, the uniting activity 
which gathers the different modes of consciousness, Fichte 
assumes it to be the foundation of all possible thought. 
His goal, like Heidegger's more than a century later, is to 
find the active principle in our consciousness responsible 
for producing a content which we are not conscious of 
having produced. It is to find the Act which "lies at the 
basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible" 
(Fichte, 1970, p. 93). Similarly to Heidegger, he is thus 
searching for the unconscious aspect of consciousness. 
Das Wesen aller Wissenschaft besteht darin, dass von 
irgend einem sinnlich Wahrgenommenen durch Denken zum 
ubersinnlichen Grunde desselben aufgestiegen werde. 
Eben also verhalt es sich mit der Philosophie. Sie 
geht aus von der Wahrnehmuncf des Wissens durch den 
inneren Sinn, und steigt auf zu dem Grunde desselben. 
(Fichte, 1845, p. 541, author's emphasis). 
The essence of all Science rests in the fact that 
through thinking the move can be accomplished from 
something perceived through the senses to the 
supersensible reason of this perception. The same 
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holds true for philosophy. Philosophy starts with the 
apperception of knowledge through the inner senses, 
and moves up to the reason of those inner senses. 
The System 
The path to consciousness is clearly laid out by 
Fichte: We proceed from the realm of acknowledging mere 
sensations (intuition) to that realm where we are able to 
determine the cause of these sensations. This path we can 
follow via the activity of thinking. Momentarily putting 
aside the question of what it means to think, Fichte asks 
instead what constitutes the different realms. Hence, his 
goal is to locate and determine these opposite poles, one 
characterized by the apperception of phenomena, the other 
by the awareness that we are indeed acknowledging these 
phenomena, and, above all, by the manner in which we 
acknowledge them. This manner of acknowledgment plays a 
vital role in the making of meaning. It is the state of the 
"I" at the moment of acknowledgment or, as Heidegger would 
put it, of disclosure. If this state were not taken into 
consideration, knowledge would remain an abstract entity, 
an entity outside of the unmediated "I", and therefore 
meaningless to the "I". Only after the apperception of 
phenomena has been "brought back" to the "I" and to the 
particular state in which it finds itself can any knowledge 
become meaningful. Knowledge has now transcended impersonal 
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objectivity and has become subjective, and meaning has been 
created by and for the "I". 
In his Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte 
begins by defining Wissen (knowledge) negatively, by 
stating that 
... es ist uberhaupt kein Wissen von - noch ist es ein 
Wissen (quantitativ und in der Relation), sondern Act, 
keine Begebenheit, oder dass etwas im Wissen ... 
gesetzt werden [kann]. (Fichte, 1845, p. 14) 
... it is not at all a knowledge of - nor is it a 
knowledge (quantitative and in relation). Rather, it 
is an act, not an event, or that something ... [can] 
be posited in knowledge. 
We will encounter precisely the same rejection of 
knowledge as Wissen in Heidegger with the only difference 
that the latter takes this rejection a step further and 
suggests that we need to employ the term "knowing" in the 
sense of konnen which suggests not an acquisition of 
external facts, but which implies the subject's familiarity 
with the object and his ability to handle it and to cope 
with certain situations. The knowledge upon which Fichte 
seems to elaborate is not a particular knowledge of an 
accumulation of particulars, of facts, or of information, 
but rather a knowledge that incorporates the knower. It is 
a knowledge that must acknowledge the fact that it would 
not be what it is without the particular state in which the 
knowing "I" finds itself at the moment of knowing, an "I", 
however, that is simultaneously produced by knowledge. The 
36 
notion of abstract knowledge being modified by the state of 
the unmediated "I" is a Kantian concept, one that Heidegger 
has adopted in his fundamental ontology. 
Level one - Sense-perception 
The method by which Fichte proposes to proceed is to 
observe the activity of Wissen, and his starting point in 
Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns is "die Wahrnehmunq 
ausserer Geaenstande" - the apperception of external 
objects (Fichte, 1845, p. 542). He carries on the Kantian 
notion of "apperception" which Heidegger, in turn, will 
elaborate in his concept of facticity which is 
characterized by Dasein's pre-conceptual acknowledgment of 
its constitution. Fichte thereby sets out to prove that 
intuition is a necessary requisite of having any experience 
at all, of perceiving external objects in the--first place. 
Apperception, therefore, is in itself determined and 
limited by our "external senses" (physical senses) which 
let us see certain objects in only certain ways. This 
limitation is reminiscent of the Kantian categories which 
set up the boundaries within which we are able to perceive 
the world in a rather predetermined manner. What is of 
interest here is that Fichte posits the necessity of our 
"external", physical senses, but simultaneously considers 
these a limitation precisely because of their teleological 
character: 
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So ist es z. B. unmoglich, dass einer, der kein 
Gesicht hat, durch Farben afficirt werde: diese 
Affection selbst aber ist eine Beschrankung des Sinnes 
iiberhaupt auf diese bestinimte Weise, des Empfangens 
durch den Sinn. (Fichte, 1845, p. 542) 
It is impossible, for example, for someone who does 
not have a face, to be affected by colors: This affect 
itself, however, is a particular limitation of the 
senses themselves, a limitation of the reception 
through the senses. 
This raises the question of whether we can be affected by 
phenomena because we have sensory organs, or whether we 
have sensory organs because we are destined to be affected 
by phenomena, a matter which Heidegger will easily bring to 
its fruition. 
Since, according to Fichte, apperception of external 
objects is dependent on affect or intuition (determined, 
however, by our external senses) and on the Kantian notion 
of Ausdehnung (expansion), determined by our internal 
capacity to pass judgement on external objects, we are 
still on the first level of development. We have not yet 
overcome the realm of immediate intuition of objects, that 
realm where intuition is not yet characterized by the 
awareness of external objects. Hence, we are at the stage 
of pre-consciousness or what Fichte calls elsewhere the 
pure ego, still in the condition where it is unaware of 
anything that might be a non-ego. 
This pre-conceptual realm bears a striking resemblance 
to Heidegger's conception of Dasein employing the Zeug 
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(tools) which is present-to-hand. Just as the pure ego has 
no awareness of objects, so Dasein is unaware of the 
"toolness" of things. The relationship that Dasein has with 
tools is a pre-conscious involvement with them. This 
involvement in turn brings to mind the kind of knowledge 
that both Fichte and Heidegger define as a konnen (skill) 
rather than a wissen (abstract knowledge). Both skills and 
tools are thus characterized by the pre-conscious 
involvement that Dasein displays, by the unaware coping 
that it engages in when dealing with tools in a skillful 
manner. Awareness, according to Heidegger, does not set in 
until a discrepancy occurs in the relation between user and 
tool, in other words, when the tool breaks down and with 
this failure calls into awareness its originally intended 
function which is now absent. It is the conflict which this 
break-down causes which, for the first time, lets Dasein 
think about the present-to-hand-ness that is now lost, and 
therefore makes for an awareness. 
Level two - The Thinking Self 
In order to reach the second level in the development 
of consciousness, what is required for Fichte is the 
activity of thinking, now defined by the fact 
dass herausgegangen werde aus der Anschauung; ein 
Herausgehen aber aus der unmittelbaren Anschauung 
haben wir schon fruher Denken genannt. (Fichte, 1845, 
p. 545) 
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that we leave the realm of intuition; Above we have 
already called this activity of leaving thinking. 
Is the "activity of leaving intuition" comparable with 
Husserl's epoche in which he recommends that we leave 
behind our everyday conception of the world? For Husserl it 
seems enough to leave one realm behind while attaining 
another one. This move from one extreme to another points 
to the Husserl's inability to put behind him Cartesian 
dualism. The inability to mediate opposites constitutes 
part of Husserl's mathematics with which Heidegger was 
disenchanted. Husserl, unlike Heidegger insisted on a 
precise system of consciousness, and found therefore no 
room for amalgamation of opposites. For Fichte, as for 
Heidegger, it is only through the unification of intuition 
and thinking that the object becomes recognized as object, 
something outside of us, seemingly independent of us - a 
non-ego. It seems that this insistence on the unification 
of two different realms of consciousness is an example of 
Fichte's impulse for unity, otherwise characterized by his 
attempt to avoid traditional dualism. Thus, thinking means 
stepping out of mere intuition, while affect and expansion 
are simply products of Selbstbewusstseyn (self-
consciousness, here not necessarily in the Hegelian sense 
of self-reflection). This, for Fichte, is the proof needed 
to proclaim that consciousness is not merely "a dead and 
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passive mirror of external objects", but that it is 
"something alive and powerful in itself" (Fichte, 1845, p. 
546). Simultaneously, Fichte's consciousness is not an 
individualized consciousness, particular to only one 
Dasein. It is a generalized consciousness, common to all, 
and it can certainly be considered the forecurser to Karl 
Marx's concept of collective consciousness. 
In ordinary experience we are under the illusion that 
there are objects existing outside of us. Fichte admits 
that an unconditional idealism cannot account for this 
phenomena, and it is here where he differs radically from 
Kant. According to Fichte there must be a "non-I" which is 
independent of the "I" that apprehends it. In the conscious 
experience this "non-I" is opposed to the finite 
consciousness that apprehends it. But Fichte aims to show 
that this "non-I" has its source in the "I" on a deeper 
level, on the level of the Act, i.e. in the process of 
reflexive thinking. 
Whereas philosophers after Fichte, namely Heidegger, 
attribute to language the power to create the manner in 
which we see the world, for Fichte it is Denken (thinking) 
that gives external or physical apperception its form, that 
of an "objective Dasein" (Fichte, 1845, p. 547). However, 
Fichte is not insensitive to the use of language. In his 
assertion that objects consist primarily of two parts, that 
of the objective Form, created by thinking, and that of 
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Hatter (Stoff), created by the contemplation of the inner 
capacity, Fichte appropriates two Kantian concepts. His 
development of that thought, however, must seem familiar to 
those who have followed Heidegger's etymology and may even 
be the origin of his concept of Gestell (scaffold), for on 
the recording Der Satz der Identitat, he acknowledges 
several times that he had come to the term Gestell via an 
analogy of Gesetz. which, in turn, is derived from Setzen 
in the sense of "positing.11 
Sodann ist uber die Form des Denkens hier uberhaupt zu 
bemerken, dass das Denken ein Setzen. und zwar ein 
Setzen einem anderen gegeniiber, ein Geqensatz ist. 
(Fichte, 1845, p. 547, author's emphasis) 
Therefore we can note at this point that thinking is a 
positing, or more specifically, a positing of 
something over and against something else, an op-
positing. 
Here, the activity of thinking is seen as a "positing" of 
something over and against something else, which results in 
an "op-posite". The relationship of the verb and the 
constructed noun is not as clear in English as it is in 
German. It is still obvious that this proposition can only 
lead to one end: That all opposites ensue directly from the 
act of thinking. This is a notion that had already been 
embraced and elaborated by Kant. Here, Fichte narrows the 
opposites down to ego and non-ego. He calls the 
acknowledgment of these opposites ursprunaliches Denken 
(primordial thinking), or das erste Denken (the first 
42 
thinking), an expression that must bring to mind 
Heidegger's concept of the "first naming." (It now becomes 
obvious that thinking for Fichte and language for Heidegger 
perform approximately the same function, that of producing 
an awareness of external objects). This parallel is further 
developed by Heidegger when he insists on the fact that 
"language speaks itself", an insistence that may very well 
have its roots in Fichte's assertion that "...das Denken 
selbst als ein selbststandiges Leben denkt aus und durch 
sich selbst... (...thinking itself thinks as an independent 
being, out of itself and through itself..., Fichte, 1845, 
p. 548), since at this point in the development it is not 
the "I" that thinks in thinking, but rather it is thinking 
which thinks in the Act of thinking. Thinking for Fichte is 
gaining awareness. Speaking for Heidegger is to answer the 
call of the first naming which also translates as becoming 
aware. The Heideggerian notion of "language speaking 
itself" is therefore an appropriation of Fichte's concept 
that "thinking thinks itself." For Heidegger the 
acknowledgment of the autonomy of language will conclude 
his search for consciousness, because for him speaking 
constitutes the conclusion or the result of thinking. For 
Fichte, on the other hand, the notion of the autonomy of 
thinking is merely the first step in the ladder that leads 
to consciousness. 
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Level three - Being Conscious of Consciousness 
Let us follow Fichte on his path of thinking which 
takes us from intuition (acknowledgment of the "I") to the 
apperception of external objects (acknowledgment of a 
"non-I") to internal apperception or Reflexion (reflexive 
thinking characterized by the amalgamation of abstract 
thought and knowing that there is an "I"). On this third 
level the notion of freedom is introduced, a concept which 
is paramount in Fichte's thought, "...the same idea [of 
freedom] would become the radical fulcrum of Fichte's 
entire philosophy, by which he would overturn [Kant]" 
(Solomon, 1988, p. 50). Knowledge, or "knowing that" is 
defined as das Seyn der Freiheit (the Being of freedom), 
and this idea is of utmost importance in the development of 
the concept of Reflexion (reflexive thinking). On this 
third level, Dasein has reached the realm in which it knows 
that it knows. Here again, Fichte reminds us that this 
realm of consciousness can only come about through unity, a 
notion which Heidegger embraced. 
In external apperception consciousness (as opposed to 
self-consciousness) is bound by a certain Bilden 
(picturing, imagining), and it is at the same time free of 
Being and thus aware of Being. Contrarily, in reflexive 
thinking, consciousness has achieved freedom from mere 
Bilden, which, of course, implies that it is now aware of 
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this Bilden. Here again, we are considering opposites, 
limitation and freedom. Both are prerequisites for 
consciousness. The freedom that this new consciousness has 
acquired, a freedom that it did not possess in the first 
stage, is that of choice: 
In der Wahrnehmung sagte das Bewusstseyn aus: Das Ding 
ist, und damit gut. Hier spricht das neuentstandene 
Bewusstseyn: es ist auch ein Bild, eine Vorstellung 
des Dinges. Da ferner dieses Bewusstseyn die 
realisirte Freiheit des Bildens ist, so spricht in 
Beziehung auf sich selbst das Wissen: ich kann jene 
Sache bilden und vorstellen oder auch nicht. (Fichte, 
1845, p. 553) 
In apperception, consciousness states: The thing is, 
and that is that. Here, the newly developed 
consciousness says: in addition, it is an image, a 
representation of the thing. Furthermore, since this 
consciousness is the realized freedom of imagining, 
knowledge says in relation to itself: I can shape and 
imagine these things, or I can choose not to. 
Dasein's freedom is a result of its ability to think 
independently. Freedom is defined by Fichte as the -
possibility to be independent of the outside world. This 
potential of independence was of vital importance to 
Heidegger, since in his epistemology, Dasein is not only 
able to think, but to distinguish between its own thinking 
and that of others. Simultaneously, Dasein. in dts 
potentiality of independence, is capable to think about 
thinking. 
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Imagination 
But now the question arises whether the apperception 
that preceded Reflexion was indeed an image at all. Fichte 
negates this possibility, since apperception is not 
something that has been created by true knowledge. He comes 
therefore to the conclusion that "pure apperception" 
without thinking is die Sache - the thing itself (Fichte, 
1845, p. 553). 
With this move, Fichte discards any remains of the 
Cartesian notion that what we "see" in apperception is 
merely an image of the object. Heidegger will repeatedly 
point this out, especially in his later lectures which deal 
with Veraegenwartiauna (imagination or better "making 
present"). Heidegger repeatedly insists that what is "in 
our minds" at the moment of apperception or at the moment 
of imagination is not a picture of the object nor a 
representation or a concept of the object, but the object 
itself, die Sache selbst (see the Zollikoner Seminare and 
the Le Thor Seminare of the sixties). 
Fichte characterizes the third stage in the 
development of thinking as one capable of imagination. The 
mind has freed itself from the external, physical senses, 
and is capable of producing images by itself. Obviously the 
drawback is that a certain stock of apperceptions must have 
accumulated in order for the mind to draw on these and to 
give imagination free play. In this way imagination is 
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bound to the physical senses. It is precisely through 
imagination's ability to ignore the myriad of apperceptions 
that affect the mind constantly in everyday life that 
intensifies the question of choice: 
Die Einbildungskraft allein ist es, welche uns liber 
diese Affection durch den Sinn hinwegsetzt, und uns 
fahig macht, uns den Eindriicken desselben zu 
verschliessen, indem wir unsere Wahrnehmungen davon 
abziehen, um allein dem Schaffen durch 
Einbildungskraft uns zu iiberlassen, und dadurch eine 
ganz andere Zeitreihe, die von der Zeitreihe des 
Fortgangs der sinnlichen Entwicklung durchaus frei 
ist, zu erschaffen. (Fichte, 1845, p. 555, author's 
emphasis) 
Imagination alone is that power which transposes us 
beyond this affect through the senses. It is that 
power which enables us to close ourselves to the 
impressions of the senses by letting us subtract our 
apperceptions from it. In this manner we can 
surrender to the power of the imagination, and create 
a intrinsically different time sequence, one that is 
free of the sequential time connected with the 
perpetuation of sensuous development. 
Fichte's choice of words ("to subtract") indicates 
that he is indeed talking about a formula of consciousness, 
and thus betrays his scientific leanings. The idea that in 
imagination we are no longer bound to what is generally 
referred to as "real" time clearly foreshadows current 
research performed in the cognitive sciences (see Dennett, 
1991, pp. 144-153, and pp. 115-126, where he explains the 
notions of Orwellian and Stalinesque revisions of memory). 
For Fichte the finding is proof that through this new 
freedom life can transcend the causality of the immediate 
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Being. Knowledge or consciousness, becomes a principle 
which, due to its freedom to abstract itself from its 
immediate environment, becomes Thatiakeit (action), an idea 
that we will also find central in Heidegger's work. Where 
the latter differs from Fichte, however, is in his 
insistence that even in the act of imagination we are bound 
to our bodily existence, to our Leib. The fact that 
Heidegger differentiates between Korper (the body as flesh 
and blood) and Leib (a quasi-extension of our body) does 
not take away from the idea that we could not imagine 
without the presence of our bodies. After all, if our 
bodies were not at a different place than the object 
imagined, then we could not speak of imagination at all, 
but would be back in the realm of apperception. 
Consciousness, for Fichte, has now gained the ability 
to be conscious of itself. In addition to knowing objects, 
consciousness is now capable of knowing its own knowing, 
and has created the "I". By becoming conscious of itself, 
consciousness becomes its own object. As an object, 
consciousness can thus be manipulated by the subject-
consciousness. This ability to manipulate gives 
consciousness the possibility of being independent of the 
external world. Hence, in Reflexion the "I" and the 
"knowing that I know" is combined, and the old opposites 
are effaced. 
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In his earlier works, Fichte lets the "I" be created 
through a Thatiakeit (activity which goes into itself, a 
Sich-Setzen [self-positing]). By positing itself, the "I" 
comes into existence as an entity that knows itself. Fichte 
follows this procedure as well in the Wissenschaftslehre 
1798: 
Dadurch also, indem ich auf mich selbst handle, mich 
selbst setze, dass meine Tatigkeit in mich selbst 
zuriickgeht, kommt das Ich hervor, denke ich mein Ich; 
und bin beides: Ich bin Ich und ich setze mich als 
Ich, erschopft sich gegenseitig. (Fichte, 1937, 
p. 355). 
Due to the fact that I act upon myself, that I posit 
myself, that my activity goes back into myself, the I 
emerges - I think my I; and I am both: I am I, and I 
posit myself as I. These two possibilities exhaust one 
another. 
The first question is how the activity (Tatiakeit̂  can know 
that it is, and thus posit (and know) itself. No "non-I" 
must be posited, or the activity would no longer constitute 
self-positing. This knowledge of the activity of its own 
Dasein is taught through intuition in which it can assure 
itself of itself. Intuition cannot be but the activity 
itself. Otherwise the knowledge represented in the 
intuition could not enter into positing, which is necessary 
if the positing is to be its own object. Therefore, 
intellectual intuition is described as the identity of 
subject and object, in which the ego can know of its 
positing of the positing, and can thus posit it: 
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Wurde das Ich, welches handelte, nicht auch zugleich 
sich seiner selbst unmittelbar bewusst, dass es 
handle? Ich setze mich als setzend, dies ist 
Anschauung; ich stelle mich selbst vor als 
vorstellend - ich handelte und war meines Handelns mir 
bewusst - Es war eins und ebendasselbe... Es war eine 
Identitat des Setzenden und des Gesetzten... Das Ich 
setzt sich schlechthin, d.h. ohne alle Vermittlung. 
Es ist zugleich Subjekt und Objekt. Nur durch das 
sich selbst Setzen wird das Ich - es ist nicht vorher 
schon Substanz - sondern sich selbst setzen als 
setzend ist sein Wesen, es ist eins und dasselbe; 
folglich ist es sich seiner unmittelbar selbst 
bewusst. (Fichte, 1937, p. 357) 
Did not the acting I not at the same time become 
immediately aware of itself as acting? I posit myself 
as positing, that is intuition. I imagine myself as 
imagining - I acted and I was aware of my actions - It 
was one and the same... It is an identity of the 
positing subject and the posited... The I posits 
itself absolutely, without mediation. It is subject 
and object at once. Only by positing itself does the I 
become. It has not always already been substance. 
Rather, its essence is to posit itself as positing; it 
is one and the same. Therefore, it is immediately 
conscious of itself. 
Fichte calls the "intuition of the 'I' acting in 
itself" an intellectual one and explains that only this 
intellectual act makes imagination possible. If an activity 
does not know of itself, it is not a conscious activity, 
and it follows that that which is posited in it cannot be 
conscious. "This identity is absolute, an identity without 
which imagination is not possible" (Fichte, 1937, p. 357). 
The fact that for Fichte imagination is a product solely of 
the intellectual act points to the existence of a "pure 
mind" in his philosophy. Heidegger vehemently rejected this 
sort of orthodox German Idealism. For him, there is no such 
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thing as a "pure mind", only "being-in-the-world", the 
bodily involvement with things around us. He deals with the 
problem of imagination in that he insists that 
Veraeaenwartiguna (representation) is by no means a purely 
mental act, as is generally assumed. Rather, representation 
or imagination is bound by the body. He goes as far as 
insisting that the presence of the body is a prerequisite 
for imagination, for if the body were not "here", but in 
the same place as the object imagined, representation could 
not mean what it has come to stand for. 
After Fichte has created the possibility that the "I" 
posits itself as positing itself, he must now explain how 
it can be that it does so. The positing-itself must define 
itself as an "I", something which can only happen via a 
concept (Beariff) of "I". Only the abstract Begriff will 
make the object exist as an object, a notion that Fichte 
seems to have inherited from Kant. Fichte addresses the 
question with the hint that it still seems as if the "I" 
can only posit itself if it already has a previously 
posited object, towards which it can direct its activity: 
Um aber das Ich denken, auf dasselbe handeln zu 
konnen, muss man sich es ja schon als gesetzt voraus 
denken; muss ich ein Gesetztsein von meinem Setzen 
voraus setzen. Dieser Einwurf ...will so viel sagen: 
Wie kommt der Begriff des Ich zu Stande? (Fichte, 
1937, p. 357) 
But in order to think the I, in order to act upon it, 
it must be envisioned as already being posited; I must 
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presuppose a being posited of by positing. This 
interjection ...means: How does the concept of the I 
come about? 
Understanding must stand over and against (opposite) 
that which is understood and fixate it as a whole while in 
a state of repose (in Ruhe). This Ruhe seems to be 
analogous to Heidegger's state of awaiting where Dasein 
must remain open to the phenomena that will present 
themselves: 
In dieser Ruhe nun wird uns das Setzen der Aktivitat 
zu einem Gesetzten - zu einem Produkt, zu einem 
Begriff, d.h. wenn man dieselbe Tatigkeit zuerst als 
ein Nichthandeln, also fixiert, in Ruhe sich denkt... 
so entsteht daraus ein Produkt Oder der Begriff des 
Ichs, der sich bloss denken aber nicht anschauen 
lasst, denn nur Tatigkeit als handelnd ist Anschauung, 
diese aber ist nicht moglich ohne sich zugleich das 
Entgegengesetzte - dieselbe zuvor als ruhend - zu 
denken, d.h. ohne einen Begriff. Beide sind also immer 
zugleich miteinander verbunden - Begriff und 
Anschauung, sie fallen ins Eins zusammen. (Fichte, 
1937, p. 358) 
In this state of repose the positing of the activity 
becomes a posited - a product, a concept. If the same 
activity is first thought as a non-acting, as fixed, 
as in a state of repose ...then from it develops a 
product, or the concept of I. This concept can only be 
thought, not intuited, for only activity as acting is 
intuition. However, this acting activity is not 
possible without thinking simultaneously the opposite 
- activity in a state of repose, without a concept. 
Both are always connected to each other - concept and 
intuition collapse into One. 
Apparently Fichte thinks that activity as a process is 
given through intuition, whereas as a whole and as an 
object (in the state of repose) it is given through the 
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abstract concept (Beariff1. Both intuition and concept are 
necessary for the activity to posit itself. Intuition is 
necessary so that activity will know itself. The concept is 
necessary so that activity can define itself as going into 
itself, as an "I". Concept and intuition must be one. 
While activity is active, it must know itself and it must 
know itself as an "I" and posit itself - otherwise it does 
not posit anything or it doesn't posit itself as an entity 
going back into itself. Both moments of the activity's 
knowing-itself are conceptualized as a temporal sequence. 
Fichte's Conception of Time 
While Fichte insists on the freedom of imagination, he 
vehemently denies that this same freedom applies to the 
concept of time. Time, for him is a given, not something 
that we posit. Time enters our consciousness by its own 
force. It is not something we create. We have no choice but 
to acknowledge it as something that exists independently of 
our thinking, as an entity in which our thinking takes 
place in order to give us our notions of "before" and 
"after" which we clearly entertain. Time is seen by Fichte 
in Kantian terms. It is one of the forms (things-in-
themselves) because the different acts of the ego occur in 
such a manner as to be dependent on each other in a 
definite order. 
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It becomes vital to acknowledge that in this case 
independence and freedom are not to be used 
interchangeably. Independence is seen by Fichte as a given 
fact, a thing-in-itself over which consciousness has no 
power and which it cannot manipulate. All it can do is 
accept the fact that something exists independently of 
itself. Freedom, on the other hand, involves a will. This 
will is synonymous with the choices that an individual 
makes when it comes to the different modes of 
consciousness. While Dasein may well be able to exist in a 
pre-reflective (and pre-reflexive) state, it must exert a 
will in order to reach the realm of Reflexion and of 
abstract thought. This concept of the will seems to 
foreshadow Husserl's notion of intentionality in which an 
awareness of an object can only come about if consciousness 
makes the choice to focus on that object. 
Where Fichte's account of freedom becomes problematic 
is in his insistence that the newly created "I" is in a 
position to choose between mere intuition (defined as 
pre-reflexive state), apperception or awareness (which 
implies paying attention to an object), and to not pay 
attention. Whereas there is indeed a choice between the 
latter two possibilities, it seems that the first is 
necessarily lost once consciousness has reached this higher 
realm, once the "I" is established. The "I" may be under 
the illusion that it can choose the innocent pre-reflexive 
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state. However, as soon as it is aware of that possibility 
of choice, it has already chosen and therefore lost the 
state of innocence (unawareness). If we develop this 
thought further, it seems that we can never characterize 
the act of learning as a creation of choice, since the mode 
of consciousness in which we found ourselves before the 
learning took place, must necessarily be lost. 
The Logos 
Intellectual intuition, the third stage in the 
development for Fichte, is composed of Sein and of 
Freiheit. These terms can not continue to be seen in their 
separate existence if we insist on employing them to define 
consciousness. Rather, they have to have undergone a 
Verschmelzungf a process of melting. External and internal 
apperception cannot simply be added in order to constitute 
consciousness. They must be seen as constituting, in 
Heideggerian terms, a primordial unity, the pre-socratic 
Logos: 
Es ist nicht die Aufgabe die, dass du bedenken 
sollest, du wissest von dem Gegenstande, und nun dein 
Bewusstseyn (eben vom Gegenstande) als ein 
subjectives, und den Gegenstand, als ein objectives, 
begreifest, sondern dass du innigst lebendig 
erfassest, beides sey Eins, und sey ein sich 
Durchdringen: und erst hinterher, und zufolge dieses 
Durchdringens mogest du auch beides unterscheiden. 
(Fichte, 1845, p. 19) 
The task is not to think that you know about the 
object, and thus understand your consciousness 
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(precisely of the object) as a subjective, and the 
object as an objective. Rather, you should grasp in a 
fervently alive manner that both is One, constituting 
a permutation. Only afterward, and by virtue of this 
permutation, may you differentiate the two. 
Fichte's dismissal of Cartesian dualism becomes obvious in 
this passage. According to him, consciousness can only be 
discovered through the insistence that the antithesis 
between subject and object does not exist. This insistence 
must be accompanied by abstraction and reflexive thinking 
(Reflexion). 
The Unity of reflexive thinking 
Fichte defines Reflexion as being composed of 
self-knowledge, self-awareness of being bound by external 
objects, and, above all, of thinking. This thinking, in 
turn, is defined by our Dasein, a term Heidegger will 
appropriate in his writings. Heidegger's Dasein is 
characterized by its being alongside objects in th6 world. 
This, presented by Fichte, constitutes an object in itself. 
In other words: "I" is aware of itself as something that 
exists. Through the unity of these three components - self-
knowledge, awareness of external objects, and thinking -
consciousness liberates itself from a mere knowing that it 
knows, and develops instead into an independent Being which 
is at the same time just as much a product of thinking as 
are external objects. Without the thinking that thinking 
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does, the "I" would not exist. Or, as Heidegger will put 
it: "Das Denken denkt" (Thinking thinks). 
Reflexion does bring with it the perils of infinite 
regression which gives us the illusion that the "organic" 
unity of knowledge was a matter of uniting different parts. 
Fichte reminds us that what we are able to grasp in our 
knowledge is necessarily a unity, but that as soon as we 
grasp it, it splits into separate parts, each of which we 
can again grasp as a unity, and which splits again. The 
only way we can avoid this regression is by not attending 
to it ("dass du dich nicht weiter darum kiimmerst", Fichte, 
1845, p. 21). In this way, knowledge must not be seen as a 
uniting, since this would imply that there were separate 
parts in the first place which could be united, but that it 
is a Verschmelzunq. suggesting that a separation into its 
components would require some effort. As Fichte sees it, we 
exert this effort in philosophical reflection. In our 
everyday activities we are necessarily unaware of the 
possible separation of knowledge. It is precisely into this 
realm of unawareness that Fichte tries to probe. 
Fichte's concept of Verschmelzung has its roots in the 
Greek Logos. While he himself does not make specific 
reference to his philosophical heritage, it seems that 
Heidegger's elaboration on the Logos clarifies Fichte's 
concept of the primordial unity. "[Der Logos] ist niemals 
dialektisch bestimmt, das heisst als Gegeniiberstehen 
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standiger Gegensatze." ([the logos] is never determined 
dialectically, that is to say as a op-positing of constant 
opposites, Heidegger, 1986b, p. 277). With this statement 
Heidegger clearly follows in Fichte's footsteps in the 
sense that he, too, rejects the Hegelian dialectic which 
concentrates on the dissolution of opposites, opposites 
which must have been posited against each other before such 
a dissolution can take place in the form of the synthesis 
(Schacht, 1975, p. 33). As regards Fichte's suggestion that 
we do "not attend" to the regression, it brings to mind 
Heidegger's insistence on the "unaware" consciousness in 
which we are immersed in our everyday coping with things 
around us. 
When Fichte says that in order to avoid regression, we 
must not attend to the form of knowledge, or rather of 
reflection, he is foreshadowing the Heideggerian notion of 
"letting go", implying not a denial of the existence of 
reflection, but rather a bracketing activity. The fact that 
on the third stage philosophical reflection can be 
bracketed by "letting go" or by not attending to it, leads 
us back to our everyday mode of being, or, as Heidegger 
would put it, lets us return to Dasein's being-in-the-
world, and to its concernful employment of things present-
to-hand. According to Fichte, abstraction or philosophical 
reflection is meaningless in itself. Meaning is created 
only when we incorporate the everyday "I" into it, which 
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necessarily implies that we bracket philosophical 
reflection for the moment. In order to clarify the 
difference that Fichte sees, we can summarize that 
reflective thinking is characterized by philosophical 
abstraction. This implies the bracketing of the 
everydayness, (compare Husserl's epoche) whereas reflexive 
thinking implies bringing abstractions back to the "I", 
i.e. the bracketing of reflective thinking (Heidegger's 
Being-in-the-world). 
If Reflexion creates indeed a "doppeltes Wissen" (a 
double or two-fold knowledge, Fichte, 1845, p. 28), one 
subjective, the other objective, neither in itself would 
constitute knowledge. If we visualize form and matter of 
knowledge and imagine them as lines, we could see the 
"ideal" line defined by freedom, whose content is 
Beleuchtung (illumination). The "real" line is defined by 
Being, and has as its content Aufklaruna (clarification or 
clearing, Fichte, 1845, p. 29). Should these lines have 
different directions, should they never intersect, then 
knowledge would be impossible. If an intersection does 
occur, it would seem that we can define the point of 
juncture (der Punkt) as the moment in which absolute 
knowledge takes place. At the risk of overinterpreting the 
evidence, it would appear that this point of juncture 
constitutes the Heideggerian idea of Lichtuna (clearing). 
Heidegger's choice of words is reminiscent of Fichte's play 
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with terms of light. The notion of the meeting point brings 
to mind not only the Lichtunaf but the Auaenblick (moment) 
as well, a term employed by Heidegger to define a temporal 
point in which the past and the future "presence" 
themselves. The semantic relationship between Fichte's 
"illumination" and his "clarification" is not as readily 
apparent in English as it is in German. Nevertheless it 
produces an image of light, since even the adjective 
"clear" can have connotations in definite opposition to 
"dark". If we chose another translation of Aufklarung, that 
of "clearing", we soon come to realize that it can be 
employed spatially, in the sense of clearing away an 
obstruction. Maybe Fichte had this in mind, since the line 
of Aufklarung is, in his own words, that which is produced 
by freedom. It can be seen as the act of clearing away the 
obstruction of being bound, of finding itself limited by 
the physical senses. 
The ultimate ground of these limitations cannot be 
discovered by theorizing. It is here where Fichte disagrees 
with Kant. Whereas Kant stays true to the tradition of 
Idealism by insisting on the capabilities and powers of the 
ego to form the world, Fichte assumes the existence of a 
principle that works within us without our being aware of 
it. This principle he calls the pure or infinite ego, a 
unifying force that connects our different modes of being. 
This principle cannot be found in the finite or empirical 
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ego, which is merely our personal "I", and which is 
characterized by our everyday "common" consciousness, 
concerned with individual products and acts. While this 
ordinary consciousness may well perceive certain limits 
imposed on our thinking and on our knowledge. It is only 
through abstraction and philosophical reflection that we 
can reach the point where we are capable of an awareness of 
that which is limited. In other words, in order to pry open 
the realm of the pure ego, which Fichte defines as the 
primitive activity of consciousness, we have to exert a 
spiritual energy that differs from our everyday being, or 
as Heidegger would call it, from our being-in-the-world. 
Although being-in-the-world constitutes the most original 
mode of consciousness, we can only come to know it by a 
different mode, one that presupposes it. 
Fichte and Language 
Fichte claims that our view of the world is formed in 
its totality by ordinary consciousness. He simultaneously 
posits that this world-view is the product of an 
involuntary activity of the mind of which we are not aware. 
This activity works in conformity to rules, but Fichte's 
rules differ from the Kantian categories in that he denies 
the exclusivity of the categories. Fichte suggests that we 
can supply different sets of concepts, or to use more 
modern terminology, are able to operate in alternative 
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conceptual frameworks. He rejects the determinism of the 
Kantian categories, but he does not deny the existence of 
limitations, which operate according to certain laws. 
Die Regel dieser Beschrankung ist der Begriff - des 
Objects der ausseren Wahrnehmung nemlich, welches 
reproducirt wird. [Gieb mir einen Begriff von der mir 
unbekannten) Sache, heisst, gieb mir die Regel, nach 
der ich mir die Sache im freien Denken construiren 
kann.] (Fichte, 1845, p. 568, author's 
emphasis). 
The rule of this limitation is the concept- the 
concept of the object of external apperception which 
is being reproduced. [Giving me a concept of the thing 
(unknown to me) means giving me the rule according to 
which I can construct the thing for myself in free 
thought]. 
Without explicitly stating so, Fichte addresses the 
limitations, or in this case, the powers of language. In 
English this is not immediately evident, since the only 
possible renderings of Begriff with "idea" or "notion" do 
not necessarily convey the sense of anything verbal. "Idea" 
or "notion" may just as well define a spiritual entity. In 
German, the word Beariff necessarily implies a verbal 
expression. A Begriff can be an audible or written form of 
an idea, not just the abstract "idea" itself. 
Although the notion of the "idea itself" seems Kantian 
in its formulation, unfortunately it has never been 
considered by Kant. It seems that if there is a 
thing-in-itself, then there should as well be a 
subject-in-itself or an abstraction-in-itself. If this were 
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the case, could we not assume that then the abstraction 
would stand on its own, and could never be brought into 
objectification? 
When Fichte suggests that giving the Beariff implies 
giving the rule, not only does he suggest that a definition 
of an object is necessary for activating the imagination, 
but that it is language which makes imagination, and 
therefore knowledge, possible. After all, if we follow in 
Heidegger's footsteps and attempt a personal etymology, we 
come to realize that by taking apart the word Beariff we 
come upon areifen (to grasp, which, even in English can 
mean to understand). Greifen is the German term for 
literally grasping, taking hold of something. This taking 
hold again shows up in beareifen (to understand), which 
brings us full circle, since it is itself the verbal form 
of the noun Beariff. After this digression, Fichte's 
exposition of the necessity of thinking for the production 
of imagination becomes clearer. 
It has already been established that Fichte considers 
intuition-the preconceptual state preceding apperception -
to be immediate consciousness. His description of intuition 
enlightens the notion of the givenness of consciousness: 
Conceptual self-definition has to join with mere intuition 
in order to create an "I". In his Wissenschaftslehre of 
1798, Fichte develops the metaphor of the eye. Here it 
seems that the metaphor is directly applied to the 
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intuitive character of the "I". This is plausible, because 
in intellectual intuition, a positing is positing itself. 
Such a positing is a knowing that knows itself. If it is 
interpreted as intuition, it can be described adequately as 
an eye, whose view is directed towards itself. 
Denn nach paragr. 1 ist Bewusstsein ein sich selbst 
idealiter setzen: ein Sehen, und zwar Sich sehen... 
In dieser Bemerkung liegt der Grund aller Irrtiimer 
anderer philosophischer Systeme, selbst des 
Kantischen. Sie betrachten das Ich als einen Spiegel, 
in welchem ein Bild sich abspiegelt; nun aber sieht 
bei ihnen der Spiegel nicht selbst, es wird daher ein 
zweiter Spiegel fur jenen Spiegel erforderlich usf. 
Dadurch aber wird das Anschauen nicht erklart, sondern 
nur ein Abspiegeln... Das Ich in der 
Wissenschaftslehre hingegen ist kein Spiegel, sondern 
ein Auge; es ist ein sich abspiegelnder Spiegel, ist 
Bild von sich; durch sein eigenes sehen wird das Auge 
(die Intelligenz) sich selbst zum Bilde. (Fichte, 
1834, p. 377) 
For, according to paragraph 1, consciousness is a 
positing of oneself in a more ideal fashion: a seeing, 
a seeing oneself... In this observation lies the 
reason for all errors of other philosophical systems, 
even the Kantian. They consider the I as a mirror, in 
which an image is mirrored. In those systems the 
mirror does not see, therefore a second mirror is 
needed for this mirror, etc. Thereby, what is 
explained, is not intuition, but a mirroring... The I 
of the Science of Knowledge, on the contrary, is not a 
mirror, but an eye. It is an image of itself. The eye 
(intelligence), through its own seeing, becomes its 
own image. 
Fichte suggests the eye as a metaphor for the "I" because 
the Kantian mirror, which can only be reflection of an 
"Other", cannot explain the intuition, the "looking at". It 
is possible that Fichte choses the eye as the sign of 
intellectual intuition because it is the reason that Dasein 
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can come into a relationship with itself by seeing, even if 
not yet in a conceptual mode. Perception, for Fichte is a 
process which culminates in conception, the product of the 
process. Analogous to this conception is the Heideggerian 
notion that knowing is the process the outcome of which is 
knowledge. For Heidegger, as for Fichte, the mode of the 
knowing (process) modifies the knowledge (product). The 
state in which the unmediated "I" finds itself during the 
process of knowing or learning will necessarily determine 
the quality and the form of the knowledge that the "I" 
produces. As far as Fichte is concerned, the same holds 
true for the creation of concepts, since the precept 
(process) affects the form of the concept (product). 
In the Wissenschaftslehre of 1801 this application of 
the metaphor of the eye becomes even clearer. Fichte now 
constructs consciousness from a dichotomy of Being and 
Freedom, which transcends and illuminates Being. This Being 
is not outside of Dasein, it belongs to it. Knowledge is a 
for-itself, in which Dasein becomes transparent for itself. 
Reflexion is now called Absolute Reflexion. probably 
because Dasein is reflected in it as a whole, and with this 
activity steps into Dasein. Fichte now describes 
intellectual intuition as the act of reflexive thinking: 
Eben in dem Mittelpunkte, d.i. in dem Akte des 
Reflektierens steht die intellektuelle Anschauung und 
vereinigt beides, und in beiden die Nebenglieder 
beider. (Fichte, 1845, p. 35) 
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Precisely in the center, in the act of reflecting, 
intellectual intuition is located and unites both. In 
both, it unites the secondary members of both. 
Reflexive thinking is the absolute form of knowledge 
which is called "an in itself bright, posited, and clear 
eye" (Fichte, 1845, p. 37). Now intellectual intuition has 
taken a central position in Fichte' system, and it is 
considered the highest point to which one must climb. 
Fichte stresses the self-relation of the gaze when he says 
that the eye is not closed in itself. The eye "sees nothing 
outside of itself, but it sees itself" (Fichte, 1845, 
p. 38). 
The Return to the Unmediated "I" 
Re-tracing Fichte's path to consciousness, we come to 
see that the first level is that of intuition, on which 
Dasein acknowledges itself as an "I". This "I" is here not 
yet characterized as an "I" that distinguishes itself from 
a "non-I". The ability to make this differentiation enters 
in the second stage. It is defined by the apperception of 
phenomena, and by the illusion that there are entities 
which exist independently of us (things-in-themselves). 
Evidently this is an idea that Fichte inherited from Kant. 
Here the "I" must necessarily have a different form than it 
had in the preconceptual level, since it is in part shaped 
by these outside influences. Once the leap is made from 
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mere apperceptions of external objects to the abstraction 
of these objects via concepts fBeariff&) and ideas, the 
third level in the development of consciousness is reached. 
The "I" is now capable of philosophical thought, of 
reflection. However, the path that culminates in 
intellectual intuition is not completed until this 
capability of abstracting is brought back and united with 
the mode of Dasein on the first level, that of intuition. 
Having reached the third level and being able to 
entertain abstract concepts, does not guarantee that 
knowledge becomes meaningful for the "I". The achievement 
of philosophical reflection is indeed a prerequisite of 
consciousness. Consciousness as Fichte attempted to define 
it is only reached once the capability of abstracting has 
turned back into itself, turned back into the most basic 
form of the "I", defined by intuition. The activity of 
reflexive thinking is the missing link through which the 
circle can be completed. While on Fichte's third stage, 
abstraction is possible, it becomes meaningful only after 
it has been brought back to the stage of intuition, where 
it has to be "melted" with the most basic awareness of the 
"I". Without linking it to the personal, intuitive "I", 
abstraction must remain outside of me, must remain 
meaningless. 
This turning back into itself is a concept that has 
been appropriated and elaborated by Heidegger in his notion 
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of Zuruckgehen (returning) to that which is always already, 
the unconscious knowledge that "I" am "I". Fichte's concept 
of the passive mode of the "I" which awaits abstractions in 
a state of repose (Ruhe), is born out of this turning back. 
The turning back is not to be considered a fourth stage, 
rather it is the process, the activity (Thatigkeit) by 
which knowledge is appropriated in the act of personalizing 
it and therefore rendering it meaningful. Reflexive 
thinking is therefore characterized by the activity of 
applying knowledge to "myself" and to who the "I" is in 
everyday life (Fichte's intuition). 
It seems, therefore, that the quality of Fichte's 
"state of repose", the "waiting for the apparition of 
abstractions", determines the quality of the abstraction. 
While in philosophical reflection the form of the 
abstraction may be considered objectively, it becomes 
subjective through the activity of turning back. The 
quality of the "I" at any given point of "repose" or of 
"awaiting" is itself a determining factor as to the quality 
of the abstraction entertained on the stage of 
philosophical reflection. 
It is not surprising that Fichte was enchanted with 
the writings of Rousseau who concluded that the first six 
years in the life of a child are the determining ones, and 
that anything happening after these initial years no longer 
matters. We may characterize the activity of learning as 
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the activity of bringing abstraction back to the level of 
intuition. Beforehand, we must realize that the determining 
factor is the quality of the "I" which must already be 
developed to a certain degree in order to sort out and 
personalize the abstractions that are being brought back to 
it. The limitations of knowledge are inspired by the 
limitations of the ways of knowing. All later knowing is 
but reorganization and rearrangement. If the "I" has only a 
limited stock of organizational possibilities available, 
then the knowledge it will produce will necessarily be 
limited as well. If, on the other hand, the "I" has a large 
capacity to arrange the abstractions that besiege it, the 
knowledge that ensues will be broader. Naturally, this 
poses serious problems as far as learning is concerned. 
Rousseau had already acknowledged the fact that after a 
certain age any sort of instruction could not result in an 
increase of knowledge. In Fichtean terms, this means that 
the "I" in its developing stages is dependent on input, is 
formed by abstract thought. At the moment of learning or 
knowing, however, the mind must do with the form and 
capacity it has developed so far. At this point, its 
capacity will determine the form that the knowledge will 
take on. 
Knowledge, for Fichte, takes on an aesthetic form once 
it returns and incorporates intuition. In this process, the 
abstraction can only take on a certain predetermined form 
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because of the form that the "I" has at this point. The 
query of how the "I" has assumed this form must be answered 
similarly to the query of how knowledge of external objects 
is at all possible. According to Fichte, it seems that the 
knowledge that the "I" has of itself must develop parallel 
to the knowledge that it has of external objects. This 
implies that the "I" itself must pass through the three 
stages described above in order to reach the state where it 
can simultaneously influence and be influenced by the 
abstractions that it awaits. 
To summarize, we must acknowledge that for both Fichte 
and his predecessor Kant the limitations of thinking are 
biologically determined. The major difference between these 
two thinkers must be the fact that for Kant the "I" is 
unequivocally autonomous, whereas for Fichte this autonomy 
is not total. Fichte insists that it is not the "I" that 
does the thinking. It is the thinking, the Act or process, 
that does the thinking. Heidegger appropriated this 
particular aspect of Fichte's philosophy more than a 
century later. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE INDIVIDUAL MIND 
Part 1: Hegel - The Beginning of a Collective Consciousness 
Having come to an understanding of the development of 
the individual "I" in Chapter I, we are now in a position 
to consider the possibility of gathering and organizing 
these diverse egos into an all-encompassing concept - that 
of Hegel's collective consciousness. To use a Kantian 
metaphor, the manifold of individual egos must be 
synthesized in order for Hegel to be able to arrive at the 
stipulation of a general consciousness whithin which the 
individual mind can be situated. 
The transition from Kant and Fichte to Hegel is best 
characterized as a move from a purely personal to a 
universal subject. For Kant and Fichte, there is one 
subject per person, (Solomon, 1987, p. 13) and that 
conscious self is, simultaneously, a formal necessity. It 
is the unifying principle which precedes any form of 
consciousness. While Kant considered this unifying 
principle as being in space and time, Hegel's main 
criticism of Kant is the fact that the thinking self 
imposes these forms on any possible experience and must 
therefore precede even the conception of time and space. 
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For Kant the vehicle of all knowledge is the 
Transcendental Ego. For Fichte it is the Absolute Ego. Both 
are clearly reminiscent of Descartes' cogito and both are 
limited by their individual scope. Hegel, however, posits 
the concept of Geist as general consciousness that is 
common to everyone. While his philosophy stresses the 
unimportance of the individual, this is not to say that he 
denies the existence of individual differences, but, for 
the sake of determining how it is possible that we come to 
knowledge, he suspends the differences between individual 
minds. He brackets the mind, so to speak, in order to 
theorize about knowledge in a philosophical sense. This 
gives his philosophy the impersonal and general overtones 
that Kierkegaard and Heidegger will eventually reject on 
the basis that the Hegelian Geist is too objective and too 
abstract. In short, it is not concerned with the concepts 
that inform the lives of everyday people. 
The discussion of Hegel's concept of Geist gains 
importance once we acknowledge that it is this Geist which 
constitutes the foundation of all knowledge. Hegel, like 
Heidegger after him, tries to probe the realm behind 
consciousness. The Geistf although located in that realm as 
the unifying force, is not a thing or a substance. It is a 
unifying, thoroughgoing activity, (Tatigkeit), reminiscent 
of Kant's synthesis and Fichte's Actf capable of gathering 
the manifold representations or impressions of intuition 
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and thereby creating the universal concepts of reason and 
of understanding. While Hegel's Geist is necessarily 
presupposed by any kind of experience, it cannot be 
experienced as such in any of these experiences. In this 
respect, his Geist parallels Kant's transcendental ego. 
Hegel removes himself from the Kantian theory, however, in 
his insistence that Geist is truly universal. It is a 
general consciousness, and therefore different from Kant's 
transcendental ego, since it does not take as its basis the 
claim that through its unifying activity it generates one 
ego in each individual. 
The System 
In the Phanomenologie des Geistes, Hegel suggests a 
redefinition of Kant's critical philosophy. In the 
introduction, Hegel challenges the presuppositions of 
Kant's critique. He expresses an uneasiness with Kant's 
claim that various kinds of knowledge are not equally 
reliable, and that we might choose the wrong kind. The 
Kantian critique is founded on the assumption that 
knowledge can lead either to error or to truth. Kant's goal 
is to show us the right direction. Simultaneously, his 
Critique must assume that its own definitions of knowledge 
and truth must be true in order to appeal to them. It seems 
that Hegel's criticism of the Kantian Critique is valid, 
since the Critique defines its own criteria of truth-
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measurement without examining their validity. His main 
concern is the fact that the Kantian Critique makes no 
assumptions about what should or should not constitute 
knowledge. 
In the Phanomenologie, Hegel's main project is to 
demonstrate that philosophy expresses the highest truth 
about reality (ontology). His philosophy is a 
reconciliation with reality. It is in stark contrast with 
Kant's subjective searching and the sharp distinction that 
he and Fichte had proposed between the ideal and the real. 
Contrary to philosophers before him, Hegel sees no value in 
refuting previous or contradictory philosophical systems. 
... so ist es nicht abzusehen, ... dass diese Furcht 
zu irren schon der Irrtum selbst ist. In der Tat setzt 
sie etwas, und zwar manches, als Wahrheit voraus. ... 
sie setzt namlich Vorstellungen von dem Erkennen als 
einem Werkzeuge und Medium, auch einen Unterschied 
unserer selbst von diesem Erkennen voraus. 
(Hegel, 1987, p. 66) 
... it is unavoidable ... that this fear of erring is 
the initial error itself. As a matter of fact, this 
fear presupposes something, indeed a great deal, as 
truth. ... It presupposes ideas of knowledge as an 
instrument and a medium, and it presupposes a 
distinction of ourselves from this knowledge. 
Hegel, in contrast to Kant, does not see traditional 
skepticism as a problem. He accuses Kant of an error in his 
distinction between objects of knowledge and things-in-
themselves. He argues that by thinking any thought to its 
conclusion, the thinker will reach the Absolute. This 
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applies to philosophical systems as well as to the "naive" 
attitude prescribed to by the "common individual." 
Denn ist das Erkennen ein Werkzeug, sich des absoluten 
Wesens zu bemachtigen, so fallt sogleich auf, dass die 
Anwendung eines Werkzeugs auf eine Sache sie vielmehr 
nicht lasst, wie sie fiir sich ist, sondern eine 
Formierung und Veranderung mit ihr vornimmt. ... Wir 
gebrauchen ... ein Mittel, welches unmittelbar das 
Gegenteil seines Zwecks hervorbringt; oder das 
Widersinnige ist vielmehr, dass wir uns iiberhaupt 
eines Mittels bedienen. ... Sollte das Absolute durch 
das Werkzeug uns nur iiberhaupt naher gebracht werden, 
ohne etwas an ihm zu verandern, ... so wiirde es wohl, 
wenn es nicht an und fiir sich schon bei uns ware und 
sein wollte, dieser List spotten; denn eine List ware 
in diesem Falle das Erkennen, da es durch sein 
vielfaches Bemuhen ganz etwas anderes zu treiben sich 
die Miene gibt, als nur die unmittelbare und somit 
miihelose Beziehung hervorzubringen. (Hegel, 1987, 
pp. 65/66) 
If knowledge is a tool used to take possession of 
absolute reality, it becomes obvious at once that 
the application of a tool to an object does not leave 
it as it is for itself, but gets formed and changed. 
... We use ... a means which immediately produces the 
opposite of its purpose; or rather, the absurdity lies 
in the fact that we employ a means at all. ... Should, 
through the tool, the absolute be brought closer to us 
without being changed, ... it would defy such a trick 
if it were not and did not want to be with us in and 
for itself in the first place. In such a case 
knowledge would be a trick, since through its manifold 
effort it would pretend to do something very different 
than just to produce an immediate and therefore 
effortless relation. 
In this passage from the Introduction, Hegel claims that 
the Absolute is with us from the very beginning, and that 
the process of thinking can only make us aware of that 
which has always already been in the background of 
consciousness, the Absolute. Whereas Kant and Fichte had 
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presented Absolute Knowledge as the ideal to be pursued by 
man, Hegel finds it in the innermost nucleus of everything. 
It seems that recollection plays an important role for 
Hegel, although he does not explicitly speak of Er-inneruna 
until the last pages of the Phanomenologie (Verene, 1985, 
p. 3). When he does mention recollection, it clearly has 
platonic overtones. 
The unity of Being and Thinking 
According to Hegel, the Kantian system of thought 
neglected to establish a standard (Masstab̂  against which 
any judgement could be measured. Hegel asserts that such a 
standard is always already present in a thinking 
individual. Discerning truth from falsity, the individual 
must already believe that any thought can be true only 
under certain conditions. Accepting these conditions, he 
has already had such a standard of judgement. Thus, even 
ordinary knowledge, rooted in the natural attitude (as 
opposed to philosophical reflection), already contains the 
Absolute, and can illuminate it by following the ladder to 
philosophical reflection which Hegel will furnish in the 
course of the Phanomenologie. The image of the ladder 
clarifies Hegel's intention not to dismiss the natural 
attitude or other philosophical positions, but to offer a 
series of transformations through which these other 
attitudes can be related to philosophy: 
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Die Wissenschaft von ihrer Seite verlange vom 
Selbstbewusstsein, dass es in diesen Ather sich 
erhoben habe, um mit ihr und in ihr leben zu konnen 
und zu leben. Umgekehrt hat das Individuum das Recht 
zu fordern, dass die Wissenschaft ihm die Leiter 
wenigstens zu diesem Standpunkt reiche. Sein Recht 
grundet sich auf seine Absolute Selbstandigkeit, die 
es in jeder Gestalt seines Wissens zu besitzen weiss, 
denn in jeder, sei sie von der Wissenschaft anerkannt 
oder nicht, und der Inhalt sei welcher er wolle, ist 
die absolute Form zugleich oder hat die unmittelbare 
Gewissheit seiner selbst; und, wenn dieser Ausdruck 
vorgezogen wurde, damit unbedingtes Sein. (Hegel, 
1987, pp. 26/27) 
Science on its part would demand from self-
consciousness that it has risen to this high ether in 
order to live with and in it [science]. Conversely, 
the individual has the right to demand that science 
hand him the ladder to help him to reach at least this 
position. His right is based on his Absolute 
Independence which he knows he possesses in every 
phase of his knowledge, because in each phase - be it 
accepted by science or not, be the content what it may 
- the absolute knowledge is contained or has the 
his right as an individual is the absolute and final 
form, i.e. he is the immediate certainty of self, and, 
Should the expression be preferred, he is 
unconditional Being. 
In this passage, the demand has been made that the 
Phanomenologie must demonstrate to natural consciousness 
that the absolute standpoint is already within its 
structures, even if it is unrecognized and preconceptual. 
Hegel sets as his task the demonstration that a unity 
exists between the two opposed standpoints of natural 
consciousness and philosophy. It is an idea that will 
figure prominently a century later in the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger. 
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Hegel demonstrates this unity via the dialectic. The 
dialectic of Geist is a process of discovery, not of 
ultimate proof. He rejected the philosophy of reflection 
because it could not rise to the idea of the absolute unity 
of subject and object. Contrarily, the Hegelian dialectic, 
recognizes the opposites. Therefore, the Absolute is not a 
dead concept, a thing to be reached or not. It is a 
process, it is life, it is spirit. Here again we must look 
toward Heidegger to find the continuation of this thought. 
Heidegger thought Hegel's thought to its conclusion, and 
came to the understanding that any kind of knowing is a 
discovery, or, to.put it in his own words, a presencing of 
that which has always already been there but has been 
unthought. For Heidegger, ultimate knowledge consists of 
returning to the unthought realm, returning to our everyday 
existence in the world through the act of Er-innerunq. His 
emphasis is on the process, on the continuity of the 
different forms of thinking. Contrarily, various forms of 
knowledge that Hegel discusses oppose one another. For 
objective knowledge, subjectivity is untrue. For subjective 
knowledge, objectivity is untrue. However, if the objective 
knowledge proves untrue, this does not prove that it is a 
wrong way to define truth. It only proves its failure to 
bring into consciousness an object independent of 
subjective conditions. 
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The Hegelian Dialectic 
In order to get a grasp of the Hegelian dialectic, we 
must first come to an understanding of its chief element, 
the notion of negation. If the object which consciousness 
apprehends (der Geaenstand furies, the object for 
consciousness) reveals the object-in-itself (der Geaenstand 
anzsich) - or, similarly, if the object-in-itself is 
known - then, according to Hegel, knowledge is true. If the 
object-in-itself is not known, then knowledge is untrue. 
The negation implied in this statement seems to affect not 
the object, but rather the consciousness that contemplates 
it. For Hegel, this is not the case. The object which we 
apprehend is not endowed with some truth that we may call 
the object-in-itself and which we may or may not know. 
Consciousness takes the truth to be the object-in-itself: 
Der Gegenstand scheint zwar fur [das Bewusstsein] nur 
so zu sein, wie es ihn weiss; es scheint gleichsam 
nicht dahinterkommen zu konnen wie er, nicht fur 
dasselbe, sondern wie er an sich ist, und also auch 
sein Wissen nicht an ihm prvifen zu konnen. Allein 
gerade darin, dass es uberhaupt schon von einem 
Gegenstand weiss, ist schon der Unterschied vorhanden, 
dass ihm etwas das An-sich, ein anderes Moment aber 
das Wissen, Oder das Sein des Gegenstandes fur das 
Bewusstsein ist. (Hegel, 1987, p. 74) 
The object seems to be [for consciousness] only the 
way it knows it; consciousness does not seem to be 
able to find out how the object is - not for 
consciousness - but in itself, and it can therefore 
not test its knowledge in relation to the object. 
Alone in the fact that it knows about an object at 
all, the difference becomes clear that for 
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consciousness the in-itself is one thing, but another 
element is the knowledge or the Being of an object for 
consciousness. 
Negation is defined and limited by what it negates. It does 
not prove the untruth of other kinds of knowledge which may 
define truth in another manner. It seems that the 
Heideggerian concept of Privation has its origin in the 
Hegelian negation, for, as Heidegger points out repeatedly, 
privation does not imply the total absence of content, but 
that it limits, and to a degree, re-defines the content. 
The fact that Hegel posits a difference in the two modes of 
consciousness, and supposes that consciousness is aware of 
that difference, paves the way for Heidegger. The latter, 
in his insistence that Dasein is always already familiar 
with the things present-at-hand, suggests that 
consciousness knows of its different modes, and that, 
therefore, we need to ask the question of Being with Dasein 
as our starting point. 
Every concept is limited, and, once it is logically 
thought through, it passes over into its opposite, its 
negation. Through this negation a new positive is created. 
Negation (or Privation for Heidegger) negates only the 
definite content, not all content of a concept. In the 
process, a new concept comes into force which is related to 
the previous one. It is related to the old concept by 
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memory, by recollection, and it is thus richer than the old 
one. 
In the Phanomenologie, Hegel provides an explanation 
of what he understands by the dialectic movement. If the 
process of thinking a thought to its conclusion brings the 
thinker to an awareness that the object-in-itself (der 
Geqenstand an-sichl is in actuality only the object-for 
consciousness (der Geqenstand fur-esl, then consciousness 
has touched both itself and the object. The object must now 
be seen in a different light. Hegel links the dialectic 
with experience, since it was through the experience of 
thinking that the object apprehended changed for the 
thinker: 
Diese dialektische Bewegung, welche das Bewusstsein an 
ihm selbst, sowohl an seinem Wissen als an seinem 
Gegenstande ausubt, insofern ihm der neue wahre 
Gegenstand daraus entspringt, ist eigentlich 
dasjenige, was Erfahrung genannt wird. ... Dieser neue 
Gegenstand enthalt die Nichtigkeit des ersten, er ist 
die iiber ihn gemachte Erfahrung. (Hegel, 1987, p. 75) 
This dialectical movement, which consciousness 
performs upon itself as well as upon its knowledge and 
its objects - as far as the new, true object 
originates from it - is really that which is called 
experience. ... This new object contains the 
negation of the first object; it is the experience 
that has been made about it. 
Here, again, negation (or the Heideggerian Privation) is 
not to be seen as the untruth of the object as it was first 
apprehended. On the contrary, without the negation the 
object as it now appears, could not be apprehended in this 
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new manner. The new object has been produced by a Umkehrunct 
des Bewusstseins (a reversal of consciousness). Similarly, 
it was our doing that has appropriated the negation and 
transformed the apprehended object. 
Level one - Sense-Certainty 
In the first three chapters of the Phanomenologie, 
Hegel discusses three forms of consciousness. While each 
form of consciousness contains within itself a certain 
philosophical analysis of knowledge, a certain 
philosophical view, together they represent the ladder that 
leads from the natural attitude to philosophical reflection 
or Absolute Knowledge. Different from Kant and Fichte, 
Hegel stresses the importance of the object. Kant insisted 
on inner knowledge as the arbitor of any kind of knowledge. 
Hegel suggests that the object is taken as more essential 
than our knowledge. With this move, he positions himself in 
the realm of Phenomenology in the Husserlian sense, since 
he is concerned mainly with the impact that objects and 
phenomena have on the thinking Self. For Hegel, to go 
beyond the subjective standpoint of the subject is the only 
possible way to arrive at an objective understanding. This 
implies, that in Hegel's epistemology, the ego is no longer 
limited to a particular viewpoint which in turn will impose 
on our categories. The different rungs of the Hegelian 
ladder which will eventually lead to absolute knowledge are 
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those of Sinnliche Gewissheit (sense-certainty), 
Wahrnehmuna (perception), and Verstand (intellect). This 
"path to natural consciousness" is clearly one that 
progresses from the inner to the outer realm, from 
subjectivity to objectivity, from the individual to society 
at large. 
On the level of sense-certainty, 
Das Wissen, welches zuerst oder unmittelbar unser 
Gegenstand ist, kann kein anderes sein als dasjenige, 
welches selbst unmittelbares Wissen, Wissen des 
Unmittelbaren oder Seinenden ist. Wir haben uns also 
unmittelbar oder aufnehmend zu verhalten, also nichts 
an ihm, wie es sich darbietet, zu verandern, und von 
dem Auffassen des Begreifens abzuhalten. (Hegel, 
1987, p. 79) 
That knowledge, which is first or immediately our 
object of concern, can be no other than that which is 
itself immediate knowledge, knowledge of the immediate 
or of the being (of what is). We must act in an 
immediate or receptive fashion, we must change nothing 
about the object as it offers itself, and prevent the 
grasp of the understanding. 
It seems that this most basic and original level of 
knowledge will later be appropriated by Heidegger who will 
also inherit the Hegelian concept of being aufnehmend 
(receptive). The stress that Heidegger puts on Dasein's 
receptivity is explained by the fact that the ultimate mode 
of consciousness for him takes place in precisely the realm 
which Hegel characterized by sense-certainty, where we do 
not yet "understand", where our "knowledge" of things is 
still preconceptual. This preconceptual stage represents 
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for Heidegger the primordial grounding where all we can do 
is to "stand open" (be receptive) to phenomena. This realm 
of unmediated knowledge, of the unmediated "I", is also the 
realm of the logos which is characterized by an absence of 
the difference between subject and object. 
Auffassen (mere apprehension) is still free from 
Beareifen (conceptual comprehension). Knowledge at this 
level means being acquainted with the objects of our 
immediate concern. (Compare Heidegger's zuhandene Dinae -
objects which are present-to-hand, and Kant's "blind 
intuition" without concepts.) According to the traditional 
view, objects can be identified only if we presuppose that 
they have properties. Even in this view, the object must 
first of all be a mere "this". Contrarily, Hegel argues 
that even a "this" must simultaneously constitute a 
"what?11, implying that in order to identify an object we 
must not only find it worthy of attention, but must be able 
to describe it in more or less universal terms (Solomon, 
1987, p. 20). His insistence that, in order to understand 
knowing, we must understand how we describe objects of our 
knowledge gives us an idea of his view of the importance of 
language: Without language, without descriptions, there can 
be no knowing. Hegel dismisses Sense-Certainty as a valid 
form of consciousness, and he drops it from the dialectic 
almost from the beginning. As knowing subjects, or as 
agents, we must have some sense, however inarticulate, of 
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what we are doing. According to Heidegger, it is a matter 
of bringing this dim sense to formulation that will enable 
us to reach a higher form of consciousness. Thus, that 
activity of articulating something, that is, the activity 
of language will bring something to full consciousness that 
we have previously only had an inarticulate sense of. 
The knowledge that we as agents have of our action is 
very different than that we may have of external objects, 
but it is never an immediate one. It is always mediated by 
our efforts to formulate it. With this assertion, Hegel 
distances himself clearly from the Cartesian "privileged" 
access that we as agents have to the activity of our minds. 
It seems that Kant was one of the first philosophers 
to attack the notion of immediate access to the workings of 
the mind. He, as well, made a distinction between the 
different kinds of knowledge we can have - the knowledge of 
an external object, and the synthetic a priori truths we 
can hold, and which are an important sense of our own 
actions. Fichte, who had attempted to define subject-object 
identity, is Kant's successor in this line of thought. He 
took over the latter's concept of "intellectual intuition" 
as a kind of knowledge in which the activity of the self 
makes possible the unity of the manifold, in this case 
subject and object. 
The task of the first moment of the dialectic is 
established; it is that of description, bringing to mind 
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the Socratic practice of articulation. "Sense-Certainty", 
the original naive position, although not a valid form of 
consciousness, establishes certain presuppositions for 
experience. It contains certain beliefs about knowledge, 
experience, and reality without which a reflective attitude 
could not be achieved. The validity of this "natural" frame 
of mind is assured by the fact that it constitutes the 
"absolute beginning" of knowledge. Hegel considers this 
naive frame of mind a lower kind of knowledge without which 
the rise to a higher kind cannot be accomplished. 
Level two - Perception 
In the second chapter of the Phanomenologie, we begin 
by assuming that the presuppositions of the "natural" 
stance are inadequate. For an alternate form of 
consciousness, that of Perception fWahrnehmunal. the 
external object is both unique and distinct from other 
perceivable things. Perception is an attempt to replace the 
bare particulars of Sense-Certainty with a different 
conception of knowledge, one in which we must assume that 
an object is a unit of properties. 
Die Wahrnehmung nimmt hingegen das, was ihr das Seinde 
ist, als Allgemeines. Wie die Allgemeinheit ihr 
Prinzip uberhaupt, so sind auch ihre in ihr 
unmittelbar sich unterscheidenden Momente, Ich ein 
allgemeines, und der Gegenstand ein allgemeiner. Jenes 
Prinzip ist uns entstanden, und unser Aufnehmen der 
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Wahrnehmung daher nicht mehr ein erscheinendes 
Aufnehmen, wie der sinnlichen Gewissheit, sondern ein 
notwendiges. (Hegel, 1987, p. 90) 
Perception takes what is given to it as universal. As 
universality is its overall principle, so too are its 
moments distinguished in their immediacy. "I" is a 
universal, and the object is a universal. Every 
principle has developed for us, and our reception of 
perception is therefore no longer a reception of 
phenomena, as it was in sense-certainty, but it is a 
necessary reception. 
Here, consciousness can no longer apprehend its object to 
appear as perceived. The object must now be taken to be 
both a distinct unity as well as a multiplicity of 
properties. Now the object must become an intelligible 
object, and consciousness must make the transition to 
understanding. The stage of Perception is an attempt to 
replace Sense-Certainty with a conception of knowledge 
suggesting that all that we are acquainted with are 
properties and that an object is nothing but a unit of 
properties. 
Level three - The Intellect 
In the chapter on the intellect (der Verstand) as a 
form of consciousness, Hegel makes the point that 
consciousness, although in the form of perception, has 
"arrived at thoughts" ("ist es zu Gedanken gekommen," 
Hegel, 1987, p. 104), can only in the form of intellectual 
understanding bring these thoughts together "in the 
unconditional universal" ("im unbedingt Allgemeinen", 
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Hegel, 1987, p. 104). The intellect's first conception of 
an object is a rule by which it construes the perceived 
appearance of the object and then goes on to a form an 
"unconditional" conception of it. The intellect is still 
under the impression that the object it perceives is 
distinct from itself and that it is simultaneously a 
multiplicity of properties. This Kraft (Force) explains our 
ability to individuate objects, and so, the intellect has 
realized that the identity of an external object is to be 
construed in terms of the notion of "difference." The idea 
of this suprasensible force is reminiscent of Kant's thing-
in-itself as a substance that lies behind properties and 
particulars. This force (or this substance) can only be 
known by the intellect. 
To summarize, Hegel discusses and simultaneously 
dismisses three versions of consciousness on the basis that 
we can never know particulars, only universals. In Sense-
Perception this thought is conveyed by his argument that 
objects are not simply there. Similarly, in Perception, it 
is argued that we are acquainted with properties. Therefore 
he suggests that we predicate properties of particulars by 
referring to a suprasensible substance (Kraft) which has 
those properties. In his rejection of the Kantian thing-in-
itself, Hegel, simultaneously, follows Kant's move and 
speculates that objects are not given, but that we are 
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responsible of producing the objects which we are under the 
illusion of being given. 
Subject versus Object 
In the section on Self-Consciousness, Hegel follows 
Kant in his insistence that the contribution of the knower 
is vital to any theory of knowledge. Self-consciousness 
becomes a new form of knowledge. By reflecting on our 
knowledge of objects we must ultimately come to 
self-knowledge. In this chapter, Hegel's aim is the 
description of the individuals quest for selfhood. He 
begins with the natural subject as a living, conscious 
being with desires. Conscious, it must distinguish itself 
from a world of objects which are other than it. These 
objects are not merely objects of knowledge, but also 
objects of desire. They seem to exist independently from 
the individual. In the process of achieving the truth, of 
realizing that these objects are not independent, the 
object is destroyed as object and preserved as subject. 
The process of desire is destructive of an object and 
productive of a subject. The subject has now achieved a 
level of "self-feeling", which is falling short of self-
consciousness . 
In opposition to this natural subject is the 
proto-self, which has achieved self-consciousness. He can 
make the distinction between I-as-a subject and 
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I-as-an-object. His quest is the destruction of the 
I-as-an-object, and the preservation of the I-as-a-subject. 
If two self-conscious beings engage in battle, the true 
goal is not to obliterate the other being, but rather to 
destroy the object-side of the "I." Therefore, when one 
consciousness looses the battle, it will submit as a 
"slave" to a "master" simply for the reason of being 
recognized as a second I-as-a-subject. 
Die Wahrheit des selbststandigen Bewusstseins ist 
demnach das knechtische Bewusstsein. Dieses erscheint 
zwar zunachst ausser sich und nicht als die Wahrheit 
des Selbstbewusstseins. Aber wie die Herrschaft 
zeigte, dass ihr Wesen das Verkehrte dessen ist, was 
sie sein will, so wird auch wohl die Knechtschaft 
vielmehr in ihrer Vollbringung zum Gegenteile dessen 
werden, was sie unmittelbar ist; sie wird als in sich 
zuriickgedrangtes Bewusstsein in sich gehen, und zur 
wahren Selbststandigkeit sich umkehren. (Hegel, 1987, 
p. 147) 
The truth of the independent consciousness is 
therefore the serving consciousness. At first this 
appears outside of itself, and not as the truth of 
consciousness. But as the mastery has shown that its 
essence is the opposite of that which it wants to be, 
so in its accomplishment the servitude will as well 
become the opposite of that which it is immediately. 
The servitude will go into itself as a consciousness 
forced back into itself, and will turn into true 
independence. 
The master-slave relationship is reminiscent of 
Fichte's point of juncture of the "real" line and the 
"ideal" line (Fichte, 1945, p. 29). Here, the Kantian 
"Form" and "Matter" meet, and produce consciousness. The 
mode of consciousness which will ensue, however, is 
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determined by the weight that each line bears at the moment 
of consciousness. For Fichte, as for Hegel, the 
fluctuations which consciousness undergoes, are thus 
explained by their respective philosophical systems. 
It is now established that for Hegel, human existence 
is primarily a matter of mutual recognition. Only by being 
recognized by others do we achieve self-awareness and are 
able to strive towards social meaning in our lives. 
To take things a step further, Hegel's dialectic moves 
from mere consciousness of objects to self-consciousness, 
to the notion of Reason. Once we have achieved Reason, we 
must acknowledge the fact that our activities are as 
essential to the objects of knowledge as the objects are to 
our knowledge. This, again, brings to mind the "activity" 
and the "process" of knowing of which Fichte and Heidegger 
speak. 
Whereas for Descartes, self-conscious understanding 
was self-evident, Hegel saw it as a goal that could only be 
achieved by an interiorization of what was once external, 
the overcoming of an instinctive external life. Self-
perception, for Hegel, is an activity, not a given, as it 
was for Descartes. This notion of activity is clearly 
appropriated from Kant, who insisted that all perception is 
constituted by our conceptual activity. 
The achievement of any higher intellectual 
understanding comes about through our activity of 
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formulating - in our language, our concepts, and in our 
social practices - as the institution of the master-slave 
relationship which has shown to be a search for 
recognition. 
However, it can be argued that embodiment plays a 
central part in Hegel's epistemology. Since for him, mental 
life is pimarily to be understood as the inner reflection 
of an embodied life-process, this mental life must have a 
depth which goes far beyond the Cartesian self-transparency 
of the self. The path to consciousness is for Hegel a 
journey from outwardness, manifested in our practices, 
toward inwardness. Therefore, all the presuppositions for 
Reason which we find in the different forms of 
consciousness have a bodily origin, since they originate in 
Sense-Certainty. 
Against Cartesian dualism, Kant argued that it is 
false that we know the mental better than the physical. 
Contrarily, he saw the very possibility of a unified self-
consciousness grounded in the existence of physical 
objects. He believed in the existence of raw sensory 
materials which could be examined as existing within 
themselves. Hegel argued against this notion. He argues 
that any sensation we have of sense data (such as 
properties) can only follow and must be parasitic of our 
prior knowledge of physical objects. 
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Speculation and the Absolute 
For Hegel, the intellect does not merely understand, 
but determines our world. In agreement with Fichte, Hegel 
stipulates that our experience changes with our concepts of 
experience. Different forms of consciousness must produce 
different experiences. Different philosophical outlooks 
must also provide different bases for experience, and for 
him there is no intelligible way to acknowledge a world 
beyond our possible knowledge. 
While self-reflection is a subject-object relationship 
which is primarily subjective, Hegel posits that once this 
"reflection upon reflection" destroys itself, the path is 
opened to an establishment of a totality, the Absolute. 
Thus the destruction of self-reflection, which is caused by 
reflection making itself its own reflective subject, 
coincides "with the overcoming of the last possible 
opposition, that of the self to itself" (Gasche, 1986, 
p. 41). It is the Ego, the subject, the Self, which stands 
in the way of achieving speculation or absolute reflection. 
According to Hegel, it is Reason which makes possible the 
overcoming of the last possible opposition, that of the 
self to itself. Once this gulf is bridged, subject and 
object will be identical - not through a subjective or 
objective synthesis of the subject-object relation - but 
because of the fact that all opposition is overcome, and 
the realm of the Absolute is reached. 
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The means by which this Absolute can be reached, 
according to Hegel, is speculation and its mirroring 
function. As Gasche has pointed out, speculation, since 
German Idealism, meant a kind of purely theoretical 
knowledge which constituted itself in self-reflection: 
One calls a relation speculative when an object first 
remains fixed in a purely phenomenal state, but is 
then also recognized as being for a subject - an 
in-itself, or indeed a for-itself. (Gasche, 1986, 
p. 43) 
The difference to the traditional notion of reflection is 
the fact that the relationship is not one of assigning a 
property to a given thing, but rather "...must be thought 
of as a mirroring, in which the reflection is the pure 
appearance of what is reflected..." (Gadamer, 1975, in 
Gasche, 1986, p. 43). Speculative thought lifts "the 
identity of which sound sense is not conscious into 
consciousness" (Hegel, 1977, p. 100). However, since 
conscious and non-conscious are by nature posited in 
polarity, it seems that consciousness must also be 
nullified in speculation. Contained within this is the 
assumption that speculation comes close to what Heidegger 
calls our originary being-in-the-world, our being-with 
things present-at-hand, a state which exists 
preconceptually, and which is the presupposition of all 
consciousness (in the sense of awareness, or as Hegel would 
call it "mere cognition"). Certainly it would seem that 
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this condition results if we define speculation as the 
overcoming of the major antinomy of reflection, that of the 
subject and the object of its thought. 
In the first section of Hegel's Phanomenologie, 
entitled "Consciousness", the focus is not on knowledge but 
on the object of knowledge. The object is the "other" of 
the activity of knowing, whereas that activity has lost 
itself to the object. Only in the section dealing with 
"Self-consciousness" is the transition to knowledge made. 
Here, self-consciousness is defined as the truth of 
consciousness. 
Wahrheit des Wissens, d.h. das Wissen alŝ das Wahre, 
ist erst erreicht, wo das Wissen selbst fur es 
Gegenstand wird, wo das Wissen solches fur es ist, wo 
die Gewissheit nicht mehr sinnliche ist, sondern 
"Gewissheit seiner selbst." (Heidegger, 1988, p. 185) 
Truth of knowledge, i.e. knowledge as the truth, is 
only then achieved when knowledge becomes an object 
for itself, when knowledge is in such a manner for 
itself that certainty no longer is sense-certainty, 
but where it becomes "certainty of itself." 
For Heidegger, "certainty" in this sense is not 
characterized as the Cartesian "I-certainty", but as the 
"How" and "What" of the thing known. He is in agreement 
with Hegel that only when consciousness knows itself, is 
there a possibility of it knowing truth. For Heidegger, 
once consciousness has made itself its own object, 
knowledge is no longer relative, but becomes absolute and 
infinite. In mere consciousness, the boundaries of the 
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Hegelian sense-certainty cannot be transcended. 
Consciousness is necessarily limited in its scope. But once 
it has made itself its object, it is no longer limited by 
these boundaries. In self-consciousness, consciousness can 
transcend the limitations, and it is open to an endless 
array of possibilities. 
Mit dem Selbstbewusstsein ist die Wahrheit iiberhaupt 
erst zu Hause, auf ihrem Grund und Boden. In der 
Sphare des Bewusstseins dagegen ist sie in der Fremde, 
d.h. sich selbst entfremdet und bodenlos. Wie die 
Interpretation der Wahrnehmung zeigte, ist die 
absolute Wahrheit, in der der Widerspruch wirklich 
gedacht werden soli, fur das Bewusstsein das 
Befremdliche, wogegen es sich wehrt und dem es zu 
entgehen sucht. (Heidegger, 1988, p. 187) 
Truth is at home, on its own ground and soil, only 
with self-consciousness. Contrarily, in the sphere of 
consciousness, it is in foreign parts, i.e. it is 
estranged from itself, and it is without ground. As 
the interpretation of apprehension has shown, for 
consciousness, the absolute truth, in which the 
contradiction is to be thought, is something strange 
against which it struggles and from which it attempts 
to flee. 
If Hegel conceives of reason as the absolute mode of 
consciousness, developed by the Geist. then Heidegger 
defines self-consciousness as the "middle", the relation, 
between consciousness and reason. For him, it is this 
"middle" which constitutes absolute truth. It is a relation 
which will produce the Geist capable of transcending its 
earthly boundaries. The potentialities of self-
consciousness constitute for Heidegger once again the link 
to temporality. Not only is self-consciousness aware of its 
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origins (its beginnings as consciousness in the realm of 
apprehension), it recognizes simultaneously its capability 
to transcend these origins in the form of the Geist. While 
the acknowledgment of the beginnings of self-consciousness 
constitute the past, the possibilities of the transcending 
Geist point to the future, "... die Richtung der Zukunft, 
die ihm als Geist zukommt." ("... the direction of the 
future which belongs to it (comes toward it) as Geist," 
Heidegger, 1988, p. 187). Heidegger himself points out that 
zukommen in this case has a double meaning. It indicates a 
"belonging to" in the sense that the Geist belongs to self-
consciousness as its truth, and "coming toward" in the 
sense that the possibilities of transcendence are still in 
the future. 
In his study of Hegel's Phanomenologie, Heidegger 
leaves no doubt that in the development of self-
consciousness the "I" as the knower plays a vital role. 
Since mere consciousness turns away from the infinite 
character of self-consciousness, it is up to the "I" to 
propel it forward. But the closer knowledge comes to being 
absolute knowledge, the smaller out role becomes. 
Knowledge is on its way to knowing, and the part that we 
play as the knower is relegated to the sidelines. The 
further abstract knowledge and consciousness "go back into" 
absolute knowledge, the more it takes our place as the 
knower. "Wir selbst, die 'Wir', sind zu unserer wahren 
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Selbstheit gebracht." ("We ourselves, the 'We", have been 
brought to our true self-hood." Heidegger, 1988, p. 188). 
After the return from abstract thought or consciousness to 
self-consciousness, the "We" have become identical with the 
Geist. Through the thinking of thinking, which is now 
internalized, the identity of the knower and of the known 
is achieved. Abstract thought has thus returned to the 
realm of being-in-the-world in which the "I" exists in an 
unreflective manner, aware, however, of its possibilities 
of transcending this mode of existence. 
Hegel and Language 
After positing that knowledge has returned to the 
inner realms and has become knowledge of the self, 
Heidegger stipulates that language undergoes the same 
process, beginning in sense-certainty. He reminds us that 
when we say "this", we mean "this particular thing", but 
our language expresses a general "this", defined by its 
properties. 
Die Sprache sagt das Gegenteil von dem, was wir 
meinen. Wir meinen das Einzelne, sie sagt das 
Allgemeine. ... Die Sprache ist in sich das 
Vermittelnde, was uns nicht versinken lasst im 
Diesigen, ganz und gar Einseitigen, Relativen, 
Abstrakten. (Heidegger, 1988, p. 90) 
Language says the opposite of what we mean. We mean 
the particular, language says the general. ... 
Language is in itself the mediating force which 
prevents that we sink into the "this", the totally 
one-sided, the relative, the abstract. 
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For Heidegger, as well as for Hegel, language is 
absolute. In the realm of sense-certainty, we say: This is. 
But by formulating it in such a manner, what we are 
actually expressing is the notion that Being in general is. 
"Wir stellen uns dabei freilich nicht das allgemeine 
Dieses, oder das Sein iiberhaupt vor, aber wir sprechen das 
Allgemeine aus." ("Of course we do not represent to 
ourselves the general "this", or even Being in general, but 
we speak the general," Hegel quoted in Heidegger, 1988, p. 
91). According to Heidegger, Being can only be spoken 
because it has always already be understood by us. But, 
while Dasein finds itself still in the realm of sense-
certainty, it cannot acknowledge the fact that it means 
more than the particular "this", the particular object 
which it apprehends. Only in self-consciousness, or in 
absolute knowledge, can the truth of that which is said 
return to the "I", the subject, the Geist. Only in self-
consciousness can the constant movement of the Absolute 
produce the unity of subject and object. Heidegger makes 
reference to the constant "is" of the ordinary sentence 
which, in Hegel's speculative proposition is turned into a 
transient "is", one that changes meaning according to the 
state of the speaker. (Heidegger, 1988, p. 93). 
Since speculation, an important concept for Hegel, is 
rooted in language itself, it may be appropriate, at this 
point, to consider Hegel's conception of language and his 
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"speculative proposition." As Gasche has emphasized, if 
language is to be considered as more than mere 
communication, then it could certainly be considered and 
constructed as the medium by which a relationship to the 
whole, the Absolute, can be expressed. (Gasche, 1986, p. 
45). Regarding the speculative proposition, Hegel exclaims: 
Formell kann das Gesagte so ausgedruckt werden, dass 
die Natur des Urteils oder Satzes iiberhaupt, die den 
Unterschied des Subjekts und Pradikats in sich 
schliesst, durch den spekulativen Satz zerstort wird, 
und der identische Satz, zu dem der erste wird, den 
Gegenstoss zu jenein Verhaltnisse enthalt. (Hegel, 
1987, p. 54) 
The general nature of the judgement or proposition, 
which involves the distinction of Subject and 
Predicate, is destroyed by the speculative 
proposition, and the proposition of identity, which 
the former becomes, contains the counter-thrust 
against that subject-predicate relationship. 
Implicit in this is that the common proposition, with 
its clear separation of subject and predicate, is adequate 
for common thought. Nevertheless, it is highly inadequate 
for expressing any speculative content, which would 
constitute the identity of the subject and of thought 
itself. Kant had already acknowledged that the relationship 
between two concepts in a proposition or judgement was 
inadequate, and had promulgated a third aspect, that of 
self-consciousness, which was to serve as the mediator of 
the two concepts. Hegel realized that self-consciousness, 
for Kant, was not a concept. Therefore, he replaces 
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consciousness with a third concept, that of the copula, 
which takes on the synthesizing function, leaving self-
consciousness as a fourth construct. While in a common 
proposition, the predicate is an attribute of the subject, 
in a speculative proposition, the copula expresses an 
identity of subject and preposition. Hegel's own example 
demonstrates the inner destruction (the overt form of the 
proposition is not destroyed) of the common proposition: If 
we look at the sentence "God is being" from the traditional 
standpoint, "being" functions, so to speak, as an 
attribute. If we consider the speculative content of that 
statement, "being", the predicate, becomes the subject, 
while the subject "God" is dissolved. Or, as Hegel 
explains: 
Das Denken, statt im Ubergange vom Subjekte zum 
Pradikate weiterzukommen, fiihlt sich, da das Subjekt 
verlorengeht, vielmehr gehemmt und zu dem Gedanken des 
Subjekts, weil es dasselbe vermisst, zuriickgeworfen; 
oder es findet, da das Pradikat selbst als ein 
Subjekt, als das Sein, als das Wesen ausgesprochen 
ist, welches die Natur des Subjekts erschdpft, das 
Subjekt unmittelbar auch im Pradikate; und nun, statt 
dass es im Pradikate in sich gegangen die freie 
Stellung des Rasonierens erhielte, ist es in den 
Inhalt noch vertieft, oder wenigstens ist die 
Forderung vorhanden, in ihn vertieft zu sein. 
Hegel, 1987, pp. 54/5) 
Here, thinking, instead of making progress in the 
transition from Subject to Predicate, in reality feels 
itself checked by the loss of the Subject, and, 
missing it, is thrown back on to the thought of the 
Subject. Or, since the Predicate itself has been 
expressed as the Subject, as the being or essence 
which exhausts the nature of the Subject, thinking 
finds the Subject immediately in the Predicate; and 
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now, having returned into itself in the Predicate, 
instead of being in a position where it has freedom 
for argument, it is still absorbed in the content, or 
at least is faced with the demand that it should be. 
We can now envision that the inner reversal does in no way 
constitute a simple revocation of subject and predicate. 
The copula, the "is", has changed meaning as it now 
expresses an identity rather than solely securing an 
attribution to a subject, or, succinctly stated, an 
attribution of universals to a particular. Thus, in a 
speculative proposition, the predicate becomes a category, 
a "universal determination" which "is the very substance, 
the essence of the subject." (Gasche, 1986, p. 48). 
What is significant in this, is that the single 
proposition becomes a link in a chain of propositions, 
implying that in the language used in speculative thought, 
the categories supersede the proper meaning of the word. 
Hegel's insistence on speculative discourse cannot be 
construed as being about the functions of language. 
Therefore his theory of speculative knowledge seeks to 
combine both the empirical mode of thinking (that an object 
is present before reflection upon it), and Kantian 
transcendental philosophy, which stipulates that thought 
must know itself in order to be a content for itself. Or, 
as Hegel put it, "enters consciousness through free 
abstraction from the whole manifold of empirical 
consciousness, and in this respect it is something 
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subjective.11 (Hegel, 1977, p. 173). Speculation, therefore, 
is absolute intuition, since it synthesizes the opposite 
polarities ordained by empiricism and transcendentalism: 
In empirical intuition, subject and object are 
opposites; the philosopher apprehends the activity of 
intuiting, he intuits intuiting and thus conceives it 
as an identity. This intuiting of intuiting is, on the 
one hand, philosophical reflection and, as such, 
opposed both to ordinary reflection and to the 
empirical consciousness in general which does not 
raise itself above itself and its oppositions. On the 
other hand, this transcendental intuition is at the 
same time the object of philosophical reflection; it 
is the Absolute, the original identity. (Hegel, 1977, 
p. 120) 
Hegel's concept of speculation, stipulated insofar as 
it results from the self-destruction of reflection, annuls 
the opposition of the a priori of the transcendental and 
the a posteriori of the empirical (of subjectivity and 
objectivity). Above all, it annuls the last opposition, 
that of the self to itself. It is "the full exposition of 
all the logically possible moments of the logos, a process 
that is completed as soon as the logos is folded back into 
itself." (Gasche, 1986, p. 54), and it is the insistence on 
the original meaning of logos that will now make possible a 
transition to Heidegger's conception of consciousness as 
being-in-the-world. 
Part 2 s Heidegger - Setting the Stage for Existentialism 
Martin Heidegger sets out to separate himself from 
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traditional conceptions of space and time. In the case of 
time, Heidegger suggests that it neglects the retention of 
the past and the impending nature of the future by simply 
regarding them as "no-longer" and "not-yet." As for the 
traditional concept of space, he radically distances 
himself from the notion of space as an external container 
or from a general category under which things could be 
subsumed. 
The following pages are an attempt to demonstrate how 
the reconstrual of the concept of time, which is the 
"ground for Being", sets Heidegger's work apart from most 
post-Newtonian philosophy. They will pay heed to the claim 
that Heidegger's "new" conceptions indeed constitute a 
redefinition of philosophy. They will focus on his 
understanding of "being-in-the-world", a conception of 
consciousness unique to Heidegger. 
In order to gain access to Heidegger's conception of 
time, we have to understand at first how his notion of 
Self, or of consciousness, differs from that held by 
philosophers before him. Since for him the question of 
Being, which constitutes the central problem of his life 
work, is ultimately not answerable without considering its 
in-time-ness, it is only through the re-thinking of Being 
and its groundings that we may gain insight into time. 
Simultaneously, only through the re-thinking of time can 
we, in any way, come close to the question of Being, since 
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the temporal aspect is one of the constituents of Being. As 
for Heidegger's conception of space, it can only be 
understood once the question of time has been asked, since 
space in Heidegger's sense no longer refers to location, 
but is dependent on temporalization. 
In an attempt to arrive at Heidegger's conception of 
time, it becomes necessary to investigate his rejection of 
reason, of self-reflection, and of the distinction between 
subject and object. Similarly, his rejection of the 
centrality of the Self, which, in his view, has not only 
led us astray in finding the meaning of Being, but which 
has also provided us with the groundwork for our distorted 
conception of time. 
The Method 
Heidegger accuses philosophers since Plato of having 
ignored the question of Being, or, at best, of having put 
it inadequately. He claims that thinkers through the ages 
have substituted the question for the meaning of Being with 
one that asks about beings. (Deely, 1971, p. 37). Since, 
for him, an inquiry into the nature of time is dependent on 
the role that time plays in our understanding of Being, he 
proposes two methods with which we can gain access to the 
question of temporality. The first method is the 
Destruktion of the history of philosophy which has laid the 
grounds for our common notions of time. The second is a re­
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opening of the question of Being, by focussing on the 
unthought that lies at the bottom of all thought, on the 
question which the metaphysicians have failed to ask. 
Level one - Being in Context 
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger makes the second 
possibility his central theme. He re-opens the central 
question through 
eine[r] ursprunglichen Explikation der 
Zeit als Horizont des Seinsverstandnisses aus der 
Zeitlichkeit als Sein des seinverstehenden Daseins. 
(Heidegger, 1986a, p. 17) 
... an original explanation of time as the horizon of 
the understanding of Being out of temporality as the 
Being of the Dasein which understands Being. 
Heidegger argues that, in order to come close to the 
question of Being, we have to begin with "Diese[m] 
Seiende[n], das wir selbst je sind und das unter anderem 
die Seinsmoglichkeit des Fragens hat" ("This entity which 
each of us is himself, and which includes inquiry as one of 
the possibilities of its Being..." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 7), 
in other words Dasein. Dasein, the German term for simply 
"being there", is the identity of the questioner, the "I" 
of phenomenological inquiry, which is defined ontically and 
ontologically at the same time. It is assessed ontically in 
the sense that it is merely "being there", defined by its 
"being-in-the-world", ontologically, in that it is the only 
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being which is capable of asking the question of its own 
Being. However, when Heidegger clarifies Dasein by 
proposing that "Seinsverstandnis ist selbst eine 
Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins." ("Understanding of Being is 
itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being." 
Heidegger, 1986a, p. 10), by "understanding" he does not 
mean the reflexive kind of understanding that permeates the 
thought of Hegel, in which the subject is aware of itself 
as a subject. 
In I and Thou, Martin Buber took a similar stance when 
he asserts that, before the "I" can become aware of itself 
as a subject, it is in an original relation to a Thou. 
The life of human beings is not passed in the sphere 
of transitive verbs alone. It does not exist in virtue 
of activities alone which have some thing for their 
object. ... [Man] asks the primary word I-Thou in a 
natural way that precedes what may be termed 
visualization of forms." (Buber, 1987, p. 4 & 22) 
In that preconceptual realm, man exists without knowing 
that objects exist (wissen). His basic mode of being is one 
in which his relation with nature, other men, and spiritual 
beings play a vital part. These relations are not things 
that can be experienced, but can only be known in a 
primordial manner which is reminiscent of Heidgger's being-
in-the-world. 
Rather than referring to the "Knowing that", Heidegger 
focuses on the "Knowing how," since in German the term 
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wissen (knowing that) refers to a self-understanding that 
is conceptual. It is evident that Heidegger had in mind an 
understanding that is defined existentially (knowing how). 
Heidegger wants to go deeper than the ontological level, 
which Husserl saw as the foundation of all categories and 
concepts. To do so - and here are found echos of 
Kierkegaard - he insists that the ontological foundations 
themselves rest on a priori conditions, that Husserl's 
ontological foundations themselves must have foundations 
(Hunsinger, 1968, p. 29). For him, these a priori 
conditions are the manner in which Dasein. before any 
reflection, any "knowing that" takes place, understands its 
Being, by having it disclosed through its relationship with 
Being. Not only does this introduction to Sein und Zeit 
stress the role that Dasein is to play in asking the 
central question, but it also foreshadows some of the major 
themes of Sein und Zeit, those of being-in-the-world, of 
disclosure, and of authenticity. 
But how does Heidegger proceed to "deconstruct" the 
history of metaphysics and ask the question that touches on 
the unthought? In laying out his concept of temporality, he 
begins by elaborating on the faulty thinking of which 
Western philosophy is guilty. One example of such 
inadequate thinking is the fact that Descartes inherited, 
from thinkers going back to Aristotle, the notion that the 
Self is an independent being, capable of "knowing" itself 
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independently from other beings. Also, Descartes was guilty 
of not examining this failure, but accepting it blindly. 
Heidegger objects strongly to the notion of the Self as 
independent. In his analysis of Dasein, he stresses the 
fact that, before Dasein is even capable of considering 
itself as an entity, we have to acknowledge that at the 
ontic level, Dasein can understand itself only in relation 
to other entities (being-in-the-world). This brings to mind 
Buber's patient step-by-step analysis, in I and Thou, of 
how the "I" made the transition from the "I-Thou" towards 
the possibility of seeing itself as a separate entity, or, 
for that matter, any text dealing with child development 
that points out the infant's existence as being one-with-
the-world before developing an ego separate from the world. 
... it becomes crystal clear to us that the spiritual 
reality of the primary words arises out of a natural 
reality, that of the primary word I-Thou out of 
natural combination, and that of the primary word 
I-It out of natural separation. (Buber, 1987, p. 24) 
The separation of the "I" from the I-Thou relation is one 
that is achieved gradually. Only after the "I" can 
recognize itself as a subject, is it possible for it to 
acknowledge objects or phenomena. Not only does Buber 
deny the Cartesian primacy of the ego, he also fixates his 
starting point in the development of the Self at a level 
which Descartes had never considered. 
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Being-in-the-world, the primordial manner of Dasein's 
being has been, according to Heidegger, ignored by the 
great Western thinkers, who have always insisted on 
separating mind and body, subject and object. 
Being-in-the-world, that essence of Dasein which one finds 
"first", before any sort of self-reflection, is not a two­
fold experience of the Self and of the world, but is to be 
regarded as one phenomenon. Only by accepting the 
metaphysical tradition have we learned, and taken for 
granted, to separate it into two entities, thus making it 
more problematic than necessary. 
The Structures of Existence 
Being-in-the-world means that Dasein is first and 
foremost engaged in the world, Dasein is a part of the 
world. Only when Dasein becomes ontological, i.e. concerned 
with its own Being, does it become detached from the world 
(the view that we commonly hold, because philosophy has 
urged us to do so). The self is not primarily a matter of 
knowledge, as the great thinkers like Descartes, Kant, or 
Hegel insisted, but it is first and foremost a practical 
function of living in the world. It is here (again) that we 
find Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger, in that he 
insists on Dasein7s "authenticity" as opposed to going 
along with the Man, the crowd, which means not making one's 
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own decisions, not facing up to the question for the very 
meaning of Being. 
"Authenticity" is linked closely with another of 
Heidegger's recurrent themes, that of Sorqe (care or 
concern for the world of which we are a part). This Sorae 
and this besoraen is what differentiates man from things. 
Whereas things, have a spatial inclusion in the world, in 
the sense of being amidst other things, (the things 
"present-at-hand"), man alone is capable of Sorae simply by 
his being-in-the-world and by the in-volvement (the 
involved relatedness) which this notion presupposes. 
Obviously, this concern, this Sorae. which refers to the 
necessity of our engagement with the world, constitutes for 
Heidegger "authenticity." Being in this world with Sorae 
means not being dependent on das Man, which implies 
defining ourselves according to the way others, the 
impersonal "they", define us. 
Das Dasein versteht sich selbst immer aus seiner 
Existenz, einer Moglichkeit seiner selbst, es selbst 
oder nicht es selbst zu sein. Diese Moglichkeit hat 
das Dasein entweder selbst gewahlt, oder es ist in sie 
hineingeraten oder je schon darin aufgewachsen. Die 
Existenz wird in der Weise des Ergreifens oder 
Versaumens nur vom jeweiligen Dasein selbst 
entschieden. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 12) 
Dasein understands itself always out of its existence, 
out of a possibility of itself to be itself or not to 
be itself. Dasein has either chosen this possibility 
on its own account, or it has somehow ended up in it 
or has always grown up in it. Only the particular 
Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by 
taking hold or by neglecting. 
Ill 
"Taking hold" here can only mean being authentic, not 
falling back into everyday routines and ignoring our 
alternatives. It is this "Fallenness", which Heidegger 
considers the neglect of the question of Being. 
"Fallenness" becomes an important structure in Heidegger's 
notion of Dasein and he contrasts it with the notion of 
Existenz, that of having the "resolution" to get a grasp on 
our true Being. 
Another of Dasein's structures is that of "facticity", 
the fact that we find ourselves part of a world, a feeling 
which is forever present to both "Fallenness" and Existenz 
(or resolution). Here the notion of equipment and of 
"being-at-hand" comes into the picture because, according 
to Heidegger, our most primordial manner of being-in-the-
world is defined precisely through the equipmentality of 
the world, of the "being-to-hand11, of being usable. His 
account on Zeug (equipment, tools) in both Sein und Zeit 
and Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks are exemplary underpinnings 
of the existential character of our Dasein (as opposed to 
the reflective kind of knowing). 
As far as Heidegger's Destruktion of philosophy is 
concerned, another mistake of which Western metaphysics is 
guilty or, as Heidegger would term it, another inheritance 
that has not been questioned properly, is that the essence 
of Being has traditionally been rendered with "presence". 
The question throughout history has not been "What is 
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Being?" but "Who am I?" Thus the essence of Being "is". But 
this "is" is what Heidegger sees as problematic, because, 
ever since Plato, Being has been equated with something 
that is anwesend (present). 
Seiendes ist in seinem Sein als "Anwesenheit" gefasst, 
d.h. es ist mit Riicksicht auf einen bestimmten 
Zeitmodus, die "Gegenwart", verstanden. (Heidegger, 
1986a, p. 25) 
A being is grasped in its being "present" (An­
wesenheit) - this means that it is understood by 
reference to a determinate mode of time, the 
"present." 
And in Was heisst Denken? he continues: 
Weil Sein fur alle Metaphysik seit dem Anfang des 
abendlandischen Denkens besagt: Anwesenheit, muss das 
Sein, wenn es in hochster Instanz gedacht werden soli, 
als das reine Anwesen gedacht werden, d.h. als die 
anwesende Anwesenheit, als die bleibende Gegenwart, 
als das standige stehende "jetzt". (Heidegger, 1992, 
p. 63) 
Since in all metaphysics from the beginning of Western 
thought, Being means being present, Being, if it is to 
be thought in the highest instance, must be thought as 
pure presence, that is, as the presence that persists, 
the abiding present, the steadily standing "now." 
Here Heidegger makes his move to show us the "faulty" 
concept of time that we have taken over unquestioningly. 
There is no doubt that the German language aids him 
tremendously in this endeavor. 
Das Jetzt-sagen aber ist die redende Artikulation 
eines Gegenwartigens, das in der Einheit mit einem 
behaltenden Gegenwartigen sich zeitigt. Die im 
Uhr-gebrauch sich vollziehende Datierung erweist sich 
113 
als ausgezeichnetes Gegenwartigen eines Vorhandenen. 
(Heidegger, 1986a, p. 416) 
This "now-saying" however, is the discursive 
articulation of a "making-present" which temporalizes 
itself in the unity with a "retentive awaiting". The 
dating aspect which happens through the use of clocks 
distinguishes itself as a "presencing" of something 
that is "present-at-hand". 
In this passage, which I consider the most problematic one 
as far as translation into English is concerned (and 
considering the abundance of footnotes that each translator 
finds necessary at this point, I am not the only one), the 
word Geqenwart or qeqenwartial occurs three times, each 
time, however, in need of a different translation into 
English. While taking apart this German term, Heidegger 
discovers an entrance into the notion of time, for 
translated literally, the word means: "waiting for that 
which comes towards us." Notwithstanding the fact that this 
may well be one of his personalized etymological findings, 
we have to agree with him that "waiting for something that 
comes towards us" does indeed suggest the future. Heidegger 
rejects the "now-saying", our common practice of viewing 
time as a sequence of "nows" and of stressing the 
importance of the "now" as we tend to do in our "naive" 
assumptions of time, and instead puts emphasis on the 
future. 
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The Finitude of Being 
At this point a term of importance in Heidegger's 
philosophy needs to be introduced, that of Angst. or 
anxiety, the acknowledgment of which is another means of 
establishing an authentic Dasein. By Angst, Heidegger does 
not mean a specific "fear" of one thing or another, but 
rather a general existential anxiety that faces each and 
every one of us in our awareness of our temporal 
limitations. It is the finitude of our Dasein which causes 
this Angst, our awareness, that our Dasein can, indeed, 
only be fulfilled, become authentic, at the moment of our 
death. Heidegger again mentions the notion of 
inauthenticity, which, he claims, befalls us when we do not 
face up to death, when we follow das Man and treat death as 
an abstraction, when we let inauthenticity absorb the 
knowledge of our death. In the language of Existentialism, 
we experience fear of death before love of life. Since we 
do not know what death is, we choose the will to live in 
order to comfort ourselves with the certainty of life. In 
doing so, we deny the possibility of death and treat it as 
an abstraction. What separates Heidegger from Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche, however, for whom death took a central place 
as well, is the fact that he does not suggest, as do they, 
that man goes against das Man, the anonymous crowd. Rather, 
he agrees with Hegel in that he emphasizes the historicity 
of Dasein and at the same time praises individual 
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resolution. Dasein is considered authentic by giving das 
Man its own personal affirmation in the acknowledgment of 
its facticity., 
- iLinir i 
Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit entstammt auch nicht 
einer die Existenz und ihre Moglichkeiten 
uberfliegenden "idealistischen" Zumutung, sondern 
entspringt dem nuchternen Verstehen faktischer 
GrundmSglichkeiten des Daseins. (Heidegger, 1986a, 
p. 310) 
Anticipatory Resoluteness does not originate in an 
unwarranted "idealistic" expectation that passes over 
existence and its possibilities. Rather, it originates 
in the level-headed understanding of the basic 
factical possibilities of Dasein. 
With the term "anticipatory", Heidegger points toward the 
future as the temporal structure in which authenticity can 
be found. The basic possibilities of Dasein are none other 
than the Angst which frees Dasein from such coincidences as 
Neuaier (curiosity) and Gerede (idle talk). 
In the second part of Sein und Zeit, it is evident 
that Dasein. although the means by which we can arrive at 
the meaning of Being, does not represent the main focus of 
the work. Rather, Heidegger's focus is on time as that 
aspect which permeates Being, and through which we may be 
able to re-open the Question. In Part II of Sein und Zeit, 
Heidegger makes the connection between the three structures 
of Dasein, which are "resolution" or Existenz, "facticity", 
and "fallenness" with the three dimensions of time, which 
themselves now become a fourth structure of Dasein. The 
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three dimensions of time he identifies are the future, 
characterized by the structure of understanding, or the 
resoluteness to fulfill the possibility of Dasein. the 
past, linked to our facticity, or the acknowledgment of our 
constitution which gets its meaning from the past, and the 
present, connected to our fallenness and our tendency to 
let go of- all authenticity and identify with das Man, and 
let the anonymous "they" dictate our notion of our Selfs, 
which, in turn will be characterized as "getting caught up 
in the 'now'." 
Die zeitliche Interpretation des alltaglichen Daseins 
soil bei den Strukturen ansetzen, in denen sich die 
Erschlossenheit konstituiert. Das sind: Vertehen, 
Befindlichkeit, Verfallen ... (Heidegger, 1986a, pp. 
334/5) 
The temporal interpretation of the everyday Dasein 
shall begin with those structures in which 
disclosedness is constituted: understanding, 
facticity, falling ... 
In this quote Heidegger sums up the structure of Dasein. 
through which he intends to arrive at the structure of 
temporality. 
Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology 
Dasein is different from other beings in that it is 
ontological, it is concerned with the nature of its own 
being. It is engaged in a world of which it is a part, but 
that does not mean that it is just another being in the 
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world. In its concern with its own being, Dasein is often 
tempted to detach itself from its being-in-the-world, to 
distance itself from itself and to treat itself like a mere 
object. According to Heidegger, the history of philosophy 
and science has continually urged us to take such an 
"objective" detached view of ourselves. Descartes had 
suggested that we approach perceptions and experiences with 
skepticism, that we exercise a measure of doubt in 
considering things from a subjective viewpoint. In this 
mistrust toward our perceptions is embedded a mistrust of 
ourselves, which resulted in a need to "step outside" of 
ourselves, and to assume a god's-eye view of ourselves and 
the world we live in. In order to overcome this detachment, 
Heidegger suggests a "Fundamental Ontology" in which we are 
at all times aware that the primary reason that Dasein is 
different from other objects in the world is because it 
cannot ultimately detach itself from itself. The answer to 
the question of Being can therefore never be found out via 
an objective stance. Rather, what Heidegger seems to 
suggest, is that there really is no answer, but that Dasein 
has to work out the meaning of its existence by living, not 
by knowing. 
We now get a clearer picture of how Heidegger intends 
to use his "Fundamental Ontology", which is really the 
Destruktion of the history of ontology, to come to an 
understanding of the nature and the structures of 
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primordial time, an understanding which he terms 
"ontological disclosure." In his view, Primordial time, or 
the question of Being, has never been considered by Western 
philosophers. Primordial time, like Being, is concealed 
from us by our everyday-ness, by our uncritical acceptance 
of the opinion of das Man, and of our culture and 
tradition, and by our philosophical history which has 
dwelled on what he calls "derivative time," or "now-
centered time," with its emphasis on the present. 
In order to obtain any notion at all of this 
primordial time, to have it unconceal itself for us, 
Heidegger suggests that we take basically the same steps 
that we have to take in order to re-open the question of 
Being: We must get from theoretical reflection, which has 
been part of the methodology of traditional philosophers, 
to a practical deliberation, one that heeds the being 
present-to-hand, the tool-ness of things. From there, we 
need to take one further step back to the 'mindless' 
everyday coping, which is Dasein's most basic, primordial 
mode of being. Heidegger insists that we need to look into 
the background of our everyday existence, and in this 
endeavor he is not alone. A number of philosophers make an 
investigation into precisely this background the center of 
their methodology. Heidegger's notion of primordiality 
separates itself in that his is a structured common-sense 
background whereas Searle's vocabulary-less Background, 
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Barthe's Myth, Polanyi's Tacit Dimension, Wittgenstein's 
hurly-burly Background, Gramsci's commonsense, and to a 
certain degree even Johnson's notion of Embodiment 
constitute an unstructured, unpenetrable mass of 
assumptions and presuppositions. The fact that Heidegger's 
"most primitive groundings" do indeed have a structure is 
what makes them identifiable and lays them open for 
interpretation. 
To get to the foundations of "derivative time", to the 
deepest level where our common concepts are grounded, 
Heidegger again suggests that we look at the average person 
with his unreflective assumptions about the supposed 
constancy of "now-time". This was, after all, the basis for 
the metaphysicians' claim of an eternity which was detached 
from our everyday existence. 
Der Grund dafur liegt im Verfallen des Daseins und der 
darin motivierten Verlegung des primaren 
Seinsverstandnisses auf das Sein als Vorhandenheit. 
(Heidegger, 1986a, p. 206) 
The reason for this lies in the falling of Dasein and 
in the diversion of the primary understanding of Being 
to Being as presence-at-hand, a diversion which itself 
is motivated by the phenomenon of falling. 
Dasein understands itself as a vorhanden (present-at-
hand) being "in" a vorhanden (present-at-hand) world. 
However, man is not a thing, and in this quote Heidegger 
shows us again how the traditional metaphysical conception 
of man's relationship to the world is faulty. Heidegger 
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reminds us that Dasein is not a spiritual thing which is 
placed "into" the space of other material things. Neither 
is knowledge an act that transpires "between" the subject 
and the object, in the sense that both subject and object 
are "vorhanden." (Compare "The man who experiences has not 
part in the world. For it is 'in him' and not between him 
and the world that the experience arises." Buber, 1987, p. 
5). With this move, he renounces the Cartesian notion of 
the subject as a substance, as an autonomous source. In our 
conventional conception of time, the "nows", arranged in 
linear sequence, are vorhanden; time passes outside of us. 
The past is therefore seen as vorhanden time that has 
vanished and is left behind by Dasein (Veraanaenheit), but 
it can be carried to the present as a vorhanden moment. The 
future, however, is a temporal aspect that Dasein does not 
acknowledge. Rather than giving in to the Angst, rather 
than facing its own finitude, it has resolved, together 
with das Man, that death is an abstraction, something that 
befalls people in general, but not Dasein personally. 
According to Heidegger, our conventional notion of time is 
calculative time, which is itself derivative and dependent 
on primordial time: it springs from it, yet, it conceals 
it. This conventional time is problematic for Heidegger, 
because it is so familiar to all of us, and it is taken for 
granted as something which is self-evident. Heidegger sees 
it as his mission to expose the limitations of conventional 
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time by "destructing" the sequential time which permeates 
our philosophical tradition. 
The Primordial Unity of Subject and Object 
If we are to understand the concept of primordial 
time, which is the basis for our "naive", common-sense 
assumptions of time, we have to take a closer look at 
Heidegger's Sorqe. It is in this concept that the three 
temporalities of original time are enclosed. In the 
Buberian sense, this Sorae is the I-Thou relation in which 
"The present arises only in virtue of the fact that the 
Thou becomes present." (Buber, 1987, p. 12). Contrarily, 
the I-It relation can never constitute an immediate 
present, only a mediated past, because it is concerned only 
with objects (the Heideggerian notion of falling). 
A look at Sorae in its three-fold totality, as it 
constitutes Dasein and Dasein's practical involvement in 
the world is necessary. Sorae, in its everydayness, is a 
mode of Dasein's being-in-the-world, and it involves the 
three temporalities of resolution (Sein und Zeit, paragraph 
68), which can be unveiled via the experience of Angst. It 
is "Die fundamentalen ontologischen Charaktere dieses 
Seienden ... Existenzialitat, Faktizitat, und 
Verfallensein." ("The fundamental ontological 
characteristics of this entity [Angst], ... 
existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen.11 Heidegger, 
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1986a, p. 191), which brings into focus the notion of 
Sorge. The acknowledgment of Angst constitutes Dasein's 
authenticity, and brings Dasein to the juncture where it 
can face its temporal limitations, its finitude, with an 
"anticipatory resoluteness" (Heine, 1985, p. 112). 
The Dimensions of Temporality 
Sorge, a term chosen for its etymological connection 
of Sorge/besoraen = helping or "involved relatedness" 
(Wood, 1989, p. 163), is grounded in a temporality that is 
not sequential, like our naive concept of time. Rather it 
is an integral dynamic process of Dasein. In its 
understanding, Dasein is always ahead of itself, pointing 
to the future, (Zukunft) as "that which comes towards us." 
By "understanding", Heidegger does, in this case, mean the 
"knowing how" (konnen), not the ontological "knowing-that": 
Mit dem Terminus Verstehen meinen wir ein 
fundamentales Existenzial; weder eine bestimmte Art 
von Erkennen, underschieden etwa von Erklaren und 
Begreifen, noch iiberhaupt ein Erkennen im Sinne des 
thematischen Erfassens. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 336) 
With the term "understanding" we have in mind a 
fundamental existential, which is neither a definite 
species of cognition, distinguishable, let us say, 
from explaining and conceiving. Nor is it any 
cognition at all in the sense of grasping something 
thematically. 
Rather, it is "knowing-how" in the sense of "knowing how to 
talk": 
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Wir gebrauchen zuweilen in ontischer Rede den Ausdruck 
"etwas verstehen" in der Bedeutung von "einer Sache 
vorstehen konnen", "ihr gewachsen sein", "etwas 
konnen". (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 143) 
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the 
expression "understanding something" with the 
signification of "being able to manage something," 
"being a match for it," "being competent to do 
something." 
This understanding activity is always directed toward 
bringing something about. It is organized by a 
for-the-sake-of-which, which Heidegger calls "projection", 
but 
Der EJntwurfscharacter des Verstehens besagt ferner, 
dass dieses das, woraufhin es entwirft, die 
Moglichkeiten, selbst nicht thematisch erfasst. 
(Heidegger, 1986a, p. 145) 
The character of understanding as projection is such 
that the understanding does not grasp thematically 
that upon which it projects - that is to say, 
possibilities. 
"Understanding" in this sense, is directed towards a 
possibility of Dasein's fulfillment in the future. Since 
this fulfillment can theoretically only happen at Dasein's 
own death, the possibility becomes an impossibility, and so 
"understanding" becomes the authentic facing towards death, 
towards Dasein's imminent impossibility. This authentic 
understanding and facing up to Dasein's finitude can only 
be accomplished through an "anticipatory resoluteness," 
which is a rejection of das Man and its illusions of 
infinitude: 
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Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit ist kein Ausweg, 
erfunden, um den Tod zu "uberwinden", sondern das dem 
Gewissensruf folgende Verstehen, das dem Tod die 
Moglichkeit freigibt, der Existenz des Daseins m&chtig 
zu werden und jede fliichtige Selbstverdeckung im 
Grunde zu zerstreuen. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 310) 
Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, 
fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death; it is rather 
that understanding which follows the call of 
conscience and which frees for death the possibility 
of acquiring power over Dasein's existence and of 
basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments. 
While Zukunft, analyzed into its etymological components, 
conveys a sense of passivity on Dasein's part, this is 
certainly not the case in Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit. In 
order to be resolute, we must grasp our possibilities, and 
be authentic. The concept of "understanding" as a structure 
of Sorae is the fore-structure for the possibility of 
self-knowledge and of interpretation. By being anticipatory 
resolute, Dasein is ahead of itself and understands itself 
as being primarily in and of the future. The reason for the 
future's priority in Heidegger's concept of temporality is 
the fact that the future as the ecstasy of understanding 
makes possible the "... Kunft, in der das Dasein in seinem 
eigensten Seinkonnen auf sich zukommt." ("... coming in 
which Dasein, in its own potentiality for Being, comes 
toward itself." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 325) 
The ecstasy of facticity is what structures the 
temporality of the past. Facticity, for Heidegger, are our 
Stimmunaen. or Gemiitsverf assungen f our moods or states of 
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mind. Heidegger points out that, in remembering an event, 
what makes us remember is not so much reflective knowledge, 
but rather the frame of mind, the mood we were in, at the 
time of the event. Our moods bring us back to something and 
remind us of our "disclosive submissiveness", our 
thrownness. Moods are so pervasive that they become 
unnoticed, and that may be the reason why traditional 
philosophy has overlooked them. Heidegger points out that 
we cannot analyze our moods, and we certainly cannot get 
rid of them: "... das Dasein [ist] schon immer gestimmt ... 
("... Dasein always has some mood ..." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 
134). Thus, Dasein is always given, and it is this 
givenness that Heidegger calls thrownness: 
Diesen in seinem Woher und Wohin verhiillten, aber an 
ihm selbst um so unverhiillter erschlossenen 
Seinscharakter des Daseihs, dieses "Dass es ist" 
nennen wir die Geworfenheit dieses Seienden in sein 
Da, so zwar, dass es als In-der-Welt das Da ist. 
(Heidegger, 1986a, p. 135) 
This characteristic of Dasein's being - this "that it 
is" - is veiled in its "whence" and "whither," yet 
disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call 
it the "thrownness" of this entity into its "there" in 
such a manner that it is in-the-world as "there." 
In our common assumptions about time, we see the past 
as something at-hand, something that we had at one point, 
but have no longer. Contrarily, in the primordial 
conception of time, the past is part of our being. It is 
the having-been-there (dagewesen) of Dasein which is 
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integrated with the present and the future, because it is 
behaltend (retentive). Dasein can only experience it as 
such, if it indeed exists projectively, toward the future, 
and thus becomes a behaltendes Gewartiaen (retentive 
awaiting). Our past gives us the means to understand 
ourselves, and it is in the acknowledgment of these 
"possibilities of Being" that we project into the future. 
Only by making the past our own, do we bring ourselves into 
the possession of the future possibilities. 
The third ecstasy, that of falling, belongs to the 
temporality of the present. Falling as an existential 
structure is the way Dasein is by its very nature. It is 
always drawn away from its primordial sense of what it is: 
"Im Verfallen kehrt sich das Dasein von ihm selbst ab." 
("In falling, Dasein turns away from itself." Heidegger, 
1986a, p. 185). Dasein's falling is its absorption with 
that which Dasein finds alongside, with things present-at-
hand, and which have been interpreted and defined by das 
Man. The things present-at-hand make up Dasein's necessary 
structure by insisting on making present and on the "now": 
Wenn aber das Dasein selbst im Gerede und der 
b'ffentlichen Ausgelegtheit ihm selbst die Moglichkeit 
vorgibt, sich im Man zu verlieren, der Bodenlosigkeit 
zu verfallen, dann sagt das: Das Dasein bereitet ihm 
selbst die standige Versuchung zum Verfallen. Das In-
der-Welt-sein ist an ihm selbst versucherisch. 
(Heidegger, 1986a, p. 177) 
127 
If Dasein itself, in idle talk and in the way things 
have been publicly interpreted, presents to itself the 
possibility of losing itself in the "one" and falling 
into groundlessness, this tells us that Dasein 
prepares for itself a constant temptation towards 
falling. Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting. 
Falling, however, is not necessarily inauthentic. 
Rather, it is a necessary part of authentic Dasein, 
especially when it gets transformed into resoluteness, a 
stand that produces the authentic Self. The moment of 
transformation is the Auaenblickf often translated in 
following Kierkegaard, as the "moment of vision". 
Translated literally, it means "the blink of an eye", but I 
believe that Heidegger meant to convey, once again, its 
everyday meaning, which is probably best rendered by the 
English "moment". The moment brings to light the 
possibilities of a situation (Heine, 1985, p. 116). The 
moment, like the past, is linked to the future, since 
Dasein, if indeed authentic, has to grasp that possibility 
with anticipatory resoluteness. Dasein is, therefore, once 
again in the temporality of the Zukunft: 
Der Augenblick ... meint die entschlossene, aber in 
der Entschlossenheit gehaltene Entruckung des Daseins 
an das, was in der Situation an besorgbaren 
Moglichkeiten, Umstanden begegnet. (Heidegger, 1986, 
p. 338) 
The "moment" ... means the resolute [way] Dasein is 
carried away to whatever possibilities and 
circum-stances are encountered in the Situation as 
possible objects of concern. 
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Through the present's indebtedness to both the past and the 
future, we can now see the dynamics of Heidegger's temporal 
relationship, and we can better understand his quote 
linking Dasein with Sorge: 
Das Sein des Daseins besagt: 
Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei 
(innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden). Dieses Sein 
erfiillt die Bedeutung des Titels Sorge. (Heidegger, 
1986a, p. 192) 
The being of Dasein means 
ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as 
Being-alongside (entities encountered within the 
world). This Being fills in the signification of the 
term Care. 
Dasein is ahead-of-itself in its understanding of the 
possibilities of the future. It is already-in-the-world, in 
the sense that is its past, and thus influences its future 
projects. These projects, in turn, generate the decisions 
that Dasein makes in the present by being alongside (or 
with) entities in its "spezifisch hantierende[n] 
Gegenwartigen des Zeugs." ("specifically manipulative way 
in which equipment is made present." Heidegger, 1986a, 
p. 353). Time is not something outside of Dasein, an entity 
through which Dasein goes and which is infinite. Time is, 
in its primordial sense, not the commonplace notion of 
time, but rather an ecstatic temporality which "zeitigt 
sich als gewesende-gegenwartigende Zukunft." ("temporalizes 
itself as a future which makes present in the process of 
having been." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 350). 
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In summary, for the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit, 
temporality is the sense of Sorge that permeates our being-
in-the-world. Time is the manner in which Dasein comes to 
an understanding of its own Being. For Dasein to be 
authentic, it must be aware of its have-been and it must 
grasp its possibility to move into the future. Temporality 
is the "thoughtful recovery of the ground of our Being," 
and it is this thinking which has its own temporality, 
which is the temporality of the circle. It is the circling 
back to the place where Heidegger begins: the place of the 
disclosure of Being. In the circle is hidden "eine positive 
Moglichkeit ursprunglichsten Erkennens" ("a positive 
possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing." 
Heidegger, 1986a, p. 153). Just as Heidegger's 
investigation into the meaning of Being in Sein und Zeit 
moves in a circle, so is his structure of temporality 
circular, moving from the future, from the anticipation of 
death, back to Dasein's realization of its facticity and 
its finitude, only to exist in an insightful moment. 
Opposed to this futural temporalization of time is within-
time-ness, which bypasses time in its primordiality, and 
which has been the focus of traditional philosophy. This 
within-time-ness is Dasein's everydayness and 
inauthenticity which manifests itself in the "now-time." 
Here, Dasein exists as an awaiting being which is either 
"not yet" or "not any longer". It can no longer unite the 
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past, the future, and the present. The metaphysical 
tradition thinks of the Being of beings as existing within 
time. Also, it thinks of time as a series of existing 
points, in time, in which the Being of beings exist. What 
sets Heidegger apart from traditional philosophers is his 
opposition to this within-time-ness in which Dasein forgets 
the temporalization of time itself. 
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CHAPTER III 
TRANSCENDENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Part 1: Kierkegaard's Existentialism 
With Martin Heidegger's conception of time, the 
Hegelian Geist as the all-encompassing unity of individual 
egos looses its impact. For Heidegger, Sorge is a 
presupposition for temporality, implying that in 
acknowledging our concern for the world around us, we must 
develop a new conception of consciousness. With the 
writings of Soren Kierkegaard, such a consciousness, 
anchored in the physical world, but capable of transcending 
it, is born. Kierkegaardian existentialism is characterized 
dichotomously. On the one hand, the highest level of 
consciousness we must strive to reach, transcends all 
earthly things. On the other hand - and this is the 
deciding factor - Kierkegaardian consciousness is capable 
of transcending traditional philosophical assumptions which 
locate truth solely in the spiritual realm. After 
accomplishing this move, consciousness is once again 
anchored in a pre-Socratic, and certainly pre-Cartesian 
unity of mind/object. 
Sfzfren Kierkegaard, a one-time student of Hegel, 
expressed his disdain for the German philosopher with the 
claim that he, as well as Hegel's other contemporaries, 
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have "forgotten what it means to exist." (Kierkegaard, 
1941a, p. 223). With this statement he distances himself 
from the epistemology of the idealists, notably Hegel, who 
saw the essence of humanity in the fact that man is a 
knowing being. According to Kierkegaard's contemporaries, 
man's most vital capacity is to obtain knowledge. 
Kierkegaard, like Heidegger after him, objected strongly to 
this characterization of humanity. With the often quoted 
statement "Truth is subjectivity," Kierkegaard assures his 
place in modern philosophy as the first existentialist. He 
is not primarily concerned with knowledge. The question he 
proposes to ponder in his work is what it means to exist as 
a human being. Surely there must be more to being human 
than having the capacity to think and to know. With this 
thought, Kierkegaard sets out to encourage his readers to 
peel away the shell of absolute idealism in order to 
discover what parts of the Hegelian dialectic may be 
existential (Lowith, 1958, p. 128). 
From Objectivity to Subjectivity 
Most philosophers in the Western tradition have 
equated knowledge with truth. Kierkegaard's famous 
statement reflects his rejection of knowledge as the 
defining essence of being human. For Hegel, in order to 
come to absolute knowledge, man must take on an attitude of 
objectivity. As a matter of fact, Hegel does not even take 
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into consideration "man" as an existing human being. He 
stipulates that transcendental knowledge can only be 
obtained once we refrain from considering man as "being-in-
the-world", and concentrate instead on the transcendental 
ego, an abstract entity that has nothing whatsoever to do 
with everyday existence. Kierkegaard objects very strongly 
to this attitude of objectivity. Not only does he see it as 
an impossibility, but the mere consideration seems 
ridiculous because "men are essentially finite, subjective, 
particular individuals, not unlimited, objective, 
impersonal knowing minds." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 100). 
Kierkegaard does not deny that we can be beings for whom 
knowing is one mode of existing, but "the knower is an 
existing individual and ... the task of existing is his 
essential task." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 185). 
Objectivity and universality are of tremendous 
importance for Hegel's system of transcendental knowledge, 
but for Kierkegaard, like for Heidegger after him, it is 
the state of subjectivity that man must reach in order to 
be in accord with his essential nature. Heidegger, in 
rejecting the objective stance of German idealism, 
contemplated man not as a knowing being, but as a being 
involved in things around him. Rather than asking about 
Dasein's knowledge, Heidegger resurrected the question of 
what it means to be human. Linked to this query is the 
investigation into the possible modes of knowing. Instead 
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of focussing on knowledge as a result, Heidegger made it 
his life's work to ask the question of Being, and to 
interpret the different modes in which Dasein can stand in 
relation to its world. For Kierkegaard, to exist as a human 
being is to be subjective; man's nature is to be 
subjective. "Only in subjectivity is truth, and for man 
existing, the process of transformation into inwardness in 
and by existing, is the truth." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, 
p. 184). 
But what is this inwardness for Kierkegaard? Surely it 
cannot be the reflective stance that Kant and Fichte 
propose, the self-conscious act of knowing that one knows. 
It means, contrarily, knowing what one's essential nature 
is, knowing that "Truth is subjectivity" (Solomon, 1987, 
p. 84). With this inward appropriation, this transformation 
of inwardness, truth (or that which is known) can 
correspond analogically to an essence coupled to existence, 
and gains therefore a reality. That, however, is not enough 
for him. What is vital in this proposition is not only that 
one must come to know one's own essential nature, but that 
one must act in accordance with it by achieving the proper 
inner state which is not characterized by mere impersonal 
cognition. Rather, "the subjective reflection turns its 
attention inwardly to subject, desires in this 
intensification to realize (actualize) the truth." 
(Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 175). 
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Whereas Hegel tried to teach us that the 
transcendental ego, far removed from everyday existence, 
from the Dasein. must be objective and rational, 
Kierkegaard posits that the abstract Hegelian notion of 
Geist must for that very reason be without meaning. If 
Hegel defines as truth that thought which corresponds to an 
object (that which knowledge is knowledge of), it follows 
that "Truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity 
between objectivity and the Begriff." (Hegel, 1987, 
p. 354). For Hegel, an object can only be true if it 
adequately realizes its Beariff (notion) or its essence. 
Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel as far as this 
definition of truth is concerned, but he takes the 
definition to another level. For him, a man is a 'true man' 
if he acts in ways that his Beariff or his vocation 
require. This implies that one can be in a state of truth 
only if one's actual inner state is in agreement with 
essential human nature, that of being subjective, 
particular, and inward, and by rejecting any pretense of 
objectivity. In other words, "to be a particular individual 
... is the only true and highest significance of human 
being." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 134). 
While Kierkegaard rejects the Hegelian Begriff, he 
appropriates much of the latter's terminology, such as the 
concept of unity. He is in agreement with Hegel concerning 
the suggestion that the unity of two opposites constitute 
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truth. But, whereas for Hegel the dichotomy consisted of 
the Beariff and the experienced object, of subject and 
object, for Kierkegaard the opposed concepts are the finite 
(human beings) and the infinite (the God of Christianity), 
necessity and possibility, as well as temporality and 
eternity. However, it must be said that if indeed there 
exists this God, then ultimately man's finiteness is 
subjective. Through faith, God even gives man the potential 
to be non-finite. 
The dichotomies are not the only concept that 
Kierkegaard appropriated from Hegel. He obviously uses 
Hegelian terminology when he writes about synthesis. But, 
instead of according it the meaning of a solution to a 
problem, as had done Hegel, Kierkegaard sees in synthesis 
the first grasp or definition of the problem itself. 
The human being is a synthesis of infinity and 
finitude, of temporality and eternity, of freedom and 
necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a 
relation between two [factors]. Considered in this way 
the human being is not yet a self. ...In the relation 
between the two [factors] the relation [itself] is the 
third [factor] as a negative entity, and the [other] 
two relate themselves to the relation, and in the 
relation to the relation; this is the way in which the 
relation between soul and body is a relation when soul 
is the determining category. If, on the other hand, 
the relation relates itself to itself, then this 
relation is the positive third [factor], and this is 
the self. (Kierkegaard, 1941d, p. 73) 
The self, for Kierkegaard, is not a dependent factor. 
Rather, it is a controlling factor and therefore properly 
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belongs to the category of spirit or the Hegelian Geist. 
Spirit enables man to distance himself from the finite 
world. Because of his spirit, man does not live an 
immediate life, a form of life which would include no 
opposition. He constantly finds himself in a position at 
the center of the contradictions, and strives to 
reconciliate them. Man himself is a compound of these 
oppositions concerned with the possibilities of erasing the 
limitations posed by them. This unification, for 
Kierkegaard, is located in the individual will, and is 
therefore purely subjective. 
As regards the dichotomy of finitude/infinitude, it 
follows that truth can only be achieved when one is in a 
state of faith, when the individual is in a relation of 
unity with the ultimate reality, the God of Christianity. 
But this faith requires passion, and in order to leave 
behind, or, what is more, to reject Hegelian rational 
objectivity, a leap must be made into a realm that is 
opposed to rational understanding. Indeed, the concept of 
faith reckons that truth cannot even be known without the 
relation to God. This leap into radical subjectivity is 
Kierkegaard's "Leap of Faith" which constitutes the 
entrance into a relationship with God, or with the ultimate 
reality opposed to us finite beings. Faith, in the 
Kierkegaardian sense, requires an either/or decision. 
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Either we make the leap of we don't; mediation is not 
possible. 
Once again, Kierkegaard borrows certain notions from 
the Hegelian system. He insists that paradox as the 
greatest stimulus for passion is an absolute necessity. 
This is reminiscent of the Hegelian dialectic, in which an 
antithesis to the thesis is necessary in order for the 
movement to be propelled forward. In Kierkegaard's case the 
paradox consists in the opposition between humanity and 
God. He stipulates that paradox is an absolute necessity 
for the intensification of subjectivity. In fact, the 
degree of objective uncertainty is proportional to the 
possibility of faith. Similarly, the less we can rationally 
be convinced of something, the less objective we are, the 
more our passion and faith will be strengthened, and the 
more likely we will be to achieve "eternal happiness." 
Thus, knowledge gives way to emotion, since it is through 
emotional involvement that the subjective thinker can 
introduce that aspect of himself which is his reality. 
Kierkegaard's insistence on the importance of emotions 
(Solomon, 1987, p. 83) brings to mind the Heideggerian 
concept of moods (Stimmunaen or Gemutsverfassunaen^ which 
play a vital role in our everyday involvement with life. 
Simultaneously, the term "emotions" for Kierkegaard 
includes the realm of the senses. Again we hear echos of 
Heidegger and his affirmation that Dasein cannot distance 
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itself from the physical and sensuous involvement with 
things alongside of it. That, indeed, any attempt to 
consider Dasein in abstract terms will lead away from its 
essence. This essence is characterized by both Heidegger 
and Kierkegaard as the physical, embodied relation in which 
Dasein stands toward other Daseins and objects present-at-
hand. 
Kierkegaard has without a doubt paved the way for 
Heidegger with his rejection of objectivity, but it 
seems that the latter has reached a compromise in that 
he at least acknowledged the possibility of objective 
thought. Kierkegaard insisted in the exclusive validity of 
the subjective stance, whereas Heidegger considered it to 
be only one of the various modes of consciousness. The fact 
that he judged beinq-in-the-world to be the ultimate and 
authentic mode of existence does not diminish the fact that 
other modes are not without value for him. 
The System 
While Kierkegaard may indeed have a rather limited 
idea of the meaning of human existence, he nevertheless 
acknowledges the fact that most individuals are not able to 
make the ultimate leap of faith. Heidegger had acknowledged 
this shortcoming in his discussion of Dasein's facticity. 
Facticity is defined as Dasein's awareness that it is part 
of the world, that any attempt to remove itself from this 
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given fact is senseless. Kierkegaard devotes much of his 
writings to the more common mode of existence, that which 
Heidegger saw as being cursed or blessed with facticity. 
The former's ontology therefore describes the different 
life orientations. It is concerned with the ways in which 
people structure their lives in order to make them 
meaningful. His phenomenology of spiritual development, 
although it is similar to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, 
is not as exclusive as the latter's system. The different 
modes of existence that Kierkegaard elaborates are just 
that: possible modes of making meaning of life. This does 
not imply that he doesn't approach the discussion in an 
non-judgemental frame of mind. On the contrary, he makes it 
quite clear that they indeed constitute a development, 
beginning with the least adequate mode, and culminating in 
the most. 
It may be of interest to note here that in laying out 
the spiritual development of man, Kierkegaard reverses 
Hegel's "path of natural consciousness" (Flpristad, 1983, 
p. 165). Whereas Hegel's path goes from private to public, 
from inner to outer, Kierkegaard's journey is inward. For 
him, the public world is unable to provide for the 
individual's "eternal happiness," and therefore the 
individual has to turn inward in order to become radically 
subjective. Heidegger agreed with Kierkegaard in this 
respect. For him, the public world and its powers of 
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persuasion constituted das Man. Dasein, in its fallenness, 
is at constant risk of giving in to the demands and the 
temptations of das Man, and is therefore forever in danger 
of becoming "inauthentic.11 Authenticity, for Heidegger as 
for Kierkegaard, must be found within the individual. 
Therefore, the turn inward constitutes for both a vital act 
in the production of personal or subjective meaning. 
Level one - Acquiescence and the Senses 
In The Present Age Kierkegaard discusses the most 
common of all possible modes, that of public existence. 
This mode, reminiscent of Heidegger's "falling" and 
acquiescing to das Man. is the most disdainful mode of 
existence. At this level, people "...do not live 
aesthetically, but neither has the ethical manifested 
itself in its entirety," (Kierkegaard, 1940, p. 107). Like 
Heidegger's inauthenticity, this form of existence is 
characterized by the need to be socially accepted. The 
individual at this stage must "fit" himself to any 
environment of inauthenticity, thus becoming inauthentic 
himself. He does not have the capability to look and to go 
inward. There can be no mention of true individuality. 
Moreover, 
...many lives are wasted. ...the many who are 
helpless, thoughtless, and sensual, who live superior 
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lazy lives and never receive any deeper impression of 
existence than this meaningless grin. (Kierkegaard, 
1940, p. 268) 
While the individual's actions might outwardly seem to 
convey a degree of social solidarity, according to 
Kierkegaard, this is only an illusion. The individual at 
this level is not capable of any form of commitment. 
Acquiescence must not be confused with conscious 
dedication. 
One step up we find ourselves in the Aesthetic mode of 
existence. Here, Kierkegaard acknowledges the positive 
aspect of living a life devoted to sensuality. But since it 
is the pursuit and not necessarily the achievement of 
pleasure which guides this mode, it can only result in a 
temporary state of satisfaction, never in "eternal 
happiness." While the title of the work in which 
Kierkegaard describes this particular mode (Either / Or) 
suggests that a choice has to be made between the positive 
aspect of the life of the senses and its negative aspect. 
It seems that he is aware of the fact that neither can be 
excluded. Kierkegaard's stance on the life of the senses 
may well be described as ambiguous. At one point he insists 
that it represents an aspect of human existence which 
should be a part of life. Contrarily, he hastens to 
enlighten us of the dangers that such a mode might entail, 
considering the fact that sensuality may well take over the 
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whole of existence, in which case the other modes on which 
he places more value, may be relegated to the sidelines. 
The quest for a mode of more enduring satisfaction is 
therefore not yet over. 
Level two - The Development of the MI" 
It seems that with the Ethical mode of existence we 
have finally reached the highest realm of spiritual 
development. A distinction is in order on the different 
forms that this mode can take on. In Fear and Trembling 
Kierkegaard seems to suggest that it is to be understood as 
an objective spirituality, invoking memories of the 
Hegelian universality. It is defined as a commitment to a 
universal system of institutions which structures the life 
of the individual. By choosing to exist in accordance with 
the accepted ethical norms of society, the individual will * 
take on stability and orderliness, dignity and 
significance. In the Postscript, on the other hand, the 
ethical mode of existence comes to mean a mode of 
inwardness and subjectivity. "The ethical is a correlative 
to individuality." (Kierkegaard, 1941a, p. 138). In the 
lower stages of spiritual development, the modes of 
publicness and of the aesthetic did not reflect a conscious 
commitment, the ethical mode defined in this manner 
constitutes a very personal commitment, opposed to the more 
objective commitment of Fear and Trembling. Although 
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Kierkegaard seems to agree with Hegel on the importance of 
the achievement of the "universal" as concerns the ethical, 
for him, the particular, such as family life, is placed on 
the same level as participation in the life of the state: 
"The ethical had for Abraham no higher expression than the 
family life." (Kierkegaard, 1941b, p. 121). therefore 
family relations are not subordinated to other social 
institutions. Rather, 
...it is beautiful and salutary to be the individual 
who translates himself into the universal ... who has 
the universal as his home, his friendly abiding-place. 
(Kierkegaard, 1941b, p. 86) 
suggesting that the universal is seen as an umbrella term 
under which the particular and the subjective find their 
place. The shortcoming of an ethical stance that is purely 
objective is the fact that it hinders the individual in the 
development of his subjectivity and his personality. That 
this is a serious drawback for Kierkegaard is obvious, 
since for him to be human implies having a unique 
personality. It implies making conscious decisions and 
being responsible for one's own actions rather than relying 
on others for guidance, a notion which Heidegger inherited 
from him. While the "objective-ethical" mode does bring 
with it a commitment, it is a commitment to something that 
is objective and impersonal, and therefore can not have the 
same value as a commitment that is more subjective. 
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This subjectivity implies that the individual makes a 
commitment to something of his own choosing. It is through 
this commitment that an individual personality can develop. 
Without it, the multiplicity of possibility could not be 
narrowed down. It now becomes clear that for Kierkegaard 
the unifying power of personality is the choice that one 
makes, not the Kantian abstract and unconscious act of 
synthesis. Before the choice is made that will eventually 
define the personality, there is a myriad of possibilities 
available. Through the act of choosing, the individual 
defines himself as an individual. Therefore, according to 
Kierkegaard, it is not as important what one chooses, but 
how one does so. Here again, the notion of acting according 
to one's Beariff or to one's vocation comes into play. 
One's actions must coincide with one's personality, but the 
problem is that only through one's actions does a true 
personality develop. Consequently, we must assume that the 
development of a personality that is truly unique parallels 
the choices that one makes. It must be considered a 
parallel process, a tension. 
I should like to say that in making a choice it is not 
so much a question of choosing the right as of the 
energy, the earnestness, the pathos with which one 
chooses. Thereby the personality announces its inner 
infinity, and thereby, in turn, the personality is 
consolidated. Therefore, even if a man were to choose 
the wrong, he will nevertheless discover, precisely by 
reason of the energy with which he chose, that he had 
chosen the wrong. For the choice being made with the 
whole inwardness of his personality, his nature is 
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purified and he himself brought into immediate 
relation with the eternal Power whose omnipresence 
interpenetrates the whole of existence. This 
transfiguration, this higher consecration, is never 
attained by that man who chooses merely aesthetically. 
(Kierkegaard, 1949, p. 106) 
The choice involved is an "absolute choice". It represents 
an enduring commitment to something. 
The question that must come to mind is how the "how" 
of the choosing is accomplished. It seems that every choice 
I make is directly proportionate to my "I", to my Beariff 
or vocation. In making a choice, I do so with everything 
that I am, everything that I know, and with every 
experience that has accumulated and has shaped my "I". My 
actions are determined by the form of the "I" at the moment 
of decision. Simultaneously, the "I" has been produced by 
experience and by the previous choices that I have made. 
Fichte's influence on Kierkegaard becomes especially clear 
in that both would insist that the "how" of choosing can be 
educated to a degree. If consciousness is choice, then the 
choices that I make must come directly out of the modes of 
consciousness that are already established, and will, in 
turn, produce a further mode of consciousness. However, in 
order to choose, I must first become conscious of being 
conscious, otherwise my choices will be limited, and the 
act of making a choice is meaningless if there are only 
limited possibilities to choose from. Only by becoming 
self-conscious, will I be able to attain the goal of 
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stepping outside of my every-day being-in-the-world and 
will be able to even become aware of a wide array of 
choices available to me. In the Kierkegaardian religious 
mode of existence, this even implies of attaining the goal 
of eternity by achieving a Buberian I-eternal Thou 
relationship and by stepping outside of my thrownness. 
Thus, the highest level of Kierkegaard's spiritual 
development must imply being capable to attaining a god's 
eye view of my existence, and thus answering the question 
for Being. 
It would seem that European existentialism has taken 
Kierkegaard's question of the "how" of choosing extremely 
serious. While the latter focuses on the issue of choice 
primarily in his section on the ethical mode of 
consciousness, the existentialists after Heidegger have 
made the question an all-encompassing one. Borrowing the 
notion of fear from both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, they 
ascertain that the basic choice we make is the choice to 
live. While we did not choose to be put into the world, we 
have come to accept this thrownness and subsequently we 
choose life over death. It seems, however, that before we 
have become aware of choices, we have learned the fear of 
death (Heidegger's Angst). While we don't know what death 
is, we realize that we can avoid this uncertainty through 
the will to live. 
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As soon as the development of an "I" is accomplished 
and self-consciousness is achieved, we are faced with the 
paradox of being aware of our own consciousness. This puts 
us in a position of questioning the "why" of our own 
existence. According to Kierkegaard, it is blind faith 
which keeps us from being vulnerable to having been thrown. 
Therefore, the choices that he recommends must be choices 
that are in direct contrast to rationality. However, the 
fact that our basic choice is the choice to live, implies 
that all subsequent choices must be based on and come out 
of this one choice. In this case the question is no longer 
whether one can learn to choose, but whether one can learn 
to realize the necessity of choice. By becoming conscious 
of the need to choose, the choice has already been made. 
Looking back to the aesthetic mode laid out by 
Kierkegaard, it seems that what one chooses, matters after 
all. The individual absorbed in this mode of existence 
makes an absolute choice by devoting himself solely to the 
pursuit of pleasure. What seems to disqualify this general 
choice is that it is not a choice which will lead to the 
consolidation of personality. The unified personality can 
be achieved only if the commitment one makes does not lead 
to ultimate frustration as does the aesthetic mode. 
The difference in the ethical mode described in Fear 
and Trembling, which constitutes one of objectivism, and 
that elaborated on in Kierkegaard's other works, is that of 
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choice. It seems that in the objective stance one makes a 
single choice, that of an independently determined 
"universality". In the subjective stance, on the contrary, 
a twofold choice is called for. First of all one must 
choose a life of subjective and personal commitment, and 
secondly one must choose something specific to which one 
makes such a commitment. For Kierkegaard, subjectivity is 
greater than objectivity, and therefore, he insists on the 
separation. Choosing something specific, however, does not 
merely imply a subjective commitment to an objective goal. 
What Kierkegaard has in mind is a passionate choice, one 
that culminates in faith which, in turn, is born out of the 
paradox of objective uncertainty. The reason he insists on 
a subjective choice, is that, like in Fichte's system of 
consciousness, the state of the "I" at the moment of 
choosing plays a vital role because it determines the 
quality of the choice made. If the level of self-
consciousness has been achieved, the choice one makes will 
be "returned" to the subjective realm, and will therefore 
take on meaning. As long as it remains in the objective 
realm, it can never be appropriated by the "I", and 
therefore remains meaningless. By merging with the "I" at 
the moment of choosing, the choice one has made becomes the 
"I", and the unity between subject and object is achieved. 
Simultaneously this implies that the "I" is now in a 
position to overcome the aesthetic realm characterized by 
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its focus on the earthly, and is in a mode where it can 
transcend to a higher realm that is endowed with an 
infinite number of possibilities. 
Level three - Faith before Knowledge 
For Hegel the achievement of the level of objectivity 
culminated in absolute knowledge. Kierkegaard saw serious 
flaws in this type of consciousness. He stipulates that in 
order to achieve eternal happiness, more is required than 
the secular mode of the ethical. Therefore, the highest 
stage to be reached is the Religious mode of existence. It 
is here where the notion of the paradox re-enters into the 
discussion. For Kierkegaard, the very heart of Christianity 
is a belief in the paradox that God is both finite and 
infinite (generally considered a question of either/or), an 
idea established by the doctrine of Incarnation. This 
paradox constitutes the ultimate test of faith, since the 
event of Incarnation is not one which can be explained 
rationally. Since subjectivity is, for Kierkegaard, a 
function of passion, it follows that one who believes in 
this paradox has a high degree of subjectivity. 
The reason that Kierkegaard characterizes the 
Incarnation as the decisive event in Christianity is that 
it enables man to eliminate the need to transcend the 
world. The fact that God, the infinite being, appears in 
the finite realm, makes the achievement of eternal 
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happiness in this world possible, because through the 
Incarnation God makes himself accessible to all finite 
beings. Genuine individuality and eternal happiness can 
come about in a relationship of human beings to God. This 
idea must have had a great impact on the thinking of Martin 
Buber, for this particular relationship reappears in his 
work as the I-Eternal Thou. By making the leap of faith, by 
abandoning rationality, the individual will be capable to 
enter into a God relationship. But the leap of faith must 
be made in "fear and trembling", it must involve passion, 
which itself is intensified by the paradox. 
After having identified Kierkegaard's stage of 
spiritual development, it is appropriate to return to the 
central issue of his work, the question of what it means to 
exist as a human being. Kierkegaard's focus on the term "to 
exist" becomes clear once we take into consideration the 
importance that he places on subjectivity and 
individuality. We must realize that the objective stance 
prescribed by Hegel has nothing whatsoever to do with 
everyday existence. 
The notion of existence has traditionally been posed 
in opposition with that of essence. Pre-Kierkegaardian 
philosophers back to Plato have generally assumed that 
essence determines existence, that an object is an object 
due to its essence, but that that object may or may not 
exist. This thought has been adequately expressed by Kant 
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when he addresses the object-hood of things. The fact that 
certain predicates are suitable to entire categories of 
objects indicates that these predicates define their 
essence. From this essence we may then deduce that objects 
can exist in reality. Kierkegaard objected strongly to this 
stance, and turned the essence-existence problem of the 
idealists on its head. 
Factual existence is wholly indifferent to any and all 
variations in essence, and everything that exists 
participates without petty jealousy in being, and 
participates in the same degree. Ideally, to be sure, 
the case is quite different. But the moment I speak of 
being in the ideal sense I do no longer speak of 
being, but of essence. ... such being does not involve 
it [essence] dialectically in the determination of 
factual existence, ... (Kierkegaard, 1936, pp. 32/3) 
It is obvious that for Kierkegaard faith comes before 
knowing. He makes a distinction between the ideal (essence) 
and the factual (existence) mode of being. But what is 
truly innovative in his philosophy is that for him 
reasoning does not move from essence to existence, but 
rather the other way around. Hegel insisted on the 
unification of thought and being. But Kierkegaard strives 
to separate subject and object. When Hegel and his 
predecessors spoke of "existence", they did so by endowing 
"existence" with a universal ideal in mind. Kierkegaard, 
contrarily, considers "existence" as the personal existence 
of the subjective thinker, and hereby foreshadows the 
Heideggerian concept of Dasein. concerned with its everyday 
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existence in a "real" and concrete, not an "ideal" and 
abstract world. Kierkegaard's concern lies in the personal 
interpretation of being (Heidegger's Seiendem). or in the 
manner in which the concept of existence applies to the 
subjective thinker. He is not concerned, as Hegel was 
before him, with Being in a general sense, but with being 
as realized in factuality, not with essence but with 
existence. Kierkegaard does not substitute emotion for 
reflection. He points out that a mode of reflection is 
necessary that is rooted in the emotional situation of the 
subjective thinker. Pure Being, with which the pre-
Kierkegaardian philosophers had occupied themselves, has, 
by itself, no value for him, because it represents a kind 
of Being that is not that of man. It is merely an 
abstraction. 
Time and Eternity 
Concerning Kierkegaard's epistemology, one notion 
looming large is that of repetition. The Platonic concept 
of recollection establishes knowledge as something that has 
always been there. It does not place emphasis on the moment 
of transition from ignorance to knowledge (Wyschogrod, 
1954, p. 35). Since the learner has always known, the point 
where recollection helps him to identify the knowledge can 
not be of importance. Kierkegaard abandons the notion of 
recollection and proposes that the change from a state of 
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ignorance to one of knowing is like the change from non-
being to being (Kierkegaard, 1936, p. 13). 
... repetition is a decisive expression for what 
"recollection" was for the Greeks. Just as they taught 
that all knowledge is a recollection, so will modern 
philosophy teach that the whole of life is a 
repetition. The only modern philosopher who had an 
inkling of this was Leibnitz. Repetition and 
recollection are the same movement, only in opposite 
directions; for what is recollected has been, is 
repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so 
called is recollected forwards. (Kierkegaard 1941c, 
pp. 3/4) 
With the concept of repetition, Kierkegaard has 
succeeded in uniting the past and the future. While the 
forwards direction suggests an element of novelty, it is 
not entirely new and independent of the past (Wyschogrod, 
1954, p. 36). It is connected to that which has been, but 
simultaneously it is directed toward the future, toward 
possibility and becoming, concepts which Heidegger will 
respectively appropriate years later. Becoming, for 
Kierkegaard, is the transition from possibility to 
actuality (Wyschogrod, 1954, p. 37). 
Here, the Kierkegaardian view of time and temporality 
is manifested, for again, the dichotomy of essence and 
existence is played upon. He insists that possibility is 
essence (ideal), whereas becoming is existence (real), and 
the very fact that his focus is on becoming brings him to 
pronounce that the past is not necessary (Kierkegaard, 
1936, p. 63). The very emphasis that he places on the 
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concept of becoming suggests that the past must itself 
have, at one point, been in the state of becoming, 
otherwise it wouldn't be what it is now. Once again he 
connects the past to the future by proposing that the 
freedom of becoming can only then be ascribed to the future 
if it is simultaneously ascribed to the past. Thus, the 
past can never be past if it is conceived of in the 
present. What is emphasized is the potentiality of the 
future, and the possibility of the mind to liberate itself 
from the present. Kierkegaard's concept of becoming is 
strongly reminiscent of Heidegger's emphasis on the 
temporality of the future and his insistence that, while 
there is no "present" as it is generally defined, the past 
and the future meet in the "presencing". 
Like Heidegger after him, Kierkegaard realized that 
time is a factor closely related to the existential nature 
of being. Man exists in time and he must operate in and 
with time. The concept of eternity, however, is that 
temporal aspect with which Kierkegaard occupied himself 
more than with so-called finite time: 
... time itself in its totality is the instant; 
eternally understood the temporal is the instant, and 
the instant eternally understood is only 'once.' In 
vain would the temporal assume an air of importance, 
count the instants, and add them all together - if 
eternity has any say in the matter, the temporal never 
gets farther than, never comes to more than, the 
"once." For eternity is the opposite; it is not the 
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opposite to a single instant (this is meaningless). It 
is the opposite to the temporal as a whole, and it 
opposes itself with the power of eternity against the 
temporal amounting to more than that. (Kierkegaard, 
1939, pp. 103/4) 
Rather than seeing eternity as an infinite extension 
of time, as had Hegel, Kierkegaard views it as never-
changing presence, it is the present forever (Wyschogrod, 
1954, p. 42). If, as Kierkegaard had suggested, eternity is 
indeed the opposite of the temporal, must we not assume 
that eternity exists outside of time, and can therefore 
neither be viewed nor understood with our frame of 
reference which is steeped in temporality? Also, does this 
not suggest that, assuming that we could step out of time 
and take a God's view, all time and the temporal must seem 
like a mere instant or moment? The condition of 
theoretically stepping outside of time is equated with 
Being in the Hegelian sense, therefore "In modern 
philosophy the abstraction culminates in 'pure being,' but 
pure being is the most abstract expression for eternity." 
(Kierkegaard, 1944, p. 75). 
If we do step outside of time, and even Kierkegaard 
admits that in an abstract way we are able to assume that 
position, then the temporal must indeed seem to us like a 
series of moments strung one next to the other. If this 
accumulation of moments make up our conception of time, 
then Heidegger will be correct in his declaration that the 
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way in which we normally conceive of time is precisely of 
an accumulation of moments. 
Are we to assume that Kierkegaard now reneges on his 
position concerning the concept of "pure being?" It seems 
that he cannot deny the impact that it must make on man's 
thinking, but he relegates it to the sidelines by insisting 
that it is merely a part of the being of man, not all of 
his being. It is that part of him which is eternal. 
That man succeeds in capturing his eternal aspect is 
made clear in Fragments where Kierkegaard once again takes 
up the concept of moment (I am assuming that the instant 
discussed in The Concept of Dread plays the same 
role, but has been rendered from the Danish by a different 
translator). 
And now the moment. Such a moment has a peculiar 
character. It is brief and temporal indeed, like every 
moment; it is transient as all moments are; it is 
past, like every moment in the next moment. And yet it 
is decisive, and filled with the eternal. Such a 
moment ought to have a distinctive name; let us call 
it the Fullness of Time. (Kierkegaard, 1936, p. 13) 
Although the moment is defined here as belonging to 
the past, it belongs at the same time to the future. By 
calling the moment eternal, Kierkegaard reminds us that 
eternity past and future are united and result in temporal 
fullness. They result in a realm which incorporates all the 
dimensions of time in a seamless, moment to moment fashion, 
and condenses them into one instant. 
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It now becomes clear that Kierkegaard's dialectic 
method unfolds itself in the dichotomy of pure Being and 
existence as well as in that of the eternal and the 
temporal. The fact that man constantly finds himself at the 
center of these opposites is at the basis of Kierkegaard's 
concept of subjectivity. This subjectivity should not be 
seen as a doubt regarding the reality of the outside world, 
and a substitution of an inner, subjective world for it. 
His concept of doubt is not an epistemological one; it does 
not have to do with knowledge, but with an act of will. 
The Greek skeptic did not doubt by virtue of his 
knowledge, but by an act of will (refusal to give 
assent). From this it follows that doubt can be 
overcome only by a free act, an act of will, as every 
Greek skeptic would understand as soon as he had 
understood himself. (Kierkegaard, 1936, p. 67) 
Obviously, Kierkegaard considered his philosophy a 
return to the Greek tradition (Flpistad, 1983, p. 162). By 
condemning the doubt of Idealism, he clarifies his stance 
and asserts that at the center of his ontology is the 
relation of the individual to the outside world. However, 
"relation", for him, does not simply mean how one thinks, 
but rather how one acts in accordance with this thinking. 
Therefore he is clearly in a position to criticize modern 
philosophy for posing at its central problem the 
distinction between subject and object, for apparently it 
has asked the wrong question. Rather than considering 
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knowledge, Kierkegaard has opted to make his basic 
distinction between that of pure Being, which has nothing 
to do with man, and existence, which has everything to do 
with man. 
Part 2: Husserl's Phenomenology 
To understand Edmund Husserl and the impact that his 
philosophy has had on Western thought, it is important to 
situate him properly in the context of the tradition to 
which he is heir. His roots are to be found in Greek 
philosophy, and he saw it his mission to revive the ancient 
Greek ideal of pure science. 
Spiritual Europe has a birthplace... It is the ancient 
Greek nation in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. 
Here there arises a new sort of attitude of 
individuals toward their surrounding world. And its 
consequence is the breakthrough of a completely new 
sort of spiritual structure, rapidly growing into a 
systematically self-enclosed cultural form; the Greeks 
called it philosophy. Correctly translated, in the 
original sense, that means nothing other than 
universal science, science of the universe, of the 
all-encompassing unity of all that is. (Husserl, 
1954, p. 276) 
The philosophical method which he employed and 
christened Phenomenology has, therefore, as its goal the 
establishment of a science of philosophy (Elliston, 1977, 
p. 72). While most philosophers of this century were 
relegated to responding to previous philosophical systems 
(as is the case with Hegel's system, which seemed 
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impossible to top), the development of phenomenology is 
truly an innovation. Certainly Husserl himself must have 
seen it in this light, for he considered phenomenology a 
revolution and a new beginning in philosophical inquiry 
which would put an end to the "unscientific" endeavors of 
his predecessors. But he was also the first to admit that 
his point of departure is without a doubt Cartesian in the 
sense that it stresses the primacy of the first-person 
experience. Also, there are distinctly Kantian elements in 
his thought, namely the search for the basic a priori 
principles that govern human understanding. At the center 
of Husserl's phenomenology is the search for the 
foundations (or background) of consciousness. The method he 
developed is first and foremost an epistemological 
enterprise, concerned with that which is basic to all human 
understanding and experience. 
While phenomenology owes much to Descartes, there are 
points in which Husserl vehemently disagreed with him. 
These concern mainly Descartes' method itself, such as the 
mind/body split, and his insistence that we know the mind 
better than the body. Another point of disagreement is 
Descartes' skepticism - the supposition that all of our 
beliefs are false, although in Husserl's concept of epoche 
we will see a re-working of this sort of skepticism. 
Husserl was dismayed by the relativism and historicism 
of Nietzsche and Dilthey which, in his view, invited 
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skepticism. At the same time he rejected the empiricists' 
"natural standpoint", because taking it for granted implied 
failure. He wanted to return to a philosophy of the 
Absolute. By trying to locate the Absolute in 
consciousness, he follows in the footsteps of Kant, Fichte, 
and Hegel. As for them, so for Husserl, truth is to be 
found in consciousness. This explains his starting point 
which is modelled after Descartes' insistence that our own 
consciousness is self-evident. Simultaneously, it explains 
why Husserl never questioned the implications of this 
concept. 
Phenomenology is characterized as a "return to the 
things themselves," a term which, in itself, is reminiscent 
of the Kantian thing-in-itself. Whereas Kant insisted on 
the existence of independent objects, Husserl's "things" 
are not only objects but phenomena and intuitions coupled 
with experience. "Phenomena" in the Husserlian sense, 
however, should not be equated with "experiences", since 
such an idea would reinforce the Cartesian dualism which he 
tries to abandon. It would evoke a differentiation between 
experiences and the objects themselves. Husserl's 
"phenomenon", contrarily, is the object as it is 
experienced, and includes something of both the experience 
and of the object itself. A phenomenon is that which 
"immediately presents itself" to us. Thus, it is not 
something different than the physical object, also it is 
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not something different than experience. While Kant 
distinguishes between phenomena, given in intuition, and 
noumena, things in themselves, Husserl rejects this 
distinction and asserts that phenomena are the things in 
themselves. It follows that for Husserl the Kantian 
distinction between the faculties of sensibililty and of 
the intellect must seem nonsensical, since his own concept 
of intuition must include parts of both of these Kantian 
faculties. 
In order to gain a fuller understanding of Husserl's 
refusal to make this distinction, it is helpful to examine 
the notion of intentionality, which is a central aspect in 
Husserl's work, and which he had inherited from his teacher 
Franz Brentano. Husserl, unlike Brentano, claimed that in 
phenomenological description, it made no difference 
whatsoever whether the object in question was one 
experienced in "reality", in a dream, or in a 
hallucination. He insists on the intentional neglect of the 
existence of objects, indeed he claims that the 
phenomenologist is not concerned with objects except as 
they appear to consciousness. Husserl focuses on the 
ontological question raised by intentionality, which 
concerns the mode of being of intentional directedness 
itself. The distinction that Husserl insisted on is 
one between the act of consciousness and the object of 
consciousness. According to him, intentional acts are not 
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self-enclosed processes needing to be related to things 
external to them. Rather, intentionality is our very 
openness to reality. But despite the distinction, there 
must be a correlation between act and object, since every 
act takes an object, and every object is the object of an 
act (Weizsacker, 1990, p. 198). What traditional philosophy 
has called "experience" is nothing more that the 
correlation between the intentional act (the experiencing) 
and the intentional object (the experienced). It makes no 
sense to define the phenomenon either as intuition or as an 
object. Contrarily, the phenomenon as the intentional 
object of consciousness is an object as intuited. It is 
what it is only because of the fact that we are conscious 
of it. Seen in this light, we come to understand that 
phenomenology actually addresses two questions: the one 
about the conscious act and the one about the intentional 
object. However, we must bear in mind that the two can 
never be completely separated. 
Level one - Suspending all Prejudices 
If we are to consider phenomenology as a special sort 
of philosophical investigation, we must take into 
consideration some of the claims that Husserl has made in 
regard to his procedure. One such claim concerns the demand 
that phenomenology is "presuppositionless", and that 
the results of phenomenology are absolutely true and 
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unconditional. Husserl insists that phenomenology rely 
solely on description and not advance a philosophical 
theory. Phenomenology must be free of any theory, because a 
philosophical theory would lead to bias and to dogmatism. 
If any philosophical investigation were not to be 
presuppositionless, the philosopher would be in constant 
danger to include in his thinking some unquestioned element 
which he would take for granted. In order to prevent this 
and to assure that phenomenology remains indeed description 
and does not turn into theory, Husserl devises a series of 
disciplines, one of which is his insistence on the 
suspension of the natural standpoint (epoche). He further 
claims that by accepting such traditional metaphors as 
seeing the mind as a container, we base our thinking on 
presuppositions and therefore take a step away from pure 
description. The demand that phenomenology remains 
presuppositionless must eventually bring us to the 
realization that the concepts of phenomenology can only be 
analyzed in terms of the concepts of phenomenology 
themselves. It is in danger of becoming a circular 
argument, a problem that has often been focussed on by 
critics of phenomenology. It seems that every other 
philosophy runs the risk of being able to defend its 
proposition only through its own concepts and principles 
and this sort of criticism is not really valid. 
165 
The empiricists before Husserl had claimed that all 
concepts are abstractions from experience, and that, 
as a result, our knowledge of the world is empirical 
knowledge. For them, the only necessary truths were trivial 
and conventional truths. For Husserl, on the other hand, 
the very structure of human consciousness as well as the 
"essences" make necessary truths true. These essences 
cannot be discovered through traditional method, but only 
through a special discipline, that of phenomenology. 
Phenomenology is an examination of the essential structures 
of consciousness with the goal of describing necessary and 
universal truths of experience. 
Level three - The Power of Being 
What is necessary for there to be any experience at 
all? For Husserl it is without a doubt the essences that 
make things what they are. Heeding the limitations of 
language, we might describe essences as categories in that 
they are not concerned with objects in particular but with 
that aspect of objects that makes them recognizable as 
objects at all. In other words, essences provide us with 
the possibility that we may not only see particular 
objects, but that we are able to see kinds of objects. We 
are able to see now that, in contrast to Kant, Fichte, and 
Hegel, Husserl did not rely on deduction or dialectic, but 
insisted on evidence. However, this kind of evidence must 
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not be confused with the evidence of the empiricists who 
relied on the senses. Rather, Husserl speaks of a kind of 
evidence that can be directly intuited with a special 
method of philosophical investigation. And with his 
phenomenology he means to (re-)discover a body of 
indubitable necessary truths. In this sense, phenomenology 
thinks the Kantian transcendental viewpoint to its end in 
that Husserl not only claims that the truth must be found 
in the self, but that the self itself must find it there. 
The self is not only the place where the truth can be 
found, but it is at the same time the discoverer. 
Here, it may be necessary to re-examine a claim made 
above about Husserl's contempt for what he calls the 
"natural standpoint." In fact, he never disclaimed the 
validity of this ordinary way of thinking in everyday life. 
When doing philosophy, it can only lead to absurdities. If 
a thinker cannot distance himself from the natural 
standpoint, it follows that he brings to his investigation 
an entire baggage of presuppositions, biases, and taken-
for-granted notions which necessarily prevent him from 
getting at the truth. 
One such accepted notion that we have learned from 
traditional philosophy is, of course, the idea that objects 
are simply "given" to us. Although, at times, Descartes' 
doubt might affect us, and we begin to wonder whether the 
object we perceive is actually present, all doubting and 
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rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing 
the general thesis of the natural standpoint. 
... Zweifelhaftigkeit besteht in dem Sinne, dass ein 
Zweifelhaft-werden und Nichtig-werden denkbar ist, die 
Moglichkeit des Nichtseins, als prinzipielle, niemals 
ausgeschlossen ist. ... Am absoluten Sein der 
Erlebnisse ist dadurch nichts ge&ndert, ja, sie 
bleiben immer zu all dem vorausgesetzt. (Husserl, 
1950, p. 109) 
doubt exists in the sense that a becoming-
doubtful and a becoming-nothing is possible for 
thought. That the possibility of nothingness is never 
to be excluded in principle. ... This does not change 
anything about the absolute Being of experiences. In 
fact, experiences remain always a presupposition to 
all doubt. 
This standpoint is only capable of treating cognition 
as a fact of nature. It assumes that all knowledge comes 
from experience and denies the Kantian supposition that 
there must also be a priori knowledge which is not 
dependent on experience. 
Level three - Leaving Existence behind 
In order to leave behind the natural standpoint, full 
of biases and presuppositions, and to reach the 
phenomenological standpoint where we can concentrate on 
pure description, we must apply what Husserl calls epoche. 
Whereas Descartes had insisted that we doubt the existence 
of everything, Husserl suggests that we simply "bracket" 
existence, because, as such, it is entirely unimportant to 
experience. This phenomenological reduction by which we 
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suspend judgement about the natural world is, according to 
Husserl, the most important means to arrive at a frame of 
mind in which we are able to discover the importance of 
things without being burdened with unnecessary judgements. 
The reduction of experience to an intuition of pure 
consciousness enables us to recognize that there are 
objects of consciousness itself. It allows us to distance 
ourselves from the spatial/temporal existence of objects, 
and to recognize that whatever we know about these 
"external" objects we know only through the intentional 
objects of consciousness. Phenomenology, then, is always a 
description of objects for consciousness rather than for 
common sense. Husserl's epoche urges us to describe 
consciousness and its objects rather than the world and its 
objects. As has been pointed out above, the epoche seems 
almost like a reworking of Descartes' doubt, but where the 
latter is skeptical of all our every-day assumptions, 
Husserl neither doubts nor seeks a proof, but only attempts 
to describe what it is for us to believe these things. 
Simultaneously, the phenomenological reduction 
attempts to guarantee that we do not see individuals but 
essences. It is an attempt to reduce descriptions to 
descriptions of essences and to focus attention on the 
meaning of phenomena rather than on the particulars of an 
experience. This form of investigation links Husserl to 
•/ 
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Kant in that it is reminiscent of the latter's insistence 
on the categories. 
It is precisely Husserl's categorical intuition on 
which Heidegger focuses, as a point of divergence, from his 
teacher. While he acknowledges (in the Zahringer Seminars) 
that both he and Husserl had come to philosophy through 
Brentano, it was the later Brentano who influenced 
Heidegger (namely Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des 
Seienden nach Aristoteles). Husserl got his start with 
Brentano's early works. 
Ein seltsames und bezeichnendes Zusammentreffen bei 
Husserl und Heidegger, dass beide ihren ersten Schritt 
mit demselben Philosophen, aber nicht mit dem selben 
Werk gemacht haben. Mein Brentano, sagt Heidegger 
lachelnd, ist der des Aristoteles! (Heidegger, 1986b, 
pp. 385/6) 
It is a strange and telling coincidence that both 
Husserl and Heidegger have taken their first steps 
with the same philosopher, but not with the same work. 
My Brentano, says Heidegger smilingly, is the Brentano 
of Aristotle! 
In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt of 1874, 
Brentano attempted to describe the essential structure of 
mental experiences and then to classify them according to 
their natural order. He came to the conclusion that the 
essence of mental experience is intentionality - the 
minding-of-the-meant - therefore Husserl's insistence on 
the importance of intentionality. But, as concerns 
Heidegger's judgement, Husserl's major achievement was the 
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discovery that the being of entities can itself be rendered 
present as a phenomenon through categorical intuition. In 
Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen, the second part of the 
Sixth Logical Investigation has as its title "Sensibility 
and Understanding." The sixth chapter which is at the 
beginning of this second part carries the title "Sensible 
Intuition and Categorical intuition", which proves for 
Heidegger that Husserl takes as his starting point sensible 
intuition in order to reach the realm of categorical 
intuition. For Husserl, categories are more than just form. 
The Categorical Intuition implies an intuition which lets 
one recognize a category or similarly, an intuition (a 
being-present for), which is directed immediately toward 
the category. Husserl showed that no part of an assertion 
can find intuitive fulfillment in sensuous perception. In 
the statement "the paper is white", the "is" cannot be a 
sensuous intuition. The "is" or the "being" is in actuality 
*• 
a Uberschuss (surplus or excess) over the content of 
sensuous intuition. But once the "is" has been freed from 
its status as a mere copula, it can be seen as a directly 
given phenomenon. Since categorical intuition is in the 
same manner as sensuous intuition (in that it is giving), 
Husserl has come to the concept of the Categorical 
Intuition via analogy. 
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Part 3: Heidegger's Debt to Husserl 
While Heidegger agrees with Husserl to this point, he 
points out that the latter had stopped short of this 
conclusion. Husserl had failed to think the thought to its 
end by asking for the nature of the absence from out of 
which being is disclosed as presence. Heidegger 
acknowledges that Husserl's great achievement was the 
Vergeqenwartiqunq (the making-present) of the Sein which is 
phenomenologically present in the category. 
Durch diese Leistung ... hatte ich endlich einen 
Boden: "Sein" ist kein blosser Begriff, ist keine 
Abstraktion, die sich auf dem Weg der Ableitung 
ergeben hat. Der Punkt jedoch, iiber den Husserl nicht 
hinauskommt, ist der folgende: nachdem er das Sein 
gleichsam als Gegebenes gewonnen hat, fragt er ihm 
doch nicht weiter nach. Die Frage "Was besagt Sein?" 
entfaltet. er nicht. Fur Husserl war da nicht der 
Schatten einer moglichen Frage, weil es sich fur ihn 
von selbst verstand, dass "Sein" Gegenstand-Sein 
bedeutet. (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 378) 
Through this accomplishment ... I finally had ground 
under my feet: "Being" is not a mere notion, not an 
abstraction which has come about through deduction. 
The point which Husserl does not surpass, is the 
following: After he has won Being, so to speak, as a 
given, he does not continue to ask about it. He does 
not develop the question "What does Being mean?" For 
Husserl, there existed not even the possibility of a 
question, because for him it was self-evident that 
"Being" means Being-as-an-Object. 
Precisely from the fact that Husserl is content with 
considering Sein an entity or an object, stems Heidegger's 
dissatisfaction with his teacher and his claim that the 
question for Being does not exist in Husserl's work. 
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Husserl's ultimate interest lay in the epistemological 
clarification of pure consciousness. He was concerned with 
finding the foundations of knowledge. Heidegger, on the 
other hand, (and with him other existential 
phenomenologists) is in search for those universal features 
that make a human being human. For him, to be a person is 
to be in a position, and be able, to raise the question of 
who one is. The fact that man cannot find out who he is 
renders this quest into one not so much concerned with 
knowledge, but with the acknowledgment that man is 
ultimately a decision-maker. Where Husserl focussed on 
knowing objects in the world, Heidegger and other 
existentialists countered his endeavor with the insistence 
that we do not know objects, but use them instead. For 
Heidegger, intentionality is primarily evident in ordinary 
habitual experience, and he suggests that it should be 
treated as such, and not, as Husserl would have it, by 
analogy with the theoretical standpoint. His claim that 
Husserl did not see everydayness as the basic field of 
intentionality leads him to proclaim that the latter read 
the natural attitude from a prejudicial scientific 
viewpoint. 
Back to Existence 
And so Husserl's epoche, the insistence that in our 
quest for the truth we must suspend the natural standpoint, 
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is widely rejected by the Existentialists. They, including 
Heidegger, realize that we indeed must begin with the 
natural attitude in order to come close to understanding 
the role we play in the world. Because what we are 
primarily concerned with is not mere perception of objects, 
but the pragmatic dealings (Umaehen mit) with the objects 
of concern. And while for Heidegger the phenomenological 
method is a thematization of ordinary life, the implication 
stands strong that we do not "look back" to pure 
consciousness in the act of reflection, but that we "look 
ahead" into the realm of possibilities that is the 
practical dimension of objects. 
Rather than suspending the natural standpoint, as 
Husserl had prescribed, Heidegger suggests that what must 
be suspended is the prejudice of the individual experience. 
That which is priorly known when one knows an object is the 
Wozu. the what-for. As a matter of fact, the only reason we 
are able to concern ourselves with objects is because we 
have already understood it as being for the purpose of 
something. It is precisely this pre-reflective relation 
that we have to objects that constitutes for him our 
primordial involvement with the world, and he is certainly 
not going to let this viewpoint be suspended. 
Insofar as man already knows the being-dimension of 
objects, Heidegger considers man to be beyond entities (his 
Immer-schon-vorwea-sein - always-already-being-ahead). And 
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this disclosure is what he calls "world-disclosure", which 
has its basis in the constant movement directed to the 
future. 
The Tension between Presence and Absence 
We can now see that Heidegger's conception of time and 
his concept of Ereignis (appropriation) has its roots a) in 
the Husserlian method for analyzing the intentional 
disclosure of being and b) in the Aristotelian concept of 
movement. For Aristotle, a moving object is one that does 
not fully appear, is never fully present, but that does 
appear, in its incompletion. Its presence is always mixed 
with absence. Background and foreground are in a constant 
tension. Therefore, to know a moving object means to keep 
present to mind not only the present object but also the 
presence of the absence that makes it a moving object. In 
the third Le Thor Seminar in 1969, Heidegger picks up this 
idea in his discussion of Aletheia and Logos. 
Dem Wechsel unterworfen sein, sich andern, das ist 
sich von etwas Friiherem entfernen: abwesen. Die Idee 
allein ist reine Anwesenheit, nie abwesende 
Anwesenheit, ein Sich-bestandig-vergegenwartigen. Das 
ist es, was im Ubermass da ist: die anwesende 
Anwesenheit. (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 37) 
To be subjugated to fluctuation, to change, is to 
distance oneself from something earlier: absenting. 
The idea alone is pure presence, never absenting 
presence, a constant presencing. That is that which is 
there in excess: presencing presence. 
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In this discussion, Heidegger tries to make the point 
that ideas are just as anwesend (present) as are physical 
objects. We must wait until a later discussion to hear the 
details of the "presence of the absence." In the same 
seminar, Heidegger touches on the Aristotelian notion of 
movement as phenomenon (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 354), and 
comes to the conclusion that the latter's word for this 
"presence of the absence" is dynamisf a word for being, 
which Heidegger translates with Ereianuna (the 
appropriation into presence of what is not fully present). 
Aristotle concentrated on the movement of physical objects. 
For Heidegger, this movement makes itself felt in all that 
comes from unknownness into knownness or from forgottenness 
into remembrance. Through all of these modes of disclosure, 
phenomena comes into presence (Murray, 1978, p. 109). It is 
of paramount importance that for him, the factor of absence 
does not constitute a negation of the presence. Rather, it 
is a form of privation, of Mangel (lack) which is firmly 
intertwined with the presence. Therefore, the absential 
dimension is the same entity as not being fully present. 
According to Heidegger, the appropriation process, the 
process of movement and of appearance, was forgotten with 
Plato who insisted that we concentrate on only one of the 
phenomenon's possible modes: that of eidos. After Plato, 
the being of objects is interpreted as stable 
disclosedness. For Plato, only that which is unmoving and 
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stable is meaningfully present. Temporal, moving entities 
are relegated to the status of the non-real. For this 
reason, Heidegger considers man's fallenness and his 
absorption in objects-as-present a normal consequence of 
the very nature of disclosure. 
The preoccupation with movement and with the concept 
of Ereianis in Heidegger's later works brings to mind 
Bergson's deliberations on the nature of movement and his 
musings of why it is that we see a stable entity as the 
paradigm, and a moving entity as a deviation from that norm 
rather than vice versa. Derrida's work on the nature of 
supplementation focuses in part on the same view, and he 
suggests, among other examples, that traditional philosophy 
has long considered motion to be a supplement to stability. 
Of superior interest is the discovery in the area of 
quantum mechanics which stipulates that the electrons 
within a given atom are simultaneously at different places, 
and can only be pinpointed at a certain point through the 
act of observation. Just as these electrons are in all of 
their possible states at the same time, so is Heidegger's 
disclosed object in all of its possible states at the 
moment when it is described as a phenomenon. 
The only way to fix a particle in a single location is 
to observe it. Through some process physicists don't 
pretend to understand fully, the act of observation 
not only reveals a particle's condition, but actually 
determines it, forcing it to select just one of the 
possible states. (Freedman, 1992, p. 65) 
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The old Eastern parable about the falling tree which 
Heidegger must have been familiar with, especially after 
his increased interest in Eastern Philosophy, gets a new 
twist with the Schrodinger experiment in which, while 
unobserved, a radio-active sample in a box would exist in 
all its possible states, that is emitting and not emitting 
radiation. Only the act of observation would cause a Geiger 
counter to detect radiation. And so it is with Heidegger's 
act of appropriation. While he has gone far beyond the 
Kantian question of whether an objective reality does exist 
or whether we make that reality what it is through our 
interaction, he came to the conclusion that the act of 
appropriation "gives" (from es gibt1 the various forms of 
presentness to which we must awaken. If metaphysics has 
indeed taught us to forget being with its withholding the 
absent aspect of presence, then to return to appropriation 
means to enter into the true movement that is disclosure, 
and to accept that presence in the sense of Anwesenheit. 
This implies a bivalent structure of presence and absence. 
In a 1943 essay entitled "Aletheia", a discussion of 
Heraclitus' fragment 16, Heidegger struggles with the same 
dichotomy, and he comes to the conclusion that when 
Heraclitus names the "never-sinking" or the "never-
disappearing" , he 
nennt dem Sinne nach die Verbergung, namlich das 
niemals Eingehen in sie. Der Spruch meint zugleich und 
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gerade das immerwahrende Aufgehen, die eh und je 
wahrende Entbergung. ... Entbergung und Verbergung, 
nicht als zwei verschiedene, nur aneinandergeschobene 
Geschehnisse, sondern als Eines und das Selbe. 
(Heidegger, 1990d, pp. 261/2) 
names in essence concealment, namely the never-
entering-into-it. The passage refers, at the same 
time, and especially to the always-lasting disclosure, 
the lasting recovery as it is. ... Recovery and 
concealment, not as two different events pushed next 
to one another, but as One and the Same. 
While it has become standard practice to translate 
Entbergung with the English term "disclosure" or 
"unconcealment", Heidegger himself points out in the same 
essay (Heidegger, 1990d, p. 263) that the sense of Bergung 
or bergen (safe-keeping) must not elude us when we examine 
this concept. In Verberaung (concealment), the object or 
the idea is not just hidden away from observation, but 
simultaneously "preserved". At the moment of disclosure, a 
similar phenomenon must occur: The object or idea must 
still be preserved and safely kept in order that it may 
again enter into Verberaung. 
But even the Pre-Socratics seem to have ignored the 
bivalence of concealment and unconcealment in their 
everyday thinking. Why else would the Heraclitan fragment 
72 point out that precisely the Logos, which is encountered 
everyday, remains a distant notion for everyday man? Mortal 
men are constantly faced with the concealing/unconcealing 
gathering, but 
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... sie kehren sich dabei ab von der Lichtung und 
kehren sich nur an das Anwesende, das sie im 
alltaglichen Verkehr rait allem und jedem unmittelbar 
antreffen. Sie meinen, dieser Verkehr mit dem 
Anwesenden verschaffe ihnen wie von selbst die gemasse 
Vertrautheit. Und dennoch bleibt es ihnen fremd. Denn 
sie ahnen nichts von jenem, dem sie zugetraut sind: 
vom Anwesen, das lichtend jeweils erst Anwesendes zum 
Vorschein kommen lasst. Der LOGOS, in dessen Lichtung 
sie gehen und stehen, bleibt ihnen verborgen, ist fur 
sie vergessen. (Heidegger, 1990d, p. 273) 
... they turn away from the clearing and turn only 
toward that which is present, that with which they •-*• 
come into immediate contact in their everyday 
dealings. They think that this dealing with that which 
is present will secure them the appropriate intimacy 
as if by itself. And still, it remains foreign to 
them. For they have no inkling of that with which they 
are meant to be united: of presence, which illuminates 
that which is present and lets it come into 
unconcealment. LOGOS, in whose clearing they walk and 
stand, remains hidden for them, is forgotten for them. 
While Heidegger will always stress the importance of this 
"unaware" realm, he nevertheless points out with regret 
that ordinary man, even pre-socratic ordinary man, lived 
his life holding certain assumptions about the being of 
entities, because "[die Allermeisten] leben aus [dem 
Logos], ohne zu wissen, wovon sie sprechen. Sie sagen ist 
ohne zu wissen, was ist eigentlich bedeutet." (Heidegger, 
1990d, p. 227). ("[most men] live out of [the logos] 
without knowing what they are talking about. They say is 
without knowing what is actually means") In his analysis of 
the Heraclitan Fragment No. 72, Heidegger points out 
repeatedly that "everyday man" lives in a relation to day 
and night. But he notices only the game of change or the 
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moment of change from day to night. He does not realize 
that this game of change (Wechselspiel) is in actuality the 
very Being of night/day. Therefore, by focusing either on 
night or on day, ordinary man neglects the essence of 
night/day, which is its Miteinanderzusammenaehoricrkeit 
(belonging-together-one-with-the-other) to be found in the 
"hidden middle" of night and day. One cannot be what it is 
without the other, and therefore must not be contemplated 
separately. 
At first glance it seems that, with statements like 
this, Heidegger is contradicting his basic premise, namely 
that Dasein finds its most primordial meaning in the realm 
of pre-conceptual consciousness, in Being-in-the-world. 
However, considering the stress he places on the notion of 
"return", we can assume that the Logos cannot and could not 
be grasped, not even by the average Pre-Socratic, without 
the effort of philosophical thought, i.e. without listening 
to "the thinking of thought." 
Part 4: Heidegger and the Unity of Time, Space, and Body 
The notions of time, space, and embodiment are 
irrevocably intertwined in the later works of Martin 
Heidegger. These pages will focus on the treatment of 
embodiment as it appears in Heidegger's later works under 
the concept of the Leibphanomen. Whereas Descartes had 
insisted that we know the mind better than the body, 
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Heidegger distances himself from this view and suggests 
instead that even the most abstract feats that we 
accomplish "mentally" have as their presupposition the 
"being-there" of a body. 
Measuring Time 
In the Zollikoner Seminare, a series of seminars which 
Heidegger gave for a number of Swiss psychoanalysts between 
1959 and 1969, time is one of the topics he tries to 
grapple with. In his introductory remarks about the method 
of inquiry into time, he suggests that the "how" of 
formulating the question is what is most important. He 
comes to the conclusion that, if we are to let phenomena 
"speak" to us, then it is necessary for us to bracket all 
our common assumptions, everything we already know about 
time. Heidegger intends to begin his inquiry with the 
vorhanden and zuhande" thing which we use for time 
measurement: the clock. But, since there is no measuring 
without "now"-saying, we fall back again into our 
traditional assumptions, where the "now" as present has 
priority over the other two "directions" of time. Such 
expressions as "today", "tomorrow", or "before" are time 
determinations which, however, do not determine time as 
time. Instead of giving (geben) time, they state (angeben) 
time. In this instance the German language aids Heidegger, 
since between geben and angeben there is an obvious 
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connection. The expression that Heidegger is trying to 
approximate is that of geben. Geben lets us arrive at the 
es qibt or "it gives" time, a concept that I will discuss 
below. This "always already being there" takes us then to 
another expression, that of "having time": 
Dieses Messen von Zeit ist jedoch nur m&glich, wenn 
dergleichen wie Zeit schon gegeben ist, wenn wir die 
Zeit schon haben. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 53, author's 
emphasis) 
This measuring of time is, however, only possible, 
when such a thing like time is already given 
(gegeben), when we already have time. 
By examining this "having" of time, we become aware of 
the fact that we always only have time "for" something, a 
point that Heidegger makes as well in the Le Thor Seminars 
of 1968 and 1969. This "what for" Heidegger calls 
Deutsamkeit (distinctability), and Deutsamkeit is one of 
the characteristics of time. The other characteristics of 
which he reminds us are Datiertheit (datedness), Zeitliche 
Weite (temporal breadth), and flffentlichkeit (public-ness). 
We have already encountered Datiertheit in such temporal 
pronouns as "then", "tomorrow", or "after". Zeitliche Weite 
implies that the "now" of our common-sense linear time does 
not necessarily have to refer to a moment, but rather, it 
can mean a wider range of time, such as "tonight." In 
Offentlichkeit. he means that the "now" that I am referring 
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to at any given time, is not merely my personal "now", but 
is understood by those around me. 
The fifth characteristic of time, that of Privation, 
implies that a negative statement such as "I don't have 
time" does not bring about a negation of time exclusively, 
but rather, it modifies the "having" of time. Something is 
missing, just as a sickness is not the exclusive negation 
of a psycho-somatic condition, but a privation. It is this 
fifth characteristic to which Heidegger will refer 
repeatedly in his exploration of the phenomenon of time. 
By elaborating on these characteristics of time, 
Heidegger is now in a position to move a step ahead. He 
reminds us that "now" time is one-dimensional, because the 
three dimensions that we attribute to space must be 
sequential. They are not simultaneous, as they are in 
space. We cannot take "dimension" in any spatial sense, as 
Bergson had done with his assertion that calculative time 
is spatial time, based on the notion that we are "in" time. 
It is precisely the first four characteristics of time 
listed above that make it possible for us to experience the 
three dimensions of time as simultaneously (aleichzeitiq). 
Concurrently, Heidegger concedes that the three dimensions 
of time have the same origin (they are gleichurspr&iqlich^. 
but are not open to us to the same degree (not 
qleichmassia). If we focus on one dimension, the other two 
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necessarily move into the background, thus the focussing 
brings with it another instance of privation. 
This "having" of time poses another problem. In what 
sense are we to take this "having"? It is clearly not the 
case that we as the "having" subject are active in any 
manner. Nor does anything happen to the thing that is "had" 
during the "having." Therefore, "having" has nothing to do 
with possession. To elucidate, Heidegger draws once more on 
the phenomenon of Angst. which already was of vital 
importance for him thirty years earlier. Now, "to have 
Anast" (the German expression for "to be afraid") is used 
to demonstrate that it is not the fear which I have that 
makes me afraid, but rather, it is the being in fear. The 
fear is not the object of the "having", but it is the 
having itself. Therefore, the "having" of "having time" is 
present-at-hand: 
Im Zeit-haben fur etwas bin ich auf das Wofiilr 
gerichtet, auf das, was zu tun ist, was bevorsteht. 
Ich bin dessen gew&rtig, bin dies jedoch so, dass ich 
in einem dabei noch bei dem verweile, was mir gerade 
gegenw&rtig ist, was ich gegenwartige, wobei uberdies, 
... ich zugleich behalte, was soeben und vorher mich 
beschaftigte. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 84, author's 
emphasis) 
In having time for something, I am directed toward the 
"for what", toward that which needs to be done, that 
which is forthcoming. I am expectant (gewartig) of it, 
but only in such a manner that at the same time, I am 
still with that which is present to me, which I 
presence (crecrenwelrtiae), and in addition, ... I retain 
(behalte) that which has just now or before occupied 
me. 
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Here is the unity of time that Heidegger attempted to 
achieve already in Sein und Zeit. It is evident now that 
"having time" is not like having an object. It is 
temporality which is itself the "abode of humankind." 
Therefore, if we have confirmed above that time has always 
already been there, we are neglecting the phenomenon of the 
"having", because we stipulate that time is something 
present-at-hand, as if it were an object. Since it is our 
relation to time which is paramount to our being-in-the-
world, the time "for something" is created in the 
Gew&rtiaen. the Geaenwartiaen. and the Behalten. 
Dies ist in seiner dreifaltigen Einheit die Zeitigung 
der Zeit, die wir haben und nicht haben. Hierbei hellt 
sich noch ganz im Dunkel, wie die Einheit dieses 
Dreifaltigen der Zeitigung zu bestimmen ist. 
(Heidegger, 1987, p. 86) 
This is, in its three-fold unity, the temporality of 
time, which we have and don't have. By establishing 
this, it is still in the dark, how the unity of this 
three-fold of temporality is to be determined. 
Just as calculative "now"-time is a derivation of 
primordial temporality, so is physical space a derivation 
of existential spatiality for Heidegger. Although a 
detailed, yet preliminary discussion of space precedes that 
of time in Sein und Zeit, it is not until the concept of 
temporality and Sorae has been expanded, that Heidegger 
makes the move to argue that spatiality is grounded in 
temporality, a notion which he later discards: "Der Versuch 
186 
in "Sein und Zeit" Paragraph 70, die Raumlichkeit des 
Daseins auf die Zeitlichkeit zuruckzufuhren, lasst sich 
nicht halten." ("The attempt in Being and Time, section 70, 
to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable." 
Heidegger, 1969b, p. 24). 
The Spatiality of Existence 
The first mention that Heidegger makes of space in 
Sein und Zeit is in section 12, where he discusses 
being-in-the-world as the basic mode of Dasein. He 
acknowledges the games that language plays with us by 
focussing on the being-in-the-world: 
Das In-Sein meint so wenig ein raumliches "Ineinander" 
Vorhandener, als "in" ursprunglich gar nicht eine 
raumliche Beziehung der genannten Art bedeutet; "in" 
stammt von inan-, wohnen, habitare, sich aufhalten; 
"an" bedeutet: ich bin gewohnt, vertraut mit, ... 
(Heidegger, 1986a, p. 54) 
The Being-in does not mean a spatial inclusion of 
things present-at-hand, since "in" in its original 
sense did not mean a spatial relation in this manner; 
"in" stems from inan-, to live, habitare, to dwell; 
"at" means: I am used to, familiar with, ... 
Although the expression "being-in-the-world" would have us 
think of a thing (Dasein) enclosed within a space (world), 
Heidegger insists that this notion of "being-in" is to be 
regarded as a category of metaphysics, while the "being-
in", to which he is referring, is an existential. However, 
he is quick to add that under no circumstances must we make 
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a separation between body and mind, thus seeing the bodily 
"being-in" as an addition to the spiritual (aeistia^ level. 
(Heidegger, 1986a, p. 56). That this is a notion which 
philosophy has taught us, will also be taken up by Derrida 
in his treatment of the supplementary character which is 
embedded in all metaphysical dichotomies. As we have seen 
before, "being-in" is characterized by Sorge. It is not an 
attribute which Dasein has at times, and at other times can 
do without. Dasein has a spatiality of involvement in 
addition to that of inclusion in the sense of having an 
inside-ness in a spatial receptacle. In these two ways of 
being become evident the distinction between things 
present-to-hand (Zeua. tools) and things present-at-hand 
(things alongside of us). 
So etwas wie Gegend muss zuvor entdeckt sein, soil das 
Weisen und Vorfinden von Platzen einer umsichtig 
verfi!Igbaren Zeugganzheit mdglich werden. (Heidegger, 
1986a, p. 103) 
Something like a region (Gegend) must first be 
discovered if there is to be any possibility of 
allotting or coming across places for an equipmental 
whole that is circumspectively at one's disposal. 
Heidegger's example is the workshop, the region, in which a 
specific place for the tools is possible. As in the 
discussion on temporality, we can detect that it is the 
Sorae which makes up Dasein's being-in-the-world, and which 
provides the possibility of Dasein's spatiality: 
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Raumlichkeit des Daseins, das wesenhaft kein 
Vorhandensein ist, kann weder so etwas wie Vorkommen 
an einer Stelle im "Weltraume" bedeuten, noch 
Zuhandensein an einem Platz. Beides sind Seinsarten 
des innerweltlich begegnenden Seienden. Das Dasein 
aber ist "in" der Welt im Sinne des besorgend-
vertrauten Umgangs mit dem innerweltlich begegnenden 
Seienden. Wenn ihm sonach in irgendeiner Weise 
RMumlichkeit zukommt, dann ist das nur mc>glich auf dem 
Grunde dieses In-Seins. (Heidegger, 1986a, pp. 104/5) 
The spatiality of Dasein, which is essentially not a 
present-at-hand can thus mean neither something like 
existence at a certain place in the "Weltraum" (world 
space), nor can it mean a being present-to-hand at a 
certain place. Both of these are modes of being of the 
innerworldly being. Dasein, however, is "in" the world 
in the sense that it deals with beings encountered 
within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with 
familiarity. So if spatiality belongs to it in any 
way, that is possible only because of this 
being-in. 
This spatiality exhibits the characteristics of 
Ent-fernuna (dis-tance) and Ausrichtunq (directionality or 
orientation). Whereas Ausrichtuna is explained in the 
availability of tools in a certain region, and will be 
further elaborated on in the second part of Sein und Zeit 
and below in this paper, Ent-fernuna needs further 
clarification. Although often translated with "distance" or 
"dis-tance", I would prefer "dys-tance", since the prefix 
Ent- in German implies "something that is against". Ent-
fernuna. as it is used by Heidegger, conveys the 
"abolition" of distance. Like Leder in The Absent Body, who 
speaks of "dys-appearance", I believe that the English 
prefix "dys-" comes closer to what Heidegger means by Ent-
fernuna. 
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Ent-fernunq has nothing to do with measurable 
distances. Rather, it conveys the notion of accessibility 
and above all, of the interest that I take in it. 
Therefore, tools, when being used, have the highest degree 
of Ent-fernunaf because in my absorption with them, I grant 
them a high degree of accessibility. In this manner, the 
term N^'he (nearness) also takes on a new meaning, different 
from its everyday usage: "Die NMherung ist nicht orientiert 
auf das k<Brperbehaftete Ich-ding, sondern auf das 
besorgende In-der-Welt-sein, ..." ("Bringing-near is not 
oriented towards the I-thing encumbered with a body, but 
towards concernful being-in-the-world, ..." Heidegger, 
1986a, p. 107). 
Heidegger does not leave it at this explanation of 
Dasein's spatiality. He takes the topic up again after his 
treatise on temporality, and it is in section 70 that the 
problem of space arises anew. Here, he tries to find a 
connection between the structure of temporality and that of 
spatiality, and he proceeds in doing so with the help of 
the notion of Ausrichtuna (directionality or orientation). 
Although he disclaims the connection in his later works, 
and, although much of the secondary literature mentions his 
attempt only in passing, it is quite interesting to observe 
how he proceeds. 
Heidegger reminds us again that 11... Zeitlichkeit ist 
der Seinssinn der Sorge." ("...Temporality is the meaning 
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of being of Sorqe." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 367). If we wish 
to examine spatiality as dependent on temporality, we have 
to acknowledge that Dasein can be spatial only as Sorae in 
the sense of its factical fallen existing. Dasein is never 
inside space in the manner in which a body is in a 
receptacle. Rather, Dasein can be spatial in a manner that 
is impossible for a body, only because it is oeistia 
(brought about by mind, spirit,...). 
While he announces the linkage between time and space 
in a third part of Sein und Zeit, which he never completed, 
Heidegger is at this point rather cryptical about the 
connection he intends to make between these two notions. 
What makes the short paragraph interesting, however, is his 
choice of newly-coined terms which, in German, aid him 
tremendously, as they have done before in his etymologizing 
about the future. 
Since Ausrichtunq is one aspect of spatiality, 
Richtungr having the meaning of "direction", can be linked 
with the directionality that is embedded in both the 
primordial past and future. Ausrichtunq is concerned with 
the discovering of a Geaend (region) (Dreyfus, 1991, 
p. 136), and we have seen before that the region is always 
already there to be discovered. A region implies the 
"where-to" for all the tools, all the things present-to-
hand, and thus the concernful being-in-the-world is always 
"ausgerichtet - sich ausrichtend." ("directed - directing 
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itself." Heidegger, 1986a, p. 368). While Dasein is 
discovering a region (and let us be reminded that that 
region is already there, ready to be discovered), it is 
grounded in an "ecstatically retentive awaiting". This 
naturally indicates the past (its being always already) and 
future (the possibility of being discovered). While Dasein 
is getting settled and finds its place, (SicheinrMumenl. it 
is a "directed awaiting" of that region, which implies 
again the sense of futurity. But at the same time, this 
settling-in is a dys-tancing of all 
things that are present-at-hand and present-to-hand. In 
other words, through its interest and its absorption with 
everything that is alongside it in the world, Dasein is 
settling into the present. Sorae. or Dasein's concernful 
being-in-the-world comes back from the already discovered 
region to that which is closest, that which is of interest, 
that which is present-to-hand, by abolishing the distance. 
This can happen, because the 
Naherung ... des entfernten innerweltlich Vorhandenen 
... grunden in einem Gegenwartigen, das zur Einheit 
der Zeitlichkeit geh$rt, ... (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 
369) 
nearing .... of all things which are dys-tantly 
present-at-hand ... are grounded in a Gegenwartigen. 
which belongs to the unity of temporality, ... 
While spatiality comes full circle precisely like 
temporality, this discussion itself takes on the form of a 
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circle in that we are again at the point where Geaenwart in 
everyday German means "present", but where Heidegger 
performs one of his etymological tricks and underlines the 
centrality of the future. 
It is worth considering, at this juncture, whether 
Heidegger's Lichtuna (clearing) does not, in a way, reflect 
his thinking about space, or rather, his thinking about 
time-space, since clearing does not refer to a clearing in 
the sense of a location, a clearing in the forest, but also 
to something that happens, an Auaenblick, a moment, that 
has to be reckoned with and grasped. The clearing, for 
Heidegger, is a field of disclosure, an open space where 
being can be encountered by Dasein. But it is always a 
clearing which has been cleared by Dasein itself, and 
Heidegger calls this activity of clearing Dasein's being-in 
or Dasein's being-its-there: 
Was dieses Seiende wesenhaft lichtet, das heisst es 
fxir es selbst "often" als auch "hell" macht, wurde ... 
als Sorge bestimmt. In ihr grundet die voile 
Erschlossenheit des Da. (Heidegger, 1986a, p. 350) 
That by which this entity is essentially cleared - in 
other words, that which makes it both 'open' for 
itself and 'bright' for itself - is what we have 
defined as "Sorge,"... In "Sorge" is grounded the full 
disclosedness of the 'there.'" 
We must distinguish between "clearing" as a verb and 
as a noun. The clearing (verb) brings about the clearing 
(noun), and it seems that, no matter how vehemently 
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Heidegger denounces this idea, the noun does indeed suggest 
a kind of spatiality, even if it is only through its 
semantics, while the verb does retains the flavor of 
temporality. When Heidegger suggests that Dasein as being-
already-in, as being-amidst, and as being-ahead-of-itself 
can be considered an ecstatic temporal structure, it must 
be regarded as the activity of clearing in that it opens up 
the past, the present, and the future. It creates a 
clearing in which Dasein "presences" itself, and thus makes 
available the possibility of encountering everything else 
that is in the world. When Heidegger speaks of the 
"clearing of self-concealing" (Lichtung des 
Sichverberaenden1 in BeitrSge, maybe he does not mean that 
here the self-concealment which being imposes upon itself, 
is cleared away. It is possible that he means that the 
self-concealing which does the clearing and emptying, and 
allows Being to "presence" itself, in which case the 
"clearing" would function as the gerund of the verb. If any 
"presencing" or "unconcealing" is to take place, the 
clearing (noun) has to be already established, has to be 
"there". Since Heidegger insists in the Beitr&ge that the 
presencing of the clearing for self-concealing takes place 
in the moment, we are back again in the concept of 
temporality. The Augenblick is related to the present and 
does the "presencing". 
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While the discussion so far has centered on Sein und 
Zeit, we must not ignore what Heidegger had to say on time 
and space after the Kehre, notably in his lecture Zeit und 
Sein, which he gave in 1962. While at first reading, the 
concepts of Being and of Time seem to have undergone a 
reversal since Sein und Zeit, closer scrutiny reveals that, 
although they have undergone a tremendous change, 
temporality is still the horizon of Being. Whereas in Sein 
und Zeit, the occurrence or the event concerned the 
temporality of Dasein and its structure, in Zeit und Sein, 
the occurrence or the event concerns the temporal character 
of Being itself. Before his Kehre, Heidegger still spoke 
about the "present" constituting one aspect of temporality. 
Now he speaks about "presence", which is much further 
removed from the "now"-time that he has always criticized. 
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger attempted to investigate 
the nature of Being with the help of Dasein. Now he 
by-passes Dasein, in order to get to Being directly: 
Der Versuch, Sein ohne das Seiende zu denken, wird 
notwendig. ... Das Sein, es selbst eigens denken, 
verlangt, vom Sein abzusehen, sofern es wie in aller 
Metaphysik nur aus dem Seienden her und fur dieses als 
dessen Grund ergrundet und ausgelegt wird. (Heidegger, 
1969b, p. 2, pp. 5/6) 
The attempt to think Being without beings becomes 
necessary. ... and to think Being itself explicitly 
requires disregarding Being to the extend that it is 
only grounded and interpreted in terms of beings and 
for beings as their ground, as in all metaphysics. 
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Heidegger is making one final attempt to approach Being in 
a non-metaphysical manner. 
The Fourth Dimension of Time 
In this later works, Heidegger's focus is on 
"presencing." He states that "Sein besagt Anwesen." ("Being 
means presencing" Heidegger, 1969b, p. 5), and that "die 
Pragung des Seins hat sich langst ohne unser Zutun oder gar 
Verdienst entschieden." ("this character [Being as 
presencing] has long been decided without our 
contribution." Heidegger, 1969b, p. 6). But this presencing 
is not accomplished by Being itself. We would do well to 
return to what language tells us, because, as he points 
out: 
Wir sagen nicht: Sein ist, Zeit ist, sondern: Es gibt 
Sein und es gibt Zeit. Zunachst haben wir durch diese 
Wendung nur den Sprachgebrauch geandert. Statt "es 
ist", sagen wir "es gibt." (Heidegger, 1969b, pp. 
4/5) 
We do not say: Being is, time is, but rather: there is 
Being and there is time. For the moment we have only 
changed the idiom with this expression. Instead of 
saying: "it is," we say "there is," It gives." 
The German es aibt (it gives) is equivalent to the French 
il y a, does not have an English counterpart. Heidegger 
insists that it is just this "it gives" that has been 
unthought by Western philosophy. He claims that it is Being 
that has been thought. But, as the expression clearly 
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demonstrates, Being is actually that which is given, the 
object. What then is the "It", the subject of the giving, 
the giver, and how do we proceed to think about it? 
Heidegger focuses on this issue when he links Being with 
Time by suggesting that the "It" which gives Being can be 
found in time. This thought takes him to pronounce that 
"Sein heisst: Anwesen, Anwesen-lassen: Anwesenheit." 
("Being means: presencing, letting-be present: presence." 
Heidegger, 1969b, p. 10). He reminds us again, that by 
insisting on the word "present", we are transported right 
back into the old notion of representing time as a series 
of "nows,11 and thus of agreeing with Kant that time has 
only one dimension. His own suggestion will keep us from 
falling back into our old habits: 
Allein die Gegenwart im Sinne der Anwesenheit ist von 
der Gegenwart im Sinne des Jetzt so weitgehend 
verschieden, dass sich die Gegenwart as Anwesenheit 
auf keine Weise von der Gegenwart als dem Jetzt her 
bestimmen lasst. (Heidegger, 1969b, p. 12) 
However, the present in the sense of presence differs 
so vastly from the present in the sense of now that 
the present as presence can in no way be determined in 
terms of the present as now. 
But how are we to determine the sense of presence? If 
presence means "the constant abiding that approaches man, 
reaches him, is extended to him," then the source of this 
extending reach must be time. Not just in time generally, 
says Heidegger, but in the future. Here, we hear echos of 
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Sein und Zeit, in that the future is to be considered the 
dominant part of time. With the future, with that which 
comes toward us, presencing is offered. "Mit diesem 
[Anwesen] lichtet sich das, was wir den Zeit-Raum nennen." 
("With this presencing, there opens up what we call time-
space." Heidegger, 1969b, p. 14). Now, time-space becomes 
the clearing, the opening up of futural approach, of past 
and present. We are, however, cautioned that this opening 
is "pre-spatial"; it is not to be considered a container 
kind of space, but rather as that which can provide space. 
Now we can understand the change that Heidegger has 
undergone in the three decades since Sein und Zeit: Time 
now becomes four-dimensional. The reason for our failure of 
ridding ourselves of our traditional concept of time is 
that we have always borrowed the three dimensions of space 
and applied them to our concept of time. Therefore, we 
consider the future as "not yet", the past as "no longer," 
and the present as "now". We have left unthought the fourth 
dimension, that of the "it gives", "das alles bestimmende 
Reichen" ("the giving that determines all" (Heidegger, 
1969b, p. 15). The fourth dimension is the "nearhood" 
(Nahheit) that we have already encountered in the 
discussion of spatiality in Sein und Zeit. The Nahe, the 
dys-tancing which brings about the presencing of all things 
present-at-hand and present-to-hand, also brings about the 
presencing of the other three dimensions of time. It is not 
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only the present (in the old sense) that is presenced, but 
simultaneously the future and the past: 
Vielmehr beruht die Einheit der drei Zeitdimensionen 
in dem Zuspiel jeder filir jede. ... Aber sie [die Nahe] 
nahert Ankunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart einander, indem 
sie entfernt. (Heidegger, 1969b, p. 16) 
... the unity of time's three dimensions consists in 
the interplay of each toward each ... It [Nahheit] 
brings future, past and present near to one another by 
distancing them. 
With this fourth dimension Heidegger succeeds in connecting 
time and space, though not, as he had announced thirty 
years earlier, by making time a presupposition of space, 
but rather by providing a way to determine the "where" of 
time: 
Denn die eigentlich Zeit selber, der Bereich ihres 
durch die nahernde N&he bestimmten dreifachen 
Reichens, ist die vor-raumliche Ortschaft, durch die 
es erst ein mSgliches Wo gibt. (Heidegger, 1969b, 
p. 16) 
For true time itself, the realm of its threefold 
extending determined by nearing nearness, is the 
prespatial region, which first gives any possible 
"where." 
In the Zollikoner Seminare, where Heidegger makes an 
attempt to clarify some of the terminology he used in Sein 
und Zeit, we are taken back to the Lichtuna. He maintains 
that the Da in the term Dasein equals das Offene (the 
Open). 
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Diese Offenheit hat auch den Charakter des Raumes. 
Raumlichkeit gehfirt zur Lichtung, geh6'rt zum Offenen, 
in dem wir uns als Existierende aufhalten und zwar so, 
dass wir gar nicht eigens auf den Raum als Raum 
bezogen sind. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 188) 
This Open also has the characteristics of space. 
Spatiality belongs to Lichtung, in which we live as 
existing beings, in such a manner that we are not 
ourselves in relation with space as space. 
He continues with the suggestion that both temporality and 
spatiality belong to the Lichtung; "Raum und Zeit geh#ren 
zusammen, aber man weiss nicht wie." ("Space and Time 
belong together, but we do not know how." Heidegger, 1987, 
p. 188). Are we to assume that at the time of the seminars 
he had given up on the previously assumed relationship 
between time and space? Or only that, although there is a 
relationship, this relationship eludes us as something that 
cannot be proved, an idea Heidegger did not have much 
patience for? 
Heidegger's later writings are characterized by 
focus on the aesthetic. In his numerous discussions of art, 
he returns to his conception of space, which has not so 
much undergone a change, but which has been vastly expanded 
since the writing of Sein und Zeit. The short treatise 
entitled Die Kunst und der Raum (Art and Space), Heidegger 
elaborates on the concept of Leere (emptiness), and takes 
this as his clue to make the connection between "emptying" 
and "finding an area." While these concepts have already 
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appeared in his earlier works, it is not until now that he 
succeeds in establishing a direct link. 
Heidegger concedes that the Leere (emptiness, often 
translated into English with vacuous) is neither a negation 
nor a privation of space. In our common assumptions, we 
tend to consider emptiness as the opposite of fullness, as 
the lack of the "filling of spatial areas". Contrarily, he 
suggests that this Leere may be not a lack, but a force 
that brings about something. Again, he relies on etymology, 
and connects the verb leeren to lesen (in the sense of 
"collecting"). 
Die aufgelesenen Fruchte in einen Korb leeren heisst: 
ihnen diesen Ort bereiten. 
Die Leere ist nicht nichts. Sie ist auch kein Mangel. 
(Heidegger, 1969a, p. 12) 
To pour the collected fruits into a basket means: to 
prepare this place for them. 
Emptiness is not nothing. Nor is it a lack of 
something. 
Related to this Leeren (to empty) is the notion of 
Raumen (to clear away), a connection which Heidegger fails 
to elaborate. Through "listening to language", we come to 
realize that the "clearing" (verb) brings about the open in 
which people can settle, ("Raumen ist Freigabe von Orten," 
Heidegger, 1969a, p. 9). But this clearing happens 
simultaneously with the Einr&umen. the actual settling in. 
Heidegger reminds us that the German language gives 
Einraumen a two-fold meaning. Not only is it the act of 
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getting settled, it also conveys the sense of "to concede", 
in this case to "let" the settling-in take place. 
Now that the place, the clearing for the settling in 
is accomplished, what happens in that place? According to 
Heidegger, it is "das Versammeln im Sinne des freigebenden 
Bergens der Dinge in ihre Gegend." ("the collecting in the 
sense of the releasing securing of things into their 
region", Heidegger, 1969a, p. 10). The region, as defined 
by Heidegger in earlier works, is free expanse that, at the 
same time as being open, ensures that the things within it 
are kept safe (geborgen). This term, of course, brings to 
mind not only the securing aspect of the region, but the 
concealing aspect as well, since verboraen is also a 
derivative of bergen. The conclusion that Heidegger draws 
is that the things are the places themselves, and do not, 
as is commonly assumed, merely belong in the places. 
The Phenomenon of the Body 
In the Zollikoner Seminare, Heidegger reconsiders the 
concept of space, this time coupled with the phenomenon of 
Leib, and not, as in Sein und Zeit, with time. In a seminar 
given in 1985, he first approaches the concept by talking 
about Veraeaenweirtiauna (re-presentation), and the need for 
embodiment during this process. Here, the dichotomy of mind 
and body, or, in this case, since he is speaking to a group 
of psychiatrists, he calls it the difference between psyche 
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and soma, comes again under attack. In this seminar, 
Heidegger is trying to convince the participants that what 
is generally referred to as mental representation, is by no 
means a thing belonging solely to the mind, but that it 
involves the body as well. Since Heidegger's goal is for 
his audience to grasp what he means by Leib and 
Leiblichkeitsph&nomen. it might be appropriate to insert at 
this point a preliminary remark concerning the German word 
for body. Since the English language has only one word, it 
cannot distinguish between a living body, a dead body, or a 
non-living body. In German, however, two terms are 
available, that of K<Brperr and that of Leib. Although this 
statement calls for a clarification, I don't think that the 
terms should be explained at this point, since it would 
spoil the point Heidegger is trying to make at the end of 
this particular seminar. Let us therefore follow him in his 
very patient attempt to take his audience step by step to 
where he wants to lead them. 
Contrary to common assumption, Heidegger insists that 
if I am "re-presenting" or imagining a thing, then I am 
directed toward that thing itself, not toward a picture or 
an image of it. The essence of re-presentation 
(Veraeaenwartiauna1 is a Sein-bei (being-with), and the 
re-presentation is but one possible mode of our being-here 
(in the sense of being-here with our body and next to 
things present-at-hand). Only by being actually here am I 
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capable of re-presenting anything that is not here. As 
Heidegger puts it, "Im Hiersein vollziehe ich die 
VergegenwMrtigung.11 ("Through my being-here, I accomplish 
the re-presentation.11 Heidegger, 1987, p. 93). The Sein-be 
is not a being-with in the sense of being with a thing 
present-at-hand. Rather, the Sein-bei of our being here has 
the essence of being open for that which is present-at-hand 
(Offenstehens fur das An-wesendel, an aspect which we often 
neglect, precisely because it seems too obvious to be 
contemplated. This standing open for things present-at-hand 
is the essence of man, and it has, among others, the two 
possibilities of either being bodily present, or of re­
presenting. The mode of re-presentation demands that we are 
here with the things around us, otherwise it would no 
longer constitute re-presentation. In other words, we have 
to be physically removed from the thing we are re­
presenting, but the body does not simply disappear; it 
stays "here." 
In struggling with what he calls the LeibphMnomen. 
Heidegger insists that "Das Dasein ist nicht r&umlich, weil 
es leiblich ist, ..." ("Dasein is not spatial because it 
is embodied, ..." Heidegger, 1987, p. 105). Rather, he 
maintains that this embodiment is only possible because 
"...das Dasein raumlich ist im Sinne von einraumend." 
("Dasein is spatial in the sense of einraumend [finding and 
having its place]." Heidegger, 1987, p. 105). When we 
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consider the phenomenon of Leib, we probably could do worse 
than to start with our Korper (physical body), that part of 
us which has traditionally been on one side of the mind-
body-question. (This brings to mind Heidegger's procedure 
in Sein und Zeit, where, in order to ask the question of 
Being, he chose Dasein as that entity most familiar to us 
with which he entered into the question). Therefore, by 
paying attention to our sensory organs, we may be able to 
approach the phenomenon in question, that of the Leib. 
Heidegger posits that the difference between the hand and 
the eye is that of the two, only the hand is capable of a 
"double sensation". It can not only feel the object it 
touches, but can also feel itself being touched by the 
object (which constitutes, again, a kind of privation). The 
eye disappears, and it becomes obvious that this passage 
has served as the basis for Leder's book The Absent Body. 
If I say that I am involved in something mit Leib und Seele 
(in English: wholly absorbed in something, literally 
translated: involved with body and soul), then my body as a 
thing present-at-hand (K<Srper) disappears, simply because I 
no longer pay attention to it. Finally Heidegger has 
reached the point where he considers it appropriate to 
clarify his notion of Leib. He claims that the only manner 
in which traditional philosophy has come remotely close to 
the phenomenon is through Aristotle's pronunciation that 
the human body (Leib) in its being-here can only be a 
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beseelter Leib (a body endowed with a soul). And so, 
Heidegger carries this notion further by saying that "... 
ich kann das Leibphanomen nicht in der Relation zum Korper 
bestimmen.11 ("... I cannot determine the phenomenon of 
embodiment in relation to the body [Korper].11 Heidegger, 
1987, p. 112). After all, what does a statement like "This 
is my body" mean? Am "I" in the body or is the body in 
"me"? 
It slowly becomes obvious that Heidegger's Leib is the 
"I" of traditional philosophy, but it is not an "I" that is 
split into mind or body. "Das Leiben des Leibes bestimmt 
sich aus der Weise meines Seins." ("The embodiment of my 
Leib is determined by the mode of my Being." Heidegger, 
1987, p. 113). While my Korper has definite, measurable 
boundaries and a certain volume, the boundary of my Leib 
"ist der Seinshorizont in dem ich mich aufhalte." ("is the 
horizon of Being in which I dwell." Heidegger, 1987, 
p. 113). In other words, while I am looking at an object, 
not only is my Leib involved in this seeing, but its 
boundaries do not end where my Kclrper ends; rather they are 
extended to the object that I have "in eye." Thus, 
Der Leib ist im H$ren und Sehen beteiligt. Sieht denn 
der Leib? Nein, ich sehe. Aber zu diesem Sehen geh&ren 
doch meine Augen, also mein Leib. (Heidegger, 1987, 
p. 114) 
The Leib is involved in seeing and hearing. Does the 
Leib see? No, "I" see. But for that I need eyes, which 
are part of the Leib." 
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Imagination and representation are not activities that 
go on inside of me, in my mind as separate from the body. 
In acknowledging this, Heidegger cannot but give his 
audience one last kick by implying that the reasons 
psychologists are wrong in their thinking is that they see 
everything as an expression of the "inside" rather than to 
see the Leibph&nomen within the relatedness of humans, i.e. 
the "being-in-the-world." Or, as Heidegger himself put it: 
Der Leib ist das Ich, nicht mein K<Brper. ... Das 
Leiben geh8rt immer mit zum In-der-Welt-sein. Es 
bestimmt das In-der-Welt-sein, das Offensein, das 
Haben von Welt immer mit. (Heidegger, 1987, p. 126) 
The Leib is the "I", not my K&rper. ... Embodiment 
always belongs to Being-in-the-world. It always 
determines the being-in-the-world, the being-open, the 
having of world. 
In the Zollikoner Seminare, Heidegger himself sums up 
what sets him apart from traditional Western philosophy. He 
stresses that to approach the phenomenon of embodiment, we 
must overcome the dichotomy of Subject and Object, and we 
must experience for ourselves the being-in-the-world as the 
human essence. Only since Descartes does philosophy talk 
about Gegenst&idlichkeit and Anwesen. which imply things 
present-at-hand and objectivity. Whereas before Descartes, 
so Heidegger claims, the being was understood as being from 
itself, it constituted one of the great shifts in 
philosophical thinking that being exists only so far as it 
is represented by me as a subject. According to the 
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Cartesian and Newtonian conception, the I-Body-World is 
separated into components. Heidegger sees it as his mission 
to re-think "being-in-the-world" in its unity, because we 
are not in-the-world as bodies (Korper1 alongside each 
other, but out being-in-the-world is characterized by a 
being-with fMit-Sein'l that is concernful. While the 
Cartesian conception of the ego was taken over by Kant in 
the determination of the objectivity of the object, and 
carried to its end by Husserl, Heidegger sees himself as 
the first philosopher to re-think the "original" conception 
of consciousness not as self-consciousness or characterized 
with intentionality, but as being-in-the-world which is to 
a large degree unconscious in the traditional sense. What 
is needed, is description and interpretation, i.e. 
phenomenology, not explanations and scientific proofs. 
These neglect our mode of being conscious by simply being-
in-the-world. In a conversation with the Swiss psychiatrist 
Medard Boss, Heidegger sums up the essence of being human 
in the following manner: 
Wir kdnnen nicht "sehen", weil wir Augen haben, 
vielmehr k<Snnen wir nur Augen haben, weil wir unserer 
Grundnatur^nach sehenden Wesens sind. So kdnnten wir 
auch nicht "Teiblich seiri, wie wir es sind, wenn unser 
In-der-Welt-sein nicht grundlegend aus einem immer 
schon vernehmenden Bezogen-sein auf solches bestunde, 
das sich uns aus dem Offenen unserer Welt, als welches 
Offene wir existieren, zuspricht. (Heidegger, 1987, 
p. 293) 
It is not that we can "see" because we have eyes; 
rather, we can only have eyes, because, according to 
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our basic nature, we are seeing creatures. Thus, we 
could not be embodied as we are, if our 
being-in-the-world did not basically consist of a 
relatedness which is always already perceived - a 
relatedness to that which grants itself to us from the 
Open of our world, as whose Open we exist. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PHENOMENOLOGY - THE DISMISSAL OF THE CARTESIAN METAPHOR 
Part 1: Heidegger and Language 
Das Wort 
Wunder von ferae oder traum 
Bracht ich an meines landes saum 
Und harrte bis die graue norn 
Den namen fand in ihrem born -
Drauf konnt ichs greifen dicht und stark 
Nun bluht und glanzt es durch die mark... 
Einst langt ich an nach guter fahrt 
Mit einem kleinod reich und zart 
Sie suchte lang und gab mir kund: 
"So schlaft hier nichts auf tiefem grund" 
Worauf es meiner hand entrann 
Und nie mein land den schatz gewann... 
So lernt ich traurig den verzicht: 
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht. 
The Word 
A treasure from afar or from a dream 
Did I bring to my country's borders 
And I waited for the grey norn 
To find the name in her well -
Then I could grasp it tight and strong 
Now it blooms and shines through the night 
Once, I arrived after successful journey 
With a treasure, small and delicate 
She searched and searched and gave me word: 
"There is nothing that slumbers here in the depth" 
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After which it slipped from my hand 
And my country never gained the treasure... 
Thus, I sadly learned to do without, 
Where the word fails, there will be no thing. 
With an examination of Stefan George's poem The Word 
(Heidegger, 1990b, p. 154), Heidegger affirms his position 
within the philosophical controversy about the relationship 
between language and thought, or the making of meaning, as 
the thinker par excellence to reject the traditional notion 
of meaning being constituted in the direct relationship 
between word and thing. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, Lakoff, 1987, Johnson, 
1987), take a similar position in rejecting what they 
define as the objectivist stance, which posits that the 
meaning of an utterance is to be found in the direct 
relationship between the speaker and a "reality" (which 
exists independently of the speaker). Concurrently, they 
argue against the notion of language being the "mirror" of 
nature, which reflects the implication that the Self, the 
ego, or the "I", is construing itself as a result of an 
outside refractive "reality" impacting on it: 
The objectivist answer is that symbols (that is, words 
and mental representations) are made meaning-full in 
one and only one way: via the correspondence to 
entities and categories in either the existing world 
or in possible worlds. (Lakoff, 1987, p. 160) 
211 
What Heidegger calls "common sense", and Lakoff terms 
"folk models", is basically our everyday naive 
conceptualizing of exactly these correspondences. Both 
agree that this naive understanding must be grounded in 
something deeper, and they identify traditional 
philosophical theories as the culprit for our faulty 
thinking. Heidegger repeatedly refers to traditional 
metaphysics, starting with Descartes, as the basis of our 
everyday thinking. He suggests that by deconstructing the 
grounds from which our notions came, we will be able to 
approach language in a more primordial way, through the 
method of phenomenology. Phenomenology will enable us to 
become aware of the myriad of tacit assumptions we 
generally ascribe to, assumptions which are so 
overwhelmingly self-evident, that in our everyday coping, 
we seldom pay attention to them. What sets Heidegger apart 
from Lakoff and Johnson, however, is his insistence on 
language's mystery. In Unterwegs zur Sprache, he maintains 
that 
Das selbe Wort LOGOS ist aber als Wortt fur das Sagen 
zugleich das Wort fur das Sein, d.h. fur das Anwesen 
des Anwesenden. Sage und Sein, Wort und Ding gehoren 
in einer verhullten, kaum bedachten und unausdenkbaren 
Weise zueinander. (Heidegger, 1990b, p. 237). 
The same word LOGOS is a word for Saying just as it is 
a word for Being, for the presencing of that which is 
present. Saying and Being, word and thing, belong to 
each other in a veiled way, a way which has hardly 
been thought and is not to be thought out to the end. 
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The Limitations of Language 
Implied in this is that, while we are aware of the 
fact that our common sense thinking is based on 
particularistic biases resulting from the impact of 
traditional Western philosophical thinking, it is not 
necessary, perhaps impossible, to identify these 
presentiments. 
Heidegger argues that naming a "thing" is a condition 
for its being entertained in thought, (i.e. that the name 
is the mark - the physical and public form which the sign 
must have). He delineates and describes one of these 
limitations in the fact that we are never able to stand 
outside of language, to talk about language from a 
standpoint outside of its parameters. He notates the limits 
of language's reflexivity in the remark: "Erst wo das Wort 
gefunden ist fur das Ding, ist das Ding ein Ding. ... Das 
Wort verschafft dem Ding erst das Sein." ("Only when the 
word has been found for the thing, does the thing become a 
thing. ... The word provides the Being for the thing." 
Heidegger, 1990b, p. 164). However, in the analysis of 
George's poem, in addition to his "Dialogue on Language", 
Heidegger comes close to articulating the absolute sense of 
mystery caused by these limitations. It is this dimension 
of the limit of reflexivity, namely the impossibility of an 
explanation of language's originary nature, which Hegel had 
taken up. Heidegger undoubtedly owed much of his own 
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thinking to Hegel, but he rejects Hegel's absolute 
subjectivization of being. He demonstrates this rejection 
in his orientation toward the object, toward the world, and 
toward language. He does so through the method of 
phenomenological investigation. 
The Unmediated "I" 
Contained within post-Hegelian thought was a 
realization that a definition of consciousness as 
self-reflection had to result in an infinite regress. It is 
both fundamental and paramount in Heidegger that we see, 
what Tugendhat has called "self-less consciousness of self" 
(1979, p. 34), which is grounded in the immediate knowledge 
that one has of "having certain states." (the unmediated 
I). In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger demonstrates that the modes 
proper to Dasein precede any sort of reflexive cognition. 
For Heidegger, man's essence does not simply lie in a 
subject-object relationship. Rather, Dasein's relationship 
to the world is characterized primarily as being-in-the-
world: 
Dieses "Wissen" ist nicht erst einer immanenten 
Selbstwahrnehmung erwachsen, sondern gehSrt zum Sein 
des Da, das wesenhaft Verstehen ist. (Heidegger, 
1986a, p. 144) 
This knowing does not first arise from an immanent 
self-perception, but belongs to the Being of the 
"there", which is essentially understanding. 
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Dasein's identity is not established by self-
reflection. Self-reflection can only be possible because a 
primordial sense of being-in-the-world is prior to it, a 
being-in-the-world characterized by Dasein's immediate 
connectedness with things ready-to-hand withiri-the-world 
(innerweltliches Zuhandenes). Therefore, being-in-the-world 
is the prerequisite for self-reflection. Vice versa, self-
reflection is contingent on the acknowledged sensing of 
being-in-the-world. The structures of consciousness in 
daily life constitute a more original concept of 
reflection, one that is grounded in Dasein's pre-reflexive 
self-understanding, since "Es genugt nicht, den Begriff des 
Selbstbewusstseins im formalen Sinne der Reflexion auf das 
Ich zu fassen,..." ("Self-understanding should not be 
equated formally with a reflected ego-experience,..." 
Heidegger, 1989b, p. 247). To place it in a more poignant 
prescription, 
Das Selbst ist dem Dasein ihm selbst da, ohne 
Reflexion und ohne innere Wahrnehmung, vor aller 
Reflexion. Die Reflexion im Sinne der Ruckwendung ist 
nur ein Modus der Selbsterfassung, aber nicht die 
Weise der primaren Selbst-Erschliessung. (Heidegger, 
1989b, p. 226) 
The self is there for the Dasein itself without 
reflection and without inner perception before 
all reflection. Reflection, in the sense of a 
turning back, is only a mode of self-apprehension, but 
not the mode of primary self-disclosure. 
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According to Heidegger, our naive view of language 
assumes that speaking is an expression wherein something 
internal externalizes itself, and that it is a human 
activity. He maintains that our notion of language as an 
expression of inner emotions is grounded in traditional 
Western philosophy. It is this tradition that he sets out 
to deconstruct by taking the following steps: We must get 
from theoretical reflection which has been part of the 
methodology of traditional philosophers to a more practical 
deliberation, one that pays heed to the being present-to-
hand, to the tool-ness of things. From there, we need to 
take one further step back to the "mindless" everyday 
coping, which is Dasein's most basic, primordial mode of 
being. Heidegger insists that we need to look into the 
background of our everyday existence. This endeavor is not 
exclusively Heideggerian. A number of philosophers posit 
precisely this project at the center of their methodology, 
among them Martin Buber and Hannah Arendt. 
The Authority of Language 
The destruction of philosophy brings with it the 
destruction of the subject over objects. As man speaks, he 
is listening and responding to a presencing of world. For 
Heidegger, utterance is only the last event in speaking, 
and when we cannot find the right word, it is an instance 
when language in its own Being fleetingly touches us, which 
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is exemplified in George's poem above. It is an instance 
that parallels the failing of tools which brings about our 
awareness of their "tool-ness.11 ("The Zeua imposes itself 
upon awareness when it ceases to function, at the moment of 
breakdown." Ronell, 1989, p. 44). 
When Heidegger says that "Language speaks", he does 
more than turn the traditional view of language 
upside-down (Standish, 1992, p. 129). With this statement, 
he establishes the relation between language and the world 
as "the co-occurring of Saying and Worlding" (Singh, 1992, 
p. 91), the original logos. Simultaneously, he destroys the 
presumed priority of man, since man's linguistic activity 
is replicated as a responding to language's saying. In his 
later works, Heidegger clarifies that both language and 
world happen (come into presence), and that man is a 
presencing agent whom Being needs and manipulates. He goes 
a step further in his insistence on the autonomy of 
language and on the predominance of the world over man by 
relegating man to a mere medium, through whose articulation 
language and world come to be. 
What Heidegger wants to achieve in his later work is 
an altered experience of language, freed from the 
categories of Western metaphysics. As Edwards has pointed 
out, Heidegger tried to synthesize the two dominant 
concepts of language in philosophy, namely that of language 
as expression of inner states, and that of language as 
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representation, in which the sign becomes a substitute for 
the thing itself. The latter concept insists on the 
"natural identity" of idea and object, an idea which 
Heidegger criticized mainly for its depiction of human 
consciousness as passive (Edwards, 1990, p. 70). However, 
this is an accusation that he might make of the 
expressionist view as well. For Heidegger, language 
creates, it does not represent reality, just as the symptom 
(to paraphrase Nietzsche) does not represent the disease, 
but is the disease. Language presents reality, or even, is 
reality. For Heidegger, whose aim is not to develop a 
theory of language, these traditional accounts of language 
conceal the primordial truth of language which he wants to 
have reveal itself. 
Rather than establishing a theory of language, he 
wants to "experience language preconceptually" (Edwards, 
1990, p. 86). Implicit in this notion is the uncovering of 
all existing theories. To accomplish this, he has to search 
for the "unthought" (that which traditional philosophical 
accounts have neglected, and which he hopes to find in the 
dif-ference fUnter-schied1 between word and thing). If the 
Unter-schied is the dimension in which the primordial 
experience of language, the logos, is to be found, we first 
and foremost have to clarify what he means by this term. 
In "Der Weg zur Sprache", Heidegger suggests that all 
language begins with naming. This naming must be understood 
218 
as the "primordial" kind of naming that first reveals what 
there is to be named. Primordial naming, says Heidegger, is 
calling, bidding something to come into nearness. The 
naming first reveals the thing to us. 
Das Wesende der(Sprache ist die Sage als die Zeige. 
Deren Zeigen grundet nicht in irgendwelchen Zeichen, 
sondern alle Zeichen entstammen einem Zeigen, in 
dessen Bereich und fur dessen Absichten sie Zeichen 
sein konnen. (Heidegger, 1990b, p. 254) 
The essential being of language is Saying as 
Showing. Its showing character is not based on 
signs of any kind; rather, all signs arise from a 
showing within whose realm and for whose purposes they 
can be signs. 
Here, it becomes clear that language does not pre-exist 
this first naming, but that it is this first naming which 
brings about language. This would also imply that the 
relationships between word and thing are not merely 
arbitrary ones, as Saussure claims. What Heidegger seems to 
say here, is that the relationship exists a priori, but 
that it is only revealed to us by the word, by language. 
On a deeper level, Heidegger claims that language and world 
cannot be separated from one another. They must constitute 
a whole. Saussure would certainly have agreed with this 
claim insofar as he himself calls language a holistic 
system of significant differences. "The dif-ference is 
neither distinction nor relation. The dif-ference is, at 
most, dimension for world and thing." (Heidegger, 1971, p. 
203) 
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Is Heidegger suggesting that there is some primordial 
articulation of things into a world, or words into a 
language, and that the differences of "separateness and 
towardness" must be opened up in order for language to be 
at all? Certainly it is in this dif-ference where we 
encounter the mystery that Heidegger alluded to, and 
which he characterizes as the speaking of language. 
Germane to this notion is the question: How does 
Heidegger proceed to use language as one of the means to 
arrive at his conception of consciousness, which is, in his 
opinion, constituted by language? The answer exists 
dichotomously. In his blatant refusal to accept the meaning 
accorded to words by the tradition of metaphysics (or to 
put it more bluntly, the "common" meaning of words), and 
conversely, in his deconstruction, his etymologyzing, of 
exactly and explicitly these particular words. 
The idea of an etymological deconstruction is mirrored 
in Hannah Arendt's suggestion that metaphors mark the 
relation of things, that they bridge the gap between our 
mental activities and the world of appearances. 
All philosophical terms are metaphors, frozen 
analogies, as it were, whose true meaning discloses 
itself when we dissolve the term into the original 
context, which must have been vividly in the mind of 
the first philosopher to use it. (Arendt, 1971, p. 
104, author's emphasis) 
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The conclusion is realized in a) that our everyday 
concepts are, indeed, dictated by the language that we use, 
and b) that the underlying base, the background of such 
words or expressions, reveal, once we let these words show 
themselves to us, the mode in which we are primordially 
connected to the world. By probing into the background, 
Heidegger achieves what he had set out to accomplish, 
namely to show that the question of Being is answerable by 
heeding our being-in-the-world, that consciousness as he 
defines it, is not self-reflection. It is a sort of 
unconsciousness which is defined by the things present-at-
hand, and, above all, by our language. 
The idea that thought cannot arise without speech is 
similarly expressed by Merleau-Panty when he states that 
"...thought and speech anticipate one another. They 
continually take one another's place," (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964, p. 17). It was Hannah Arendt, however, who built upon 
Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world. In her treatise 
of metaphors, she demonstrates that our language does 
indeed originate out of our bodily concerns with the world 
(She calls it the world of appearances). 
Part 2: Hannah Arendt and the World of the Senses 
In The Life of the Hind, Arendt makes it clear that 
what we find meaningful in the world is located on the 
surface. With this statement, Arendt clarifies her stance 
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concerning the metaphysical tradition. She reminds us that 
traditional Western philosophy has always insisted on the 
distinction between the world of the senses and the world 
of the mind. Based on this presupposition is the assumption 
that the world of "mere appearances" has its groundings and 
its causes in something deeper, in Being. Similarly to 
Heidegger, who spent a lifetime struggling with the 
question for Being, Arendt comes to the conclusion that 
there is no metaphysical Being, but that the world 
manifests itself of its own accord, in the realm of the 
Heideggerian being-in-the-world. 
Arendt dismisses the Cartesian dichotomy of body and 
mind, but she substitutes the Kantian distinction between 
Verstand (intellect) and Vernunft (reason). Similarly to 
Kant, Arendt suggests that the Verstand represents nothing 
more than the scientific quest for empirical knowledge. 
According to her, the intellect is concerned with 
cognition. Reason, on the other hand, occupies itself with 
thinking, which in turn generates meaning. 
The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for 
truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and 
meaning are not the same. (Arendt, 1971, p. 15) 
This is remeniscent of Fichte who claimed that "mere" 
abstract knowledge is in itself meaningless, and can be 
made meaningful only when it is "brought back" to the 
unmediated "I". 
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Arendt suggests that the metaphors we use to speak 
about our psychic life are based on our preconceptual 
bodily experiences. Without a doubt, her work has served as 
a basis for Mark Johnson's theory of embodiment. Johnson 
wants to look into the Background of our common metaphors, 
and, like Heidegger, he aims to unconceal and reveal it and 
establish it as a grounding notion. Thus, Johnson can make 
the following statement: 
A metaphor is not merely a linguistic expression 
(a form of words) used for artistic or rhetorical 
purposes; instead, it is a process of human 
understanding by which we achieve meaningful 
experience that we can make sense of. A metaphor, 
in this "experiental" sense, is a process by which 
we understand and structure one domain of experience 
in terms of another domain of a different kind. 
(Johnson, 1987, p. 15) 
Nevertheless, it is in his notion of moral 
responsibility where Johnson is clearly most indebted to 
Heidegger. He follows a similar path, beginning with the 
act of "responding". If response is not mere reaction, then 
it involves my awareness of myself as a center of force 
capable for action. But since this action presupposes a 
sense of myself, this sense of identity must be grounded in 
preconceptual structures of experience. If I am aware of 
myself as a source of force, if I can say, "I make this 
happen", then the response, which is not to be equated with 
a mere reflex action, becomes the notion of responsibility 
through which I also become aware that I have a choice as 
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to how I will respond. Thus, for Johnson, a development of 
moral responsibility is possible because we "project 
metaphorically from our sense of physical force 
and interactions onto the more abstract, psychological 
realm of moral interactions" (Johnson, 1987, p. 16). 
Thinking in Tension with Being 
When Hannah Arendt talks about the life of the soul, 
it is clear that she refers to what Heidegger has called 
the "first naming." The life of the soul are the 
Heideggerian Gemutsverfassunaen (moods) which constitute 
our facticity. With her insistence on our "moods and 
emotions, whose continual change is in no way different 
from the continual change of our bodily organs" (Arendt, 
1971, p. 32), she foreshadows contemporary cognitive 
science which reduces, or rather equates our emotions to 
chemical processes in the brain. Furthermore, Arendt 
insists that in imagining and remembering, we make present 
that which is physically absent. 
... remembrance, the most frequent and also the most 
basic thinking experience, has to do with things that 
are absent, that have idappeared from my senses. Yet 
the absent that is summoned up and made present to my 
mind - a person, an event, a monument - cannot appear 
in the way it appeared to my senses, as though 
remembreance were a kind of witchcraft. In order to 
appear to my mind only, it must first be de-sensed, 
and the capacity to transform sense-objects into 
images is called "imagination." (Arendt, 1971, 
p. 85) 
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Only by removing myself from the world of appearances and 
of bodily objects, can I come to thinking. However, in 
remembering an object that is no longer present, what 
remains with me is the "basic impression" that I still have 
of it, an impression that was first determined by my moods. 
In connection with this insight, it is of interest to note 
that recent neurophysiological findings situate the 
capacity for memory in the Hypocampus, which is also the 
site for emotions. 
Arendt's notion of "de-sensitizing" brings to mind 
Heidegger's attempt to show that in the act of imagining or 
representing, I have to be physically removed from the 
object I am recalling (Heidegger, 1987). Simultaneously, 
the concept of "de-sensitizing" makes us aware of the 
constant tension that exists constantly in us, best 
exemplified in Hegel's master/slave parable, in which two 
consciousnesses fight for dominance, and in Paul Valery's 
phrase "Tantot je pense et tantot je suis." ("At times I 
think, and at times I am." Valery, 1957, p. 916). 
It follows that in the Kantian realm of apprehension, 
life in its sheer thereness is meaningless. "... no 
experience yields any meaning or even coherence without 
undergoing the operations of imagining and thinking." 
(Arendt, 1971, p. 87). In this realm the senses dominate. 
The soul that Arendt speaks of is located precisely in this 
realm, it is linked to the senses. But the language of the 
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soul, the "first naming", needs to undergo a transformation 
before it can become what we customarily call "language." 
In order to constitute speech, the language of the soul has 
to be translated into metaphors. But Arendt is quick to 
point out that emotions, which constitute the life of the 
soul, can never be expressed. What is expressed in speech 
is what we think we feel. Here, again, we must acknowledge 
that emotions by themselves are meaningless until they 
contain a reflection upon them. Thus, Arendt, like 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, comes to the conclusion that 
language is thinking. 
With this move, Arendt completes the destruction of 
the Cartesian "res cogitans" on the basis that it is a 
"bodiless, senseless creature." (Arendt, 1971, p. 48). 
Simultaneously, she deconstructs the ensuing solipsism of 
the German Idealist tradition which asserted that the self 
is the primary object of knowledge and that nothing exists 
in itself. Going back to Kant, Arendt suggests that the 
concept of the thing-in-itself has value, because our 
common-sense assumption of its existence is based on our 
knowledge that it appears as an independent object to 
others as well. 
Therefore, our common-sense of reality is not subject 
to any doubt. Rather, it is guaranteed by a "threefold 
commonness." (Arendt, 1971, p. 50). First, and foremost it 
is guaranteed by our five senses which, although they 
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perceive of an object in different modes, all have the same 
object in common. In addition, there is the observable fact 
that for all of us the object perceived has the same 
meaning. Lastly the fact that members of other species who 
may perceive of the object very differently from us, agree 
on its identity. The first reason is of importance because, 
from the five senses, Arendt deducts a sixth sense which is 
responsible for letting "reality" appear real to us. The 
sixth sense is thus the Kantian synthesis which unites the 
manifold of the other senses and gives us the impression of 
realness. 
Again, Arendt establishes a dichotomy, this time 
between our thought processes and our "thoughtless" 
common-sense assumptions. While thought processes are 
physically located in the brain, they have no natural 
relation to reality. Common-sense, on the other hand, gives 
us our feeling of realness, and have the "same relation to 
reality as biological evolution to the environment." 
(Arendt, 1971, p. 52). The process of thinking cannot 
divorce itself from the "real" world (since our language is 
made up entirely of metaphors based on physical 
experience), and it follows for Arendt, that the Husserlian 
notion of epoche is nonsensical. On the one hand, due to 
our language, we can never claim a total separation from 
the world of appearances. On the other hand, as she had 
insisted previously, the process of thinking requires that 
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we remove ourselve from the objects present-at-hand, 
otherwise the preoccupation with them would prevent 
thinking. In any case, the method of bracketing the natural 
attitude, or in Arendt's words, the world of appearances 
and the objects around us, is not something that has to be 
learned, but is a natural part of thinking. 
Regarding thinking, Arendt is in full agreement with 
Heidegger that the post-Newtonian era has forgotten its 
meaning. 
Thinking, no doubt, plays an enormous role in every 
scientific enterprise, but it is the role of a means 
to an end; the end is determined by a decision about 
what is worthwhile knowing, and this decision cannot 
be scientific. Moreover, the end is cognition or 
knowledge, which, having been obtained, clearly 
belongs to the world of appearances; once established 
as truth, it becomes part and parcel of the world. 
(Arendt, 1971, p. 54) 
aas Heidegger has pointed out repeatedly, the Ancients 
defined thinking as the preservation of phenomena. We of 
the modern age aim to "discover the hidden apparatus which 
makes them [phenomena] appear." (Arendt, 1971, p. 53). This 
becomes evident in our reliance on technology which we try 
to employ in such a fashion as to force that to appear 
which does not appear of its own accord. It is obvious that 
the Kantian intellect has replaced thinking or reason. The 
intellect tries to make sense of what is given to us by the 
senses (through empirical observation), whereas reason 
tries to understand its meaning. 
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According to Arendt, the philosophers after Kant, 
including Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, had blurred the 
distinction that Kant had made between thought and 
knowledge because they believed that "the result of their 
speculations possessed the same kind of validity as the 
results of cognitive processes" (Arendt, 1971, p. 64), in 
other words, "truth." For those thinkers, it was the end 
result of thinking that mattered. For Heidegger, as well as 
for Arendt, the validity of thinking lies in the thought 
process itself, regardless of its outcome. Thinking, for 
Heidegger, is not propelled by a thirst for knowledge or a 
drive for cognition. It is an activity that is passionate, 
and that belongs to man, simply because he is a thinking 
being. 
Heidegger never thinks "about" something; he thinks 
something. In this entirely uncontemplative activity, 
he penetrates to the depths, but not to discover, let 
alone bring to light, some ultimate, secure 
foundations which one could say had been undiscovered 
earlier in this manner. (Arendt, 1978, p. 293) 
Since thinking undoes its own results, Heidegger felt 
compelled to start anew again and again, as his 
preoccupation with the question for Being shows. Instead of 
aiming for a result, his life's work centers on one 
question, which he approached from a multitude of possible 
angles. Heidegger was aware of the fact that 
229 
the thinking ego, of which I am perfectly conscious so 
long as the thinking activity lasts, will disappear as 
though it were a mere mirage when the real world 
asserts itself again. (Arendt, 1971, p. 75) 
This may be the reason why Arendt is indulgent when it 
comes to his dubious involvement in public life which 
culminated in his membership in the National Socialist 
Party during his rectorship. When Arendt writes that "after 
ten short hectic months ... [the shock of public life] 
drove him back to his residence" (Arendt, 1978, p. 303), 
what she is referring to is the "residence" as that realm 
of the thinker in which the world of appearances is absent. 
Thinking and Time 
The suggestion that in the activity of thinking we are 
removed from the "real" world, brings Arendt to the 
question of where exactly we are when we are thinking. If 
we are not among the things present-at-hand, that is to 
say, in space, then the other realm we must consider is 
that of time. We remember what is no longer present, and we 
anticipate what is not yet. 
Similarly to Heidegger, Arendt condems our common 
conception of time as a continuous, sequential line, going 
into one direction, into infinity. Just as Heidegger was 
unable to imagine the ego outside of time, Arendt 
conjectures that the reason we view time in this sequential 
manner is the fact that we are spatially involved in our 
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world, in which the continuity of our everyday business 
encourages the continuous conception we have of time. 
The sensation of the thinking ego actually involved in 
life takes on a very different form. No longer is the line 
a continuum, but, as Arendt sees it, 
... past and future are antagonistic to each other as 
the no-longer and the not-yet only because of the 
presence of man, who himself has an "origin," his 
birth, and an end, his death, and therefore stands at 
any given moment between them; this in-between is 
called the present. It is the insertion of man with 
his limited life span that transforms the continuously 
flowing stream of sheer change ... into time as we 
know it. (Arendt, 1971, p. 203) 
The thinking ego is thus located in the in-between. 
From one side it is besieged by the past, from the other by 
the future. And the in-between it where he makes its abode, 
its lasting presence where it spends its life. Arendt makes 
it clear the the thinking ego, the Dasein which is 
conscious of its consciousness, must not be confused with 
the self "as it appears and moves in the world, remembering 
its own biographical past," (Arendt, 1978, p. 205). On the 
contrary, her ego is ageless, without a past or a future. 
In short, it is the epitomy of the Hegelian Geist. and it 
is in contradiction with the Heideggerian notion of being-
in-the-world, on which he bases his conception of 
temporality. 
Another issue on which Heidegger is in diagreement 
with many modern thinkers is the role of the will in 
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thinking. Husserl had stressed the intentionality of 
thought, and Nietzsche had spoken of the will to power. 
Contrarily, Heidegger's stress is on Gelassenheit. the 
state of relaxation and serenity in which the thinker 
"stands open" to thoughts. With the concept of receptivity, 
Heidegger sets himself apart from his contemporaries in 
that he negates the importance of the individual, the 
subject. For him, it is the thought that comes to us, it is 
the phenomenon that presents itself, if only we as human 
beings are able to stand open toward it. As Arendt points 
out (1971, p. 122), this immobile state of receptivity is 
characterized by the fact that Heidegger removes himself 
from the metaphor of the eye. Traditionally, the activity 
of thinking has been described with the metaphorical 
activity of seeing. The later Heidegger abandons this 
analogy, and replaces it with the act of hearing. Thus, it 
becomes perfectly plausible why he should define the 
activity of thinking in a passive (receptive) rather than 
in an active manner. Seeing necessitates the active 
involvement of the subject, it involves the Husserlian 
intentionality as well as the Nietzschean will. Contrarily, 
hearing is considered a passive activity. The individual is 
not at liberty to choose between hearing or not hearing, as 
he is in the process of seeing. This lack of choice implies 
the absence of will on the part of the subject, and 
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simultaneously it suggests the autonomy of a "thinking that 
thinks." 
With this idea, the Heideggerian concept of thinking 
comes full circle. With the absence of sight, truth becomes 
invisible. It can no longer rely on the "powerful self-
evidence that forces us to admit the identity of an object 
the moment it is before our eyes." (Arendt, 1971, p. 119). 
Truth is thus not to be found in Arendt's world of 
appearances or in Kant's realm of the intellect. Truth 
discloses itself in the process of thinking which every 
once in a while happens upon a Lichtuna. where it discloses 
itself for us. 
The Death of Thinking 
Unfortunately, as Heidegger points out, our technical 
age has removed us from thinking. Due to the Ge-stell 
(scaffold) which determines our world-view, we are no 
longer even able to view objects as Seiendes (being-as-
objects), but have reached the point where there are only 
resources to be used and consumed. Similarly, knowledge, as 
it is assessed in contemporary society, is no longer even 
an "external object", but has taken on the characteristics 
of a resource, to be used for the perpetuation of the Ge-
stell . 
Sein ist heute Ersetzbarsein. Schon die Vorstellung 
einer "Reparatur" ist zu einem "antiokonomischen" 
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Gedanken geworden. Zu jedem Seienden des Verbrauchs 
gehort wesentlich, dass es schon verbraucht ist und 
somit nach seinem Ersetztwerden ruft. Darin haben wir 
§ine der Formen des Schwundes im 
Uberlieferungsmassigen vor uns, dessen was von 
Generation zu Generation weitergegeben wird. ... 'Auf 
die Zeit bezogen, ergibt dieser Charakter die 
Aktualitat. (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 369) 
Today, being means being replaceable. Even the idea of 
a "repair" has turned into an "anti-economical" 
thought. An aspect of every Being of consumerism is 
that it is already consumed and therefore demands to 
be replaced. We have before us one of the forms of 
loss of transmission, of that which is passed on from 
generation to generation. ... Taken in relation to 
time this characteristic produces the Current 
interest. 
As he had already done in Sein und Zeit, the Heidegger 
of the late sixties still laments the fact that our 
philosophical heritage has taught us to view time in terms 
of the present (which, in its excess, becomes Aktualitat), 
to be replaced at will. The fact that we resist what the 
past might offer us points to our inability to view the 
three temporal dimensions in interaction. Therefore, the 
claim that our age places an abundance of information at 
our fingertips meets on deaf ears because Heidegger would 
counter that the information available to us is just that: 
information, impersonal, external to us, and probably even 
replaceable, depending on the direction that our 
technological advances take us. 
But if all Seiendes is replaceable, it implies that 
our relation to Sein must undergo dramatic changes. 
Heidegger claims that modern man has become a slave to the 
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forgetting of Being (Heidegger, 1986b, p. 370). We, who 
have created technology, are letting ourselves be 
manipulated by our creations, and are not even aware of it 
("UND DASS ER NICHTS DAVON WEISS." Heidegger, 1986b, p. 
369). We substitute Philosophy and Poetry with Cybernetics, 
and we are equally quick to accept information as a 
replacement for knowledge. What we don't know, and what we 
will never be taught by the new disciplines, is the fact 
that we are performing this replacement, since this 
knowledge would not be in their interest. And so the search 
for the foundation of knowledge has been ended by modern 
education which is necessarily a slave to the modern Ge-
stell. The Man has taken over, and as far as Western 
thought is concerned, the fallenness that this take-over 
brings with it is no longer just one mode of Dasein, but 
has consumed it at the expense of all other modes. 
Already in Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen 
Universitat (The Self-Setermination of the German 
University), his speech at the acceptance of the rectorate 
at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger speaks of the 
essence of knowledge, or rather, of the essence of 
Wissenschaft. Despite its often nauseating rhetoric, this 
speech contains an important Heideggerian question, that of 
what constitutes knowledge in out modern age. Although a 
perfectly acceptable translation into English is the 
commonly used term "science", the more elaborate "science 
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of knowledge" would be more appropriate, since Heidegger 
does not limit himself to the Naturwissenschaften (natural 
sciences), but places the Geisteswissenschaften (spiritual 
sciences) above the former. That he does not want to speak 
about science in a "contemporary manner", he makes clear in 
the statement that comes as close to a definition as any 
Heideggerian elaboration does: 
Alle Wissenschaft ist Philosophie, mag sie es wissen 
und wollen - oder nicht. Alle Wissenschaft bleibt 
jenem Anfang der Philosophie verhaftet. Aus ihm 
schopft sie die Kraft ihres Wesens, gesetzt, dass sie 
diesem Anfang uberhaupt noch gewachsen bleibt. 
(Heidegger, 1990a, p. 11) 
All science is philosophy, may science know that and 
want it - or not. All science remains tied to that 
beginning of philosophy. From that beginning it gains 
the power of its essence, that is, if it can still 
live up to the power of its essence. 
The beginning that Heidegger speaks of is the Logos. 
through which man can, for the first time, come up against, 
question, and understand the Seiendes im Ganzen (the Being 
in its entirety, Heidegger, 1990a, p. 11). Contrary to 
contemporary notions of "science", this original Greek 
science had as its goal to come as close as possible to 
Being by means of "theory". What is important -and 
certainly contrary to any modern notion of science - is the 
fact that "in the beginning", 
Nicht stand ihr Sinn danach, die Praxis der Theorie 
anzugleichen, sondern umgekehrt, die Theorie selbst 
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als die hochste Verwirklichung echter Praxis zu 
verstehen. (Heidegger, 1990a, p. 12) 
It did not aim to adapt praxis to theory, but vice 
versa, to consider theory itself as the highest 
realization (materialization) of true praxis. 
For the Pre-Socratics, science did not merely serve as the 
means to bring into consciousness that which is 
unconscious. Rather, science is seen as the power which 
engulfs the entirety of Dasein. Science and knowledge imply 
a persistent questioning for that which is concealed. 
... dieses Wissen ist uns nicht die beruhigte 
Kenntnisnahme von Wesenheiten und Werten an sich, 
sondern die scharfste Gef&hrdung des Daseins inmitten 
der Ubermacht des Seienden. (Heidegger, 1990a, p. 12) 
... for us this knowledge is not the calm 
acknowledgment of essences and values in themselves, 
but it is the biggest threat to Dasein in the midst of 
the predominance of that which is (of being). 
In contrast to modern science and modern education, 
knowledge and, above all, thinking, is a constant 
questioning, not the answer to any of those questions. 
Therefore, the rectorate-speech must be seen as an 
elucidation on the essence of knowledge and of science. 
Simultaneously, it constitutes a warning against what 
Heidegger considered the ultimate decline of knowledge and 
of the German University system: the move from the 
dangerous and uncertain realm of the Weltungewissheit 
(world-uncertainty) in which a common questioning must 
persist, into the realm of the certainty of modern science 
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in which ready-made answers are valued above anything else. 
It is obvious that the warning was not heeded, for the 
German University has since undergone a turn which has 
brought about the forgetting of thinking that Heidegger 
spoke of, and has instead elected to celebrate the results 
of scientific investigations. 
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY 
Anxiety - Angst (Heidegger) 
existential anxiety caused by our awareness of our 
temporal limitations. 
(compare Kierkagaard's fear) 
Apperception - Wahrnehmung (Fichte) 
(second level of consciousness); perception of 
phenomena and/or objects. Limited by our physical 
senses, (compare Kant's apprehension) 
Apprehension - Sinnlichkeit (Kant) 
(Fist level of consciousness); most basic faculty of 
the mind. Our capacity to be affected by sensations. 
Apprehension makes possible the contemplation of 
objects. 
(compare Fichte's apperception) 
Being - das Sein (Fichte and Heidegger) 
The force that makes being possible and brings it 
about. 
being - das Seiende (Heidegger) 
That which exists within Being. 
Body - Leib (Heidegger) 
the "I" of the guestioner as opposed to the "body" 
of traditional philosophy which is juxtaposed with 
"mind". 
Categories - Kateaorien (Kant) 
forms of understanding. Rules which determine the 
manner in which we are able to think. 
Clearing - Lichtuna (Heidegger) 
the moment and/or the place in which we achieve 
consciousness. 
Concept - Beariff 
Kant: A priori to the experience of external objects. 
Prerequisite for knowledge. 
Fichte: The result of the activity of thinking. Makes 
possible the move from apperception to abstract 
thought. 
Kierkegaard: Vocation or calling of man that requires 
him to act in ways that are true to it. 
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Dasein (Fichte and Heidegger) 
the identity of the questioner; the "I" of 
phenomenological inquiry. - The individual as it is 
involved in existence. 
Epoche (Husserl) 
The act of temporarily bracketing or suspending our 
prejudices. (Prejudices in the sense of cultural 
baggage). 
Facticity - Faktizitkt (Heidegger) 
the fact that we find ourselves part of the world; 
characterized by our moods. 
Fallenness - das Fallen (Heidegger) 
our absorption with things alongside of us and with 
routines. 
Form (Kant and Fichte) 
Stable entity given by an individual's 
mind. Makes a priori knowledge possible. Not dependent 
on experience. 
Intellect - Verstand (Kant) 
Often translated as "understanding". 
(Second level of consciousness); makes possible the 
thinking of objects. 
Intuition - Anschauung 
Kant: pre-conceptual data produced by the faculties of 
the mind, not by experience; makes a priori 
knowledge possible. 
Fichte: (First level of consciousness); pre-conceptual 
data determined and modified by physical senses. 
Knowledge - das Wissen (Fichte and Heidegger) 
characterized as a skill rather than an accumulation 
of facts. 
Logos (Heidegger) 
The primordial unity of world and language, ("the word 
is the thing") 
das Han (Heidegger) 
the anonymous "they" which dictates our notions of 
Self, (compare Kierkegaard's comparative self) 
The manifold - das Manniafaltiae (Kant) 
a variety of data (impressions) contained in 
intuition. 
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Matter - Materie (Kant), Stoff (Fichte) 
External object or phenomenon as created by the mind. 
Moment - Auaenblick (Heidegger) 
A point in time at which phenomena present themselves. 
A point in time in which the three temporal dimensions 
meet. 
Permutation - Verschmelzunq (Fichte) 
the unity of self-knowledge, awareness of external 
objects, and thinking. 
(compare Heidegger's primordial unity or Logos) 
present-at-hand - vorhanden (Heidegger) 
objects alongside of us. 
present-to-hand - zuhanden (Heidegger) 
objects that are characterized by the use we make of 
them. 
Reason - Vernunft (Kant) 
(third and highest level of consciousness); produces 
the acknowledgment of the limitations of the 
categories. 
Reflexation - Reflexion (Fichte) 
(highest level of consciousness); amalgamation of 
abstract thought and the knowledge that there is an 
"I". 
Self-reflection - Selbstanschauung (Hegel) 
subject-object relationship. Consciousness makes 
itself the object. 
Sorge (Heidegger) 
concern for the world of which we are a part. 
Synthesis - Synthese (Kant) 
the act of ordering the variety of data supplied to 
and by the mind. 
The thing-in-itself - die Sache selbst (Kant) 
assumed existence of objects independent of our mind. 
Thinking - denken (Fichte) 
process; the activity of bringing something into 
awareness. 
Thrownness - Geworfenheit (Heidegger) 
the acknowledgment that we have been placed into this 
world without our will. 
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Tools - Zeua (Heidegger) 
Objects which we use in a pre-reflective manner. 
Transcendental Apperception - Transzendentale Anschauuna 
(Kant) 
an unmediated, unified "I" which is prior to 
intuition. Unity of subject and object. 
Understanding - das Verstehen (Heidegger) 
characterized by "knowing how" rather than "knowing 
that." 
Unity - Einheit (Kant) 
the result of the act of synthesis. 
Vergegenwartigung (Heidegger) 
Used in the sense of imagination. Bringing that into 
presence which is absent. Generally translated as re­
presentation. 
